Levent Kenez/Stockholm
A Turkish government-linked intelligence report suggests that the rise of the far right in Germany could create an unexpected strategic opportunity for Ankara, potentially increasing Turkey’s importance to Berlin as European security concerns and economic interests begin to outweigh political differences over democracy, human rights and European Union membership. The assessment portrays Germany’s political transformation as a development that could push Turkey further outside Europe’s cultural and political identity while bringing Ankara closer to the center of its security calculations.
The 34-page report, titled “The Far Right in Germany: The Representation Crisis of Liberal Democracy,” was published in September by the National Intelligence Academy, an institution affiliated with Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT). Authored by Baki Laleoğlu, the study examines the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and its potential consequences for German democracy, European integration and relations with Turkey. Rather than treating the far right exclusively as a threat, the document explores how Germany’s changing political environment could produce a more pragmatic relationship with Ankara.
One of the report’s central findings concerns the contradictory position of the AfD toward Turkey. Although the party rejects Turkey’s culturally belonging to Europe and opposes its EU membership, it simultaneously recognizes the country as an important strategic and economic partner. Citing the AfD’s 2025 federal election program, the report argues that this distinction could become increasingly influential as nationalist and culturally exclusionary positions gain wider acceptance in German politics. Turkey, according to the assessment, could become more valuable to Europe precisely as its prospects for political integration diminish.
The report suggests that the political significance of Turkey’s EU membership perspective could weaken further if positions traditionally associated with the far right become more established within Germany’s mainstream political parties. It also argues that EU membership, although still an official Turkish objective, has already lost much of its traditional importance in Turkish foreign policy. Instead of pursuing closer relations primarily through European integration, the two sides could increasingly focus on specific areas of cooperation, including trade, energy, migration, security and the management of regional crises.
The academy also presents a potentially consequential shift in Germany’s approach to Turkey’s domestic political system. It characterizes Berlin’s past emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and freedom of expression as unilateral, problematic and subjective, arguing that such disputes have repeatedly damaged bilateral relations. As Germany’s liberal-democratic political center weakens and foreign policy becomes more focused on national interests, the report suggests that these issues could carry less weight in relations with Ankara.
Such a transformation would not necessarily eliminate disagreements between the two governments, the document acknowledges. It could, however, create a more functional relationship organized around areas of mutual interest rather than political values or Turkey’s European integration. The assessment does not identify the shift as an established German policy decision but presents it as a possible consequence of the normalization of far-right and sovereignty-centered politics.
Security cooperation occupies a particularly important place in the report’s projections. Russia’s war against Ukraine, instability in the Middle East and uncertainty surrounding the United States’ role in European defense have accelerated discussions about strengthening Europe’s independent military capabilities. The report argues that these developments make Turkey’s military strength, defense industry and geographical position increasingly valuable, regardless of European political objections to Turkey’s cultural identity.
The study refers to the July 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, where German Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasized the need to increase Europe’s responsibility within the alliance. Merz also had bilateral talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the summit. The academy interprets these developments as evidence that discussions about European strategic autonomy and defense capabilities are becoming increasingly difficult to separate from Turkey’s role in regional security.
This creates what the report describes as a fundamental contradiction in Europe’s emerging political direction. Nationalist movements may seek to define Europe more narrowly in cultural terms, while the continent’s efforts to reduce its security dependence on Washington require cooperation with a country possessing significant military capabilities and regional influence. The academy questions how Europe could organize its security without Turkey at the same time that arguments excluding the country from European identity gain political acceptance.
Economic relations present another obstacle to any broader political separation between Germany and Turkey. Germany remains one of Turkey’s most important trading partners, while Turkish manufacturing and supply chains are closely integrated with European markets. The report acknowledges that economic nationalism could produce protectionist or more selective trade policies but argues that existing commercial ties make a complete rupture less plausible than a relationship increasingly governed by calculations of costs and benefits.
The academy’s assessment therefore challenges the assumption that the strengthening of nationalist politics in Germany would necessarily weaken Ankara’s bilateral position. While cultural and political differences could deepen, the report suggests that mutual economic dependence and strategic necessity may prevent those differences from determining the overall relationship. It concludes that Turkey could become an increasingly critical partner for Germany and Europe even as political resistance to its European identity grows.
The potential advantages for Ankara are accompanied by significant concerns about Germany’s population of individuals of Turkish descent. The academy warns that the normalization of far-right positions could deepen the distinction between legal citizenship and cultural belonging, leaving people of Turkish descent facing questions about whether they are genuinely accepted as members of German society. It identifies second and third-generation citizens as particularly vulnerable to a political environment in which formal German citizenship may no longer be treated as sufficient evidence of national belonging.
The report points to the AfD’s position on Islam as an example of this tension. Although the party’s programs affirm freedom of religion and conscience, they also reject Islam as part of Germany’s cultural identity and advocate restrictions concerning mosque financing, the status of imams and Islamic organizations. The academy argues that such positions could contribute to the institutionalization of anti-Muslim discrimination if they become normalized beyond the party itself.
Dual citizenship, family reunification, naturalization requirements and continuing political or cultural connections with foreign countries are identified as additional areas of potential conflict. The study warns that treating these issues increasingly as security concerns could weaken the sense of belonging among German citizens of Turkish descent. It also cautions that policies intended to enforce integration could instead deepen alienation and social polarization.
Beyond the bilateral relationship, the academy offers a broader interpretation of the AfD’s political success. It argues that the party’s rise is not primarily the cause of Germany’s democratic difficulties but a consequence of longstanding failures of political representation and legitimacy. The report links the AfD’s strength, particularly in eastern Germany, to grievances surrounding reunification, industrial decline, perceived cultural marginalization and distrust of established political institutions.
Of particular relevance to relations with Turkey is the report’s argument that the AfD does not need to enter the federal government to influence German policy. Mainstream parties seeking to recover voters from the far right could adopt more restrictive positions on immigration, national identity and sovereignty, gradually changing the boundaries of acceptable political debate. The academy argues that attempts to contain the far right through party bans or political isolation alone would not address the deeper conditions that sustain its appeal.
The study ultimately presents Germany’s political transformation as a development with competing consequences for Turkish interests. Ankara could gain strategic importance as Europe seeks greater defense autonomy and more practical partnerships, while communities of Turkish origin in Germany could face growing challenges over identity, citizenship and social acceptance.
