Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
A large-scale surveillance program covertly operated by the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s intelligence arm has been targeting critical and independent journalists living in exile in Europe, the United States and Canada, as revealed by confidential documents obtained by Nordic Monitor.
The documents confirm that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government meticulously monitors journalists in the West, profiling them, compiling detailed intelligence reports and closely tracking their movements and activities.
The clandestine initiative is managed by the foreign ministry’s covert unit, the Intelligence and Research Directorate (İstihbarat ve Güvenlik İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü). This unit has gained additional mandates and resources since Hakan Fidan, the former head of Turkey’s main intelligence agency, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT), was appointed foreign minister last year.
Intelligence gathered by diplomats, including some ostensibly operating under diplomatic cover for MIT, on journalists was subsequently disseminated to other Turkish government entities, such as the Security Directorate General (Emniyet) and the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, as evidenced by the paper trail.
Describing the critical and independent work of journalists as “black propaganda and disinformation,” the foreign ministry stated in the transmitted intelligence report that journalists target Turkish government institutions and public officials, endeavoring to discredit them in the eyes of the public.
Classified communiqué sent by the Security Directorate General reveals the spying carried out on journalists in Europe and North America:
The Erdogan government has decimated the critical and independent media in Turkey, shutting down hundreds of media outlets, including the nation’s leading newspapers and broadcast networks and jailing hundreds of journalists over the last decade. Many journalists fled Turkey to escape this unprecedented crackdown on the free and independent media, finding refuge in Western countries and continuing their work in exile.
The few remaining opposition media outlets in Turkey are under strict control by the Erdogan government, as they are compelled to echo regime narratives on fundamental issues, adhere to red lines imposed by Erdogan’s communications office and tread carefully to avoid risking imprisonment. Under these dire conditions, coverage of Turkey from abroad provides valuable insight into the Turkish government’s record by shedding light on the clandestine activities of President Erdogan and his associates to sustain the authoritarian regime.
A classified communiqué, marked secret on December 2, 2022, indicates that the intelligence was transmitted by Institution V, a code name believed to denote the foreign ministry’s intelligence section, on November 9, 2022. It bears the signature of Salih Yıldırım, the deputy head of the counterterrorism department at the Security Directorate General.
In the communiqué, Yıldırım explained that the Security Directorate General finalized its own inquiry into journalists on December 2, 2022, subsequent to receiving intelligence from the foreign ministry. This information was later disseminated to the Ankara police department to facilitate the building of a sham case against journalists, in collaboration with the Ankara prosecutor’s office.
Another communiqué, signed by Police Chief Engin Aydın, the head of the counterterrorism bureau at the Ankara police department, on December 18, 2023 discloses that the police cybercrimes unit was assigned to surveil and target the website, email and social media accounts affiliated with journalists.
The document included the names of journalists such as Abdullah Bozkurt, Levent Kenez and Bülent Korucu in Sweden; Cevheri Güven and Sevinç Özarslan in Germany; Said Sefa in Canada; and Emrullah Uslu and Adem Yavuz Arslan in the US.
Cover page of a Turkish government report filed about Turkish journalists who live in Sweden:
The attached documents indicate that more journalists were targeted by the global spying program carried out by the Erdogan government, using Turkish embassies as cover. Asım Yıldırım, Aydoğan Vatandaş and Mehmet Faruk Mercan in the US as well as Tarik Toros in the UK were also monitored by Turkish intelligence.
The comprehensive report on journalists compiled by the cybercrime unit indicates that the police scrutinized social media accounts and attempted to identify the email addresses, physical addresses and telephone numbers associated with the website and social media profiles. Furthermore, the report reveals that the unit attempted to breach the Twitter (now known as X) accounts of journalists by exploiting the password reset function.
Turkish journalists in the UK were also targeted by Turkish government agents:
The joint efforts of the foreign ministry and the police were subsequently forwarded to the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, where the reports were integrated into ongoing counterterrorism cases against journalists. The Erdogan administration frequently employs the tactic of labeling critics and opponents as terrorists, initiating abusive criminal investigations and court proceedings with partisan members of the judiciary.
Documents originating from the Ankara police department provide only a partial glimpse into Turkey’s extensive global espionage program, suggesting that the Erdogan government may have targeted additional media outlets and journalists in foreign countries, particularly in North America and Western Europe, due to their coverage critical of Turkey.
Cover page of the Turkish government’s surveillance report on journalists in the US:
Turkish journalists in Germany were monitored by Turkish government agents:
The use of Turkish embassies and consulates as intelligence hubs experienced a noteworthy surge following Fidan’s taking on the role of foreign minister in the summer of 2023. Fidan, who previously served as head of Turkey’s infamous intelligence agency MIT for a decade, played a pivotal role in supporting the Erdogan government’s endeavors, including false flag operations, influence campaigns and the abduction of critics for interrogation under torture at undisclosed black sites.
Fidan brought several senior intelligence officers with him from MIT and strategically placed them in key positions in the foreign ministry, effectively reshaping the diplomatic service into a significant intelligence apparatus.
Nuh Yılmaz, Fidan’s long-time aide and a former intelligence officer, became deputy foreign minister. While working for MIT, Yılmaz’s main mandate was to supervise Turkish media, run influence operations through intelligence assets planted in various Turkish media outlets and help build false narratives to support the Erdogan government’s domestic and foreign policy goals.
December 2023 communiqué sent by police chief Engin Aydın reveals the attempt to hack the social media accounts of journalists’ X accounts:
The foreign ministry’s covert intelligence unit, the Intelligence and Research Directorate, underwent a restructuring, with Fatma Ceren Yazgan, a seasoned Turkish intelligence operative, appointed to lead it. Yazgan played a crucial role in profiling Turkish ambassadors and diplomats, which ultimately led to the summary and abrupt removal of one-third of Turkish diplomats from the foreign service in 2016.
President Erdogan has increasingly relied on intelligence services to sustain his authoritarian regime in Turkey, quash dissenting voices and crack down on opposition factions. The heightened surveillance and intelligence collection efforts abroad are aimed at intimidating critics and adversaries overseas, fostering a climate of fear among Turkish diaspora communities and exerting influence over the foreign and domestic policies of host nations.
