Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
The Turkish intelligence service, bolstered by its success in positioning a long-time asset as Syria’s interim president, has devised covert contingency plans to establish clandestine cells. These units will comprise carefully vetted foreign jihadists who have long operated in Syria, benefitting from Turkey’s logistical support.
According to confidential sources who spoke to Nordic Monitor, these plans involve deploying select operatives to intimidate their countries of origin or third countries when deemed necessary to advance the political and strategic objectives of the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The presence of foreign fighters in jihadist groups in Syria has long been a major concern for many nations, particularly those whose citizens traveled to the region — often via Turkish territory and with the facilitation of Turkey’s intelligence agency, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT).
The potential return of these battle-hardened fighters — highly trained in weaponry, explosives, infiltration and sabotage — has remained a persistent concern for law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide. Many foreign governments continue to monitor the movements of their nationals who joined jihadist causes, fearing they may engage in terrorism, destabilize public order or threaten national security upon their return.
The sources were unable to specify the number of individuals selected from the large pool of potential recruits, but they said these operatives are organized into small, compartmentalized cells, each provided with plausible covers to remain inconspicuous for the time being. They will be reactivated when the Erdogan government seeks to use them as bargaining chips with its international interlocutors.
The size of the pool of human resources Turkey has tapped for such plans was confirmed — perhaps inadvertently — for the first time on January 25 by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who oversaw the Syria file as the head of Turkey’s intelligence agency from 2010 to 2023.
“In Syria, there are groups close to Turkey with more than 80,000 armed elements. Without any hesitation, we told them to join the national army, become part of the national army,” Fidan said in an interview with the Saudi-based Asharq news.
In other words, the former spymaster admitted that Turkey’s proxy forces in Syria number over 80,000. The Erdogan government has expressed a desire for these fighters to join the newly restructured Syrian army following the takeover of Damascus by Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), a long-time asset of Turkish intelligence.
Most of the foreign fighters under the control of MIT have already joined the new Syrian army, with some even being promoted to the rank of general. However, others remain active in smaller jihadist groups, particularly in northern Syria, close to the Turkish border.
The exact number of foreign nationals among the 80,000 fighters remains unknown, but estimates range from a few thousand to as many as 10,000. This figure is large enough for MIT to screen and select suitable candidates for precision-targeted attacks abroad.
The secret planning is overseen by MIT’s Special Operations Directorate (Özel Operasyonlar Başkanlığı), under the command of former military officer Kemal Eskintan — known in jihadist circles as Abu Furqan. Eskintan has played a pivotal role in facilitating covert Turkish support for jihadist factions, not only in Syria but also across the broader Middle East and Africa.
For this plan, MIT collaborates closely with Turkish nationals who have been planted as point men for the spy agency. One such individual is Ömer Çiftçi, known by his nom de guerre Muhtar Turk or Mukhtar al-Turki. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier general in the Syrian army, according to an announcement by the Syrian Ministry of Defense’s General Military Command on December 28, 2024, in Resolution No. 8. This resolution elevated five senior jihadist figures, including an Albanian, a Jordanian, a Tajik and a Uyghur, to the same rank.
Çiftçi was granted Syrian citizenship and listed in the resolution under the name Umar Mohammed Jaftashi. The General Military Command justified the promotions as essential for safeguarding both religion and the homeland.
This 45-year-old Turkish jihadist, born in Turkey’s Osmaniye province, began his militant career in Afghanistan in 2004. He has since become a key enabler of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as the Nusra Front, and its leader al-Sharaa in the Syrian conflict.
The exact number of Turks involved in the jihadist campaign in Syria remains unknown. However, Nordic Monitor published a classified Turkish military intelligence document in May 2019, revealing that 4,671 Turkish jihadists had traveled to Syria as of July 2016.
HTS is not the only group MIT screens for potential candidates for its secretive plan. Al-Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Din (HAD), with an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 fighters, is another group MIT has been targeting for recruitment. HAD has faced significant pressure in recent months from the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which has killed several senior leaders of the group in drone strikes.
Among those eliminated was Muhammed Yusuf Ziya Talay, a Turkish al-Qaeda operative known by his nom de guerre Jafar al-Turki. He had been enlisted by MIT for clandestine operations in Syria. His death marked a significant blow to MIT’s operations, disrupting their efforts in the region.
MIT also monitors other jihadist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which still maintains between 1,500 and 3,000 fighters in Syria, as well as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM/TIP). The latter consists primarily of Chinese nationals of Uyghur origin, with an estimated 800 to 3,000 fighters.
Khatiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, primarily composed of Uzbek fighters with an estimated 500 members, and Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, comprising mainly Uzbek and other Central Asian fighters with manpower of around 500 to 1,000, are also being reviewed by MIT to develop assets and operatives for its plans.
Along with Turkey’s increasing engagement in Africa and the Caucasus, the country’s intelligence agency has also taken a closer interest in jihadist groups such as Katibat al-Ghoraba, a French-speaking group that recruits fighters primarily from France, Belgium and other Francophone countries. Additionally, MIT has monitored Ajnad al-Qawqaz, a jihadist group primarily composed of fighters from the Caucasus region, particularly Chechnya, Dagestan and other parts of the North Caucasus, which spans Russian, Georgian and Azerbaijani territory.
Non-HTS groups are better poised to serve MIT’s clandestine operations, as they harbor more global jihadist ambitions. HTS, on the other hand, is currently focused on consolidating its gains in Syria, prioritizing the stability and security of the country. Its leader al-Sharaa, now the interim president of Syria, is keen to avoid becoming entangled in new conflicts with other countries and has adopted a more nationalistic Arab discourse.
MIT aims for the al-Sharaa government to quietly provide shelter, logistics and training for its proxies in Syria while maintaining a careful distance to ensure plausible deniability. This approach is designed to protect both Turkey and HTS’s gains, preventing any actions that could jeopardize their positions or trigger a crisis for the new government in Damascus, which is already facing numerous challenges.
The question now is how committed the Erdogan government is to the new contingency plan involving foreign fighters developed by MIT, whether it will be put into action in the future and whether such plans even warrant serious consideration by Turkey’s partners and allies.
Given that many jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe and Russia over the last decade were carried out by fighters who had, at one time or another, passed through Turkey — some even crossing into Syria for training and armed conflict — the threat posed by foreign fighters remains a very real and serious risk to the national security of other countries.
Under Erdogan’s Islamist government, MIT has been transformed into a primary tool of the repressive regime, emulating tactics from the IRGC Quds Force. It is led by individuals branded as close confidants within the president’s inner circle. There is no doubt that the agency is eager to capitalize on the threat posed by foreign fighters to further the political objectives of Erdogan’s government.
MIT has a notorious track record of false flag operations, influence campaigns and surveillance both in Turkey and abroad. While Fidan was the head of the agency, he was quite comfortable in suggesting how his operatives in Syria could stage a false flag attack on Turkey by sending mortars across the border, as revealed in a leaked recording from March 2014.
Multiple terrorist attacks in 2015 were, in fact, contract jobs granted to proxies in terrorist groups, including ISIS, by MIT to help Erdogan regain his lost parliamentary majority. MIT did not hesitate to launch a bloody false flag event in Turkey in 2016 by orchestrating a coup attempt, which ultimately served to consolidate power for President Erdogan.
The plan reportedly involved the killing of several thousand people, but the casualty count remained at 250 Turkish citizens, thanks to the common sense displayed by military officers who suspected foul play. The real perpetrators of these deaths were never identified, and the government refused to conduct a thorough autopsy on the bodies, perform ballistic examinations of the bullets or take hand swabs from the alleged perpetrators.
That track record clearly suggests that the Erdogan government does not value human life, including that of its own nationals, and is willing to sacrifice lives to pursue its political ambitions. Under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey has been transformed into a new entity, and its intelligence agency must be taken seriously as it expands its clandestine operations abroad. These operations are aimed at undermining the security of its allies and partners in Europe and Asia, destabilizing sitting governments and influencing public discourse.
