Abdullah Bozkurt / Stockholm
A secret blacklist maintained by the Turkish Union of Notaries (Türkiye Noterler Birliği, TNB) has been used for years at the request of the authoritarian government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to harass and intimidate critics by blocking their access to basic notary services. A newly obtained document shows that this covert system has now been exported abroad, extending Turkey’s domestic repression into foreign jurisdictions.
A confidential document obtained by Nordic Monitor confirms for the first time that the internal registry, known as the “sakıncalılar listesi,” literally “the list of objectionable persons,” is being implemented outside Turkey, including at Turkish consulates in the United States. The specific case detailed in the document involves the Turkish Consulate General in New York and a New Jersey resident of Turkish origin.
Individuals placed on the blacklist, including journalists, academics, businesspeople and human rights defenders, are effectively barred from obtaining powers of attorney or completing notarial transactions at Turkish consulates abroad. The registry also includes foreign nationals.
For years victims in Turkey and overseas reported being turned away by notaries or consular officials without explanation. Some were told that computer systems were down at consulates, while others were informed that their names appeared as restricted “in the system” at notary offices inside Turkey.
The existence of the sakıncalılar listesi was eventually acknowledged domestically after complaints were filed with Turkey’s Ombudsman’s Office and after opposition lawmakers raised the issue in parliament. However, its extraterritorial application by Turkish consulates was never officially admitted, likely due to concerns that such practices would expose the Erdogan government to accusations of exporting persecution abroad and potentially violating international diplomatic norms, including the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
A Turkish government document reveals that the blacklist was used at the Turkish Consulate General in New York and references a communiqué sent by the consulate to headquarters in Turkey (Redactions were made by Nordic Monitor to protect private and sensitive information.):
The newly uncovered document, dated November 10, 2025, is signed by Ankara-based police chief Engin Aydın. It references an information note transmitted to his office by the Turkish Consulate General in New York concerning a Turkish resident of New Jersey. Attached documents provide further detail, showing that the individual visited the New York consulate seeking a power of attorney to pursue legal matters in Turkey through legal representation.
According to the document, the consular officer denied the request after determining that the individual’s name appeared on the TNB-maintained blacklist. The denial was reported immediately to authorities in Turkey and later circulated among multiple government agencies.
Turkish citizens living abroad are required to obtain powers of attorney from Turkish consulates for those documents to be recognized as legally valid in Turkey. Powers of attorney issued through foreign notaries are frequently rejected by Turkish authorities, effectively forcing expatriates to rely on consular services. As a result, denial of notary services at consulates has severe legal and practical consequences.
The New Jersey resident mentioned in the document is alleged by Turkish authorities to be affiliated with the Gülen movement, a faith-based civic group critical of the Erdoğan government on issues ranging from systemic corruption to Ankara’s support of radical jihadist groups. The movement, active for decades in education, interfaith dialogue and community development, has faced an unprecedented crackdown since 2013, after its late spiritual leader, Fethullah Gülen, refused to endorse Erdogan’s increasingly radical Islamist agenda and openly criticized abuses of power.
The sakıncalılar listesi, formally known as the Sakıncalı Bilgi Girişi Programı, is operated through a centralized digital system controlled by the TNB. It was created in 2016, specifically to target Gülen movement supporters, though it was later expanded to include other groups. It was guided by internal correspondence from the Justice Ministry’s General Directorate for Legal Affairs (Hukuk İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü), which is under the strict control of the executive branch.
Two key letters sent by the Justice Ministry to the TNB on August 18, 2016, and September 6, 2016, laid out how the blacklist should function. While the second letter partially softened the restrictions by stating that routine notarial transactions unrelated to asset transfers should still be allowed, in practice the TNB imposed a blanket ban on most transactions. Notaries and consular officials routinely refuse services to avoid potential retaliation from the government for facilitating transactions for critics or opponents.
Once an individual’s identity is entered into the system, the person is automatically flagged across the nationwide notary network including at Turkish consulates abroad. When a flagged individual seeks notarial services, the system generates a warning for the notary or consular officer, who then decides whether to proceed. In practice, the warning almost always results in refusal to issue powers of attorney or conduct other notarial acts.
The system contains no automatic removal mechanism. The TNB requires a formal lifting decision to be transmitted directly by the relevant court or prosecutor. In most cases, Turkish authorities do not bother to notify the TNB when restrictions are lifted. Even when victims submit certified court decisions proving their removal, the TNB routinely refuses to act, allowing restrictions to persist long after restrictive measures have been terminated.
Critics say the structure amounts to a de facto administrative blacklist with serious legal consequences. Individuals are not formally notified when they are listed, have no direct right to challenge their inclusion and are left to the discretion of notaries, who tend to deny transactions to avoid legal or political risk.
The overbroad application of the blacklist has blocked access to legal representation and routine civil transactions, transforming what authorities initially described as temporary security measures into long-term administrative punishment without due process.
The consequences are even more severe for Turkish citizens living abroad. Human rights advocates say the Erdogan government uses the TNB blacklist as a tool to intimidate critics in the diaspora by leveraging essential notary services as a form of pressure and blackmail.
By blocking access to powers of attorney, the blacklist prevents individuals from hiring lawyers, managing property, selling assets, handling inheritance matters, running businesses, maintaining subscriptions or authorizing family members to act on their behalf. Legal experts describe the practice as unlawful and arbitrary.
An official communiqué issued by a Turkish police chief details the use of the blacklist at the Turkish Consulate General in New York in the case of a Turkish man residing in New Jersey (Redactions were made by Nordic Monitor to protect private and sensitive information.):
Multiple victims have reported being denied notary services at Turkish diplomatic missions and consulates worldwide, indicating that the blacklist is shared with consulates and enforced extraterritorially. The newly obtained document confirms this for the first time, showing that many exiles are effectively barred from managing legal and financial affairs in Turkey because of their political views.
Legal experts say the secret blacklist violates multiple provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which Turkey is bound.
At its core, the practice interferes with access to justice under Article 6. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently ruled that the right to legal representation must be practical and effective, not theoretical. In Airey v. Ireland (1979), the court held that administrative barriers preventing individuals from pursuing legal remedies violate Article 6. Blocking powers of attorney effectively prevents individuals from instructing lawyers or accessing courts.
The blacklist also interferes with property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In Beyeler v. Italy (2000), the court ruled that any interference with property must be lawful, foreseeable and accompanied by procedural safeguards. The secret denial of notary services without legal basis, notice or appeal fails all three tests.
In addition, the practice violates Article 8, which protects private and family life. Preventing individuals from authorizing relatives to act on their behalf directly interferes with family relations and personal autonomy.
Equally serious is the absence of any effective remedy, in violation of Article 13. Victims are not informed of their inclusion on the list, cannot challenge it before an independent authority and have no meaningful administrative appeal mechanism.
If, as evidence suggests, the blacklist disproportionately targets journalists, dissidents and government critics, it also raises concerns under Article 14, which prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of convention rights.
The exposure of the sakıncalılar listesi adds to mounting evidence that the Erdogan government has weaponized administrative systems to silence dissent. Beyond criminal prosecutions, arrest warrants and travel bans, secret bureaucratic controls allow the state to punish opponents quietly, without judicial oversight or public accountability. The TNB’s black list system sets a dangerous precedent by turning professional regulatory bodies into instruments of political repression.
As long as the blacklist remains in operation, critics say, Turkish citizens, particularly those living abroad, remain vulnerable to a silent but powerful form of state retaliation that strips them of fundamental civil rights.
