Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
A restructured secret cell operating in Turkey and linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terror network, has connections to a cell in Sweden, according to a statement of a detained suspect who smuggled ISIS members into Europe.
Mijbel al-Shuwaikhi, an Iraqi national who registered as a refugee in Turkey in 2017, disclosed to a Turkish prosecutor in Istanbul that the ISIS cell operating in Sweden is led by an individual known as Ebu Ubayde (Abu Obaida). He further revealed that this Swedish cell, named after its leader, is referred to as the Abu Obaida Brigade within the ranks of ISIS leadership
Shuwaikhi apparently learned this information from his handler in Syria, known by the nom de guerre of Ebu Teyibe (Abu Tayyiba), a senior ISIS leader. Ebu Teyibe entrusted Shuwaikhi with these details due to his role in smuggling ISIS members into Europe via Turkey and Greece. A member of the Swedish ISIS cell reportedly reached out to Shuwaikhi to re-establish contact after the cell members had been released in Turkey and lost their connection to the broader ISIS network.
Al-Shuwaikhi, who operated under the assumed name of Abu Yaqin al-Iraqi, joined ISIS in 2015 and relocated to Turkey two years later, after sustaining injuries to his arms and legs in an aerial strike. In his refugee application, he listed his date of birth as May 2, 1991, identified his birthplace as the Ninawah region of Iraq and provided his parents’ names as Fatuma Atallah and Salman Ali. He settled in Turkey’s Sakarya province, where he was issued identity papers and a foreign national ID, enabling him to access public services and establish a business.
According to an intelligence document dated December 20, 2023 obtained by Nordic Monitor, the counterterrorism department of the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet) identified Al-Shuwaikhi as an operative within the ISIS intelligence unit under Halid Hleyf (also known as Abu Maad al-Shimali and Yaqoob al-Muhajereen), the former leader of the Turkish ISIS branch, after his relocation to Turkey.
After operating for seven years in Turkey with little difficulty, Al-Shuwaikhi was arrested following an ISIS attack on the Church of Santa Maria (Meryem Ana Doğuş Kilisesi) in Istanbul’s Sarıyer district on January 28, 2024, which resulted in one fatality. He was part of a surveillance team that scouted potential targets in Istanbul prior to the attack, providing information, videos and photographs to his ISIS commander, Abu Obaida. Al-Shuwaikhi received $2,000 for this service.
ISIS member Mijbel al-Shuwaikhi detailed the terror network’s cell in Sweden and explained how smuggling operations connect the Turkish and Swedish ISIS cells:
To benefit from a reduced sentence under Turkey’s so-called repentance law, Al-Shuwaikhi disclosed details of ISIS operations in Turkey, Syria and Europe, sharing his knowledge with Turkish authorities.
Al-Shuwaikhi stated that he served as a mid-level leader for the Salman the Persian Brigade (Selman-ı Farisi Taburu in Turkish), a Turkish branch of ISIS originally known as the ISIS Damascus Province.
According to another intelligence document obtained by Nordic Monitor, ISIS renamed the group Ukasha ibn Mihsan (Ukkaşe Bin Mihsan Taburu, UBMT) in August 2022 and later rebranded it the Salman Persian Brigade (SFT) in September 2022.
The connection between the Turkish ISIS cell and Sweden focuses on their joint efforts to free captive ISIS fighters and their families from camps in Syria. Their operations involve moving these individuals to neighboring countries, primarily Turkey, and then facilitating transport to Europe via Greece.
In addition to carrying out temporary assignments, such as scouting and target identification, Al-Shuwaikhi primarily served as the leader of an ISIS smuggling unit in Istanbul, enabling the transport of ISIS members to Europe. He commanded a five-member ISIS team identified only by their assumed names: Mahmoud, Ahmad al-Jamili, Abu Aisham, Abu al-Nour and Abu Sara (Abu Sahran).
ISIS also operates a second smuggling cell within the SFT, based in Ankara and led by an individual identified only by his assumed name, Abdul Razzaq (also known as Emni or Amin). The Ankara cell consists of seven members: Abu Ahmad al-Iraqi, Enes al-Muhajeer, Enes, Abu Abdallah al-Jamili, Abu Ahmad, Aws, and Waddah, all of which appear to be code names.
Al-Shuwaikhi stated that he never met Abdul Razzaq in person, but they communicated through the Telegram application to coordinate smuggling operations. According to Al-Shuwaikhi, an ISIS member identified as Abdullah Şami (Abdallah Shami), who has been residing in Sweden, contacted Abdul Razzaq to inquire about a new communication protocol for ISIS members who had been detained in Turkey for their affiliation with the SFT but were later released.
It is noteworthy that ISIS members released by Turkish authorities reached out to an ISIS operative in Sweden to reestablish contact with the ISIS network in Turkey when they were unable to find a connection locally. This indicates close cooperation between the Turkish and Swedish cells within the ISIS network and suggests the presence of ISIS members familiar with both operations in the two countries.
The Swedish ISIS cell appears to have taken its name from the group’s leader, Abu Obaida, whose true identity remains a mystery. According to information relayed to Al-Shuwaikhi by his ISIS commander in Syria, four members of this group are currently under arrest. However, it is unclear from Al-Shuwaikhi’s statement whether the imprisoned Swedish ISIS members are held in Syria, Sweden or Turkey.
ISIS is known to be active in Sweden, with an estimated 300 individuals traveling to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters to join ISIS and al-Qaeda between 2012 and 2016, according to a study published by the Swedish Defense University in 2017. There are estimates suggesting that the actual number may be even higher.
A Turkish intelligence report on Mijbel al-Shuwaikhi indicates that Turkish authorities identified him as an ISIS intelligence operative:
ISIS demonstrated its capability to stage an attack in the heart of Stockholm in April 2017, resulting in the deaths of five people. Rahmat Akilov, an Uzbek national and asylum seeker whose application had been rejected, stole a truck and drove it into a busy street in downtown Stockholm. He was inspired by ISIS propaganda and ideology.
He was certainly not the only individual drawn to ISIS ideology, raising concerns about the potential for lone-wolf attacks on behalf of the terror organization. In January 2016, Swedish Security Service officers arrested Aydin Sevigin, a 20-year-old Swedish national whose parents are from Turkey and Iran, for plotting a terror attack by attempting to build a homemade bomb. Frustrated by his unsuccessful attempts to travel to Syria through Turkey to join ISIS, Sevigin is believed to have been committed to executing a terror attack on Swedish soil. He was sentenced to five years in prison in 2016.
The terror threat in Sweden, as well as a threat against Swedish interests abroad, remains high. The Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen, SÄPO) annual assessment report for 2023-2024 indicated that Sweden has become a designated target for violent Islamist terror following a Qur’an-burning incident in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm in January 2023
“The strong reactions that followed marked the start of a year in which Sweden went from being a legitimate to a designated target for violent Islamist extremism. Sweden remains in a deteriorated situation with a high terrorist threat level,” the report stated.
Swedish intelligence services believe that external actors, including hostile foreign states, are intent on exploiting these risks to undermine Sweden’s security.
“Violent extremists exploit troubled times to spread distrust, especially online. This may affect lone actors or groups to move from thought to action, sometimes guided by actors abroad. Such developments are exploited by foreign powers,” said Charlotte von Essen, head of SÄPO, at the launch of the annual report.
In contrast to Sweden, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist government in Turkey has taken a more lenient approach to cracking down on ISIS networks. Most ISIS detainees are quickly released within the Turkish criminal justice system, while the Turkish National Intelligence Agency, MIT, has been known to collaborate with certain factions of ISIS in the past to advance the political objectives of the Erdogan government, both domestically and abroad.
