Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
Iran has been expanding its diplomatic and consular presence across Turkey by acquiring and constructing additional properties, a move facilitated by the favorable stance of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pro-Iran government, which has granted greater latitude to Iran’s intelligence and terror-sponsoring networks.
After decades of Iranian attempts to establish a significant presence of diplomatic missions in Turkey —efforts that were previously unsuccessful due to lingering security concerns and unresolved reciprocity issues — the mullah regime finally secured an agreement with the Erdogan government on June 15, 2020. This memorandum of understanding (MoU) allows the Iranian government to purchase and construct new properties or renovate and expand existing buildings with staff awarded full diplomatic or consular immunity, exempt from any taxes or fees.
The Iranian regime is notorious for using its embassy and consular compounds to support terrorism and intelligence activities around the world. It often deploys operatives, particularly agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, to diplomatic posts to conceal their identities and exploit diplomatic privileges and immunity while conducting clandestine operations.
Between 2011 and 2014 a counterterrorism investigation in Turkey exposed multiple Iranian operatives working under diplomatic cover at the Iranian embassy and consulates. For instance, a leading suspect in the case, Behnam Shahriyar (also known as Seyed Ali Ekber Mirvakili), was under US sanctions for terror financing. The investigation revealed that he had been in close contact with senior government officials, including Hakan Fidan, who was the intelligence chief at the time and is currently foreign minister.
The Erdogan government unlawfully intervened in the case, derailing the entire investigation and allowing the exposed Iranian agents to escape. The names of the Iranian suspects were listed as Shahriyar, Naser Ghafari, Fatemeh Rezaei, Hamed Habibi Hafzabad, Sıamak Mazloumravasan, Ali Hassan Salami, Rasoul Abdoullahi, Seyed Asghar Seyedtorabi, Habibullah Haydari, Ali Kıasat Far, Hossein Moghtaderi, Ali Akbar Waly, İraj Najafi, Mehdi Sasany Aghdam, Ali Mandi Nejat Mamaghani, Esmaiel Sabegni, Akbar Fallah Nejad, Walid Hasan Radwan, Naser Nurani and Hassan Hraji Ghotlou.
Many of these individuals were operating out of the embassy and consulates under the guise of counselors and attachés.
Iran had long been lobbying to expand its diplomatic presence in Turkey but faced obstacles due to security concerns and Tehran’s reluctance to reciprocate with similar concessions for Turkish diplomatic missions in Iran. However, these concerns seemed to be set aside in 2020, when an MoU was signed between then-Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif.
Interestingly, unlike many international agreements, the Erdogan government opted not to submit the MoU to parliament for legislative review, debate and approval. Instead, the president signed the MoU and published it in the Official Gazette to enforce the agreement.
Iran promptly acted on the terms of the MoU by purchasing a property in Turkey’s eastern province of Erzurum, near the Turkish-Iranian border, and constructing a large complex directly across from a mosque in the district of Palandöken. Iran had previously attempted to build a consulate in Erzurum by purchasing a large property in the city without securing prior consent from the Turkish government, leading to the property being returned to its owner in 2015. Iran is the only country that has a consulate in Erzurum.
The new consulate building was inaugurated in July 2023 with the participation of top officials in the province, including Governor Okay Memiş, Deputy Mayor Fevzi Polat, ruling party provincial chairman İbrahim Küçükoğlu, provincial police chief Levent Tuncer and others. Their attendance at the event suggests that explicit instructions were given by the Erdogan government requiring their presence.
With the endorsement of the host government, the consulate has established close ties with city officials, prominent business figures and academics. In May 2024 Provincial Governor Mustafa Çiftçi visited Consul General Mohammad Ebrahimi, accompanied by Provincial Mufti Rüstem Can and Provincial Director of National Education Yakup Yıldız.
According to the MoU, Iran also secured the right to purchase properties for various diplomatic purposes in Turkey. This includes a consul general’s residence in Erzurum, an ambassador’s residence in Ankara, a consul general’s residence in Istanbul and another consul general’s residence in Trabzon, in addition to the property already acquired in Erzurum.
If Iran so wishes, it also has the option to renovate, demolish or construct buildings on properties it already owns. The Turkish government has committed to facilitating all the necessary permits for such construction projects. These expanded facilities will provide ample opportunities for the Iranian regime to enhance its clandestine activities.
The consulate in Erzurum also conducts temporary operations in the border province of Van, visited by many Iranians, and at the Kapıköy border crossing for cargo and people. Tehran is currently developing plans to establish a permanent consulate in Van. The Erdogan government has shown receptiveness to Iranian requests in this regard.
In a letter to parliament dated October 26, 2023, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan indicated that the government was willing to permit additional consulate buildings in other provinces, particularly in the border province of Van, if requested by Tehran. Fidan said that due to the large number of visitors from Iran to Van province, the Erdogan government had decided to establish a foreign ministry liaison office in Van, which would soon be operational.
The Iranian consulate in Erzurum, which provides consular services for a dozen provinces along the Turkish-Iranian border, serves as a crucial logistical hub for covert Iranian intelligence operations.
In August 2011 police in Erzurum detained Shahram Zargham Khoei, a 43-year-old Iranian intelligence operative, along with his associate Mohammad Reza Esmaeilpour Ali Malek, aged 30, after discovering that they were secretly photographing sensitive military and intelligence installations. Both men were charged with obtaining information and documents related to state security, which included accusations of espionage on behalf of Iran.
Text of MoU between Turkey and Iran on building and purchasing additional properties as part of diplomatic facilities:
Iran_Turkey_MOU_diplomatic_compounds
They were subsequently tried and convicted in July 2013, with Khoei sentenced to 15 years in prison and Esmaeilpour Ali Malek to more than 13 years. Their convictions were upheld on appeal in December 2014.
Iran dismissed the allegations, but Erzurum Consul General Reza Kilichan and counselor Husrev Ibrahimzade personally visited Khoei in a high-security prison in February 2013 after obtaining permission from the Turkish Justice Ministry. Iran’s lobbying efforts on behalf of Khoei eventually proved successful. In 2015, Khoei was removed from his cell by Turkish intelligence agents and handed over to Iran following secret negotiations between Tehran and Ankara.
Iran’s consulate in Trabzon, one of only two maintained by foreign powers in Turkey’s northern Black Sea province, has been actively engaged in conducting intelligence operations and extending Iran’s influence along the Black Sea coastline. Its activities include facilitating transportation for sanctioned goods acquired through or in Turkey to Iranian entities, leveraging the port city of Trabzon’s strategic position as a trade hub.
Similar to the Erzurum consulate, the Trabzon consulate has also cultivated close relationships with local government officials, with the approval of the Erdogan government. In February 2024 Trabzon Governor Aziz Yıldırım attended an event commemorating the anniversary of the 1979 Iranian revolution, organized by Consul General Naser Mohebati.
According to the MoU, Turkish consulates located in the Iranian cities of Tabriz, Urumia and Mashhad, all of which are currently operating in rented facilities, would be permitted to purchase real estate. However, as of now, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has not made any plans to purchase property in Iran for its consulates.
The Erdogan government’s pro-Iran stance has led Turkey to deviate from the Western bloc on several issues over the past decade. During Erdogan’s visit to Tehran in 2014, he said, “Iran feels like a second home,” encapsulating the president’s affinity for the Islamist regime in Iran. This affinity is driven not only by ideological commitment to Islamism but also by involvement in illegal and profitable business schemes. His covert dealings with Iran came to light during graft probes in 2013, which revealed how Erdogan and his associates accepted substantial bribes from an Iranian operative named Reza Zarrab, who used Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank to launder Iranian government funds, aiming to circumvent US sanctions.
Key positions around Erdogan are predominantly staffed by political Islamist individuals who were influenced in their youth by fantasies of the Iranian revolution. For instance İbrahim Kalın, the head of Turkish intelligence agency MIT, is known to be a strong admirer and sympathizer of Iran’s mullah regime. Foreign Minister Fidan was active in pro-Iran Shiite circles during his youth and established connections with numerous Iranian operatives, some of whom were later convicted on terrorism charges. He was identified as a trusted individual in seized intelligence documents obtained from an Iranian-Turkish operative in 2011.
Sefer Turan, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor for Muslim and Arab states, had previously worked for an Iranian-funded magazine that was subsequently closed down on terrorism charges. Turan is known for having defended Iran and its militant proxies in his writing, advocating for positions that included calls for the destruction of Israel.
