Levent Kenez/Stockholm
Turkey recorded higher immigration and lower emigration in 2025 compared to the previous year, according to official data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). However, despite these shifts, total departures still exceeded arrivals, resulting in a continued net outflow of population.
TurkStat on June 24, 2026, said that 393,829 people immigrated to Turkey in 2025, an increase of 25.2 percent over the previous year. Of these arrivals, 301,877 were foreign nationals and 91,952 were Turkish citizens returning or relocating to the country.
During the same period, 403,216 people emigrated from Turkey, a 5 percent decline compared with 2024. Among those leaving 248,097 were foreign nationals and 155,119 were Turkish citizens. The data show that Turkey continues to experience high levels of population mobility in both directions, with departures still exceeding arrivals in absolute terms.
TurkStat defines the foreign population as individuals having valid residence permits, work permits or equivalent legal status, along with Blue Card holders who previously renounced Turkish citizenship under official procedures. The people who are in temporary or humanitarian protection regimes are recorded separately by other government agencies. As a result, Turkey’s migration picture is divided between residence-based foreign population statistics, short-term mobility data and separate protection-based registries.
One of the largest components of this parallel system is the temporary protection regime administered by the Directorate General of Migration Management. It was introduced after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and has become one of the largest long-term displacement systems in the world. Official data show the Syrian population under temporary protection increased from 14,237 in 2012 to 3,737,369 in 2021. According to Turkish authorities, the number of Syrians in the country stood at 2,259,034 as of June 18, 2026.
The long-term presence of this population has reshaped labor markets, urban demographics and housing demand in major cities, particularly İstanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay and Şanlıurfa.
At the same time, Syrian workers have become a significant part of Turkey’s labor market, particularly in sectors that rely on low-wage and flexible employment. Agriculture, construction and manufacturing are among the areas where Syrian labor is widely present, often in informal arrangements that are not fully captured in official employment statistics.
In rural areas labor shortages have been reported in activities such as harvesting, animal husbandry and seasonal farm work. In some cases Turkish employers have pointed to difficulties in finding workers for tasks requiring continuous physical presence, including livestock care and shepherding in agricultural regions. Syrian workers have filled much of this demand. Turkey’s Interior Ministry took a radical step last week regarding the employment of Syrians under temporary protection status. In an effort to support the registered economy and regulate the labor market, the requirement for obtaining work permit documentation for Syrian workers has been completely abolished, moving instead to an exemption-based system.
Turkey’s demographic decline has become more pronounced following newly released official statistics showing the country’s fertility rate falling to 1.42 children per woman. The figure is well below the replacement level and adds pressure on long-term projections for the size of the labor force, the sustainability of economic growth and the pace of population aging in a country where the working-age population has been a key driver of expansion for decades. The decline has put renewed focus on migration as a structural component of Turkey’s labor supply.
Demographic data on refugee populations indicate that Syrian households have a younger age structure compared with the national average, with higher fertility rates contributing to a slower rate of demographic aging within that group. This difference has reinforced the long-term scale of the Syrian population in Turkey, even as overall numbers have gradually declined from their peak in the early 2020s.
Resistance to forcing Syrians to return home from small and medium-sized business circles close to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has deterred the government from implementing stricter enforcement measures. Furthermore, Erdogan’s gradual naturalization of Syrians over time serves as a strategic move to build a sympathetic voter base for himself and his ruling party. According to Ministry of Interior data, as of November 2023 the number of Syrians who had acquired Turkish citizenship stood at 237,995, with this number steadily increasing.
At the same time migration policy has also reflected cultural and regional selectivity in broader inflows. Turkey has shown comparatively open conditions for migration from culturally and linguistically closer regions, particularly Central Asia and other Turkic republics, where mobility ties, education links and labor market integration are already well established. Migration from these countries has formed a significant share of recent inflows, reflecting both geographic proximity and longstanding regional networks that facilitate movement into Turkey’s urban labor markets.
Additional reforms target foreign entrepreneurs and location-independent professionals through tax arrangements linked to investment zones and financial centers, including incentives associated with Istanbul’s role as a regional financial hub.
Taken together, Turkey’s migration framework increasingly combines three distinct elements: long-term humanitarian protection, labor-oriented migration embedded in domestic industries and investment-driven mobility policies aimed at attracting capital and skilled individuals.
The composition of foreign immigration in 2025 reflects strong regional concentration. Citizens of Turkmenistan accounted for 23.4 percent of foreign immigrants, followed by Azerbaijan at 8.3 percent, Uzbekistan at 6.9 percent, Egypt at 6.1 percent and Afghanistan at 5.8 percent.
Emigration patterns show a similar regional structure. Iraqi citizens made up 15.7 percent of foreign departures, followed by Afghans at 11.2 percent, Russians at 7.6 percent, Iranians at 6.3 percent and Turkmen citizens at 5.7 percent. These flows reflect both economic conditions and shifting residence patterns among neighboring countries.
Migration remains heavily concentrated in a small number of provinces. Istanbul received 42.2 percent of all immigrants in 2025, followed by Antalya with 9.1 percent, Ankara with 6.7 percent, Izmir with 3.1 percent and Bursa with 2.9 percent. Istanbul also accounted for 35.4 percent of emigrants, followed by Ankara, Antalya, Mersin and Izmir.
Age distribution data indicate that migration is dominated by younger adults. Individuals aged 20 to 24 accounted for 16.3 percent of immigrants, followed by those aged 25 to 29 at 13.7 percent and 30 to 34 at 11.5 percent. Among emigrants, the largest group was aged 25 to 29, representing 14.3 percent, followed by 20 to 24 at 12.5 percent and 30 to 34 at 12 percent.
