Levent Kenez/Stockholm
Turkey has announced a candidate for the presidency of INTERPOL at its upcoming General Assembly, scheduled for November 24-27, 2025, in Marrakech. The nominee, Mustafa Serkan Sabanca, currently heads Turkey’s National Central Bureau at INTERPOL–Europol. His potential election raises serious concerns among human rights observers and policing experts. According to publicly available records, Sabanca is listed under Turkey for the seat of president, with a four-year term in office.
The bid follows years of sustained effort by the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to secure greater influence within INTERPOL. Turkish officials hosted the 2021 General Assembly in İstanbul and have repeatedly emphasized their aim to shape international policing frameworks in line with Ankara’s security agenda. That strategy raises concern among experts who question whether an institution meant to operate above politics can maintain its neutrality under the influence of a government accused of exploiting it.
On April 28, 2021, Erdogan forwarded to parliament an agreement between Turkey and INTERPOL granting privileges and immunities to visiting delegates and their families during the General Assembly, a standard obligation for host countries. The accompanying justification note, however, framed the event as an opportunity to highlight Turkey’s counterterrorism activities, explicitly including operations targeting critics of the government. This framing illustrates how the Turkish government portrays the political opposition and civil society actors as security threats, effectively equating dissent with terrorism.
There is substantial evidence showing how Turkish authorities have sought to manipulate INTERPOL’s mechanisms. Investigations by independent monitoring organizations show that Turkey has filed thousands of Red Notice requests that appear to target journalists, exiles and critics rather than conventional criminals. In July 2024 Turkish Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç revealed that the government had submitted 1,774 extradition requests to 119 countries. The vast majority of these requests have been denied.
A classified internal memo dated June 18, 2025, from the Security General Directorate instructed prosecutors to omit trumped-up references to terrorism charges or links to the government critics when preparing Red Notice requests. Instead, it recommended relying on ordinary offenses such as “unlawfully acquiring or disseminating personal data.” The memo suggested that disguising politically motivated cases in this way might allow them to pass INTERPOL’s screening process.
Turkey has also been observed using the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, which operates with fewer safeguards, to mark dissidents’ passports as stolen or revoked. This tactic has led to travel bans, border detentions and, in some cases, forced returns. Legal analysts warn that individuals flagged in this way often lack the ability to challenge the data or access due process.
A recent report by the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights on July 30, 2025, identified Turkey as one of the most prolific abusers of INTERPOL’s notice system, along with China and Russia. The committee warned that authoritarian governments are increasingly using INTERPOL alerts to pursue critics living in exile under the guise of criminal proceedings. It also documented Turkey’s misuse of the SLTD database to falsely report opponents’ passports as stolen, enabling their detention or forced return.
The report also mentions that Ankara’s campaign of transnational repression has expanded since a coup attempt in 2016, relying on international policing tools to silence political dissidents abroad. According to rights groups and official US and UK findings, Turkey’s intelligence agency has orchestrated more than 100 renditions from foreign countries, often with the cooperation of local authorities. These operations target individuals linked to the Gülen movement, a group critical of President Erdogan, and illustrate how INTERPOL’s mechanisms have been drawn into politically motivated pursuits beyond Turkey’s borders.
INTERPOL’s Constitution, in Article 3, forbids the organization from intervening in matters of a political, military, religious or racial nature. Yet investigations indicate that Turkey has attempted to circumvent this rule by disguising politically driven requests as standard law enforcement cases. A leaked document instructed prosecutors to avoid any reference to terrorism or the Gülen movement, using instead broader criminal charges such as unlawful data acquisition or membership in a criminal organization.
If Turkey were to assume the presidency of INTERPOL, the implications would be far-reaching. Leadership would give Ankara influence over internal committees, reform agendas and procedural rules, potentially allowing political considerations to shape international policing. Given Turkey’s record, experts warn that this could erode the neutrality of INTERPOL’s alert systems and reduce confidence among member states.
In recent years several countries have refused to enforce Turkish Red Notices or extradition requests, citing concerns about political motivation, lack of dual criminality or risk of mistreatment upon return. Several cases involved asylum holders in Europe who could not be extradited because the charges were deemed political. Such refusals highlight the growing distrust of Turkey’s approach to international policing.
Moreover, recent data from the Global Organized Crime Index and other sources show that Turkey is struggling with rising organized crime and law enforcement challenges. The country scored 7.03 out of 10 in the 2023 Index, ranking 14th globally and first in Europe. The report highlights major concerns over human trafficking, arms trafficking and mafia-style networks, many of which reportedly maintain close ties to political and judicial actors. Analysts warn that Turkey is becoming both a transit hub for illicit trade and a center of entrenched criminal networks, exposing weaknesses in law enforcement and institutional integrity.
The question now is whether a state accused of misusing INTERPOL’s mechanisms can credibly lead the organization responsible for enforcing global policing standards. The upcoming election in Marrakech will reveal whether INTERPOL defends the integrity of its systems or allows them to bend toward political interests.
