



Security Council

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Identical letters dated 20 February 2025 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to once again highlight Lebanese violations of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and of the Ceasefire Understandings (effective 27 November 2024).

On 27 November 2024, Israel and Lebanon agreed to a ceasefire. The Ceasefire Understandings outline provisions for implementing resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and previous resolutions, including the establishment of a United States-led International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism. There are encouraging signs that the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are trying to implement their obligations under these Understandings. However, despite LAF's efforts, so far, its response has been insufficient, given the extensive military arsenal and Hezbollah's infrastructure on the ground, as well as difficulties to effectively address the full scope of violations in a timely manner and in many instances, Israel had to take action by itself.

Since the entry into force of the Ceasefire Understandings between the parties, Israel has reported to the mechanism hundreds of violations by Hezbollah in breach of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and contrary to the Ceasefire Understandings. These violations include, inter alia, continued Hezbollah military activity, including south of the Litani River, arms smuggling through the Syria-Lebanon border, money transfers through the Beirut International Airport, active weapons production facilities and launching of uncrewed aerial vehicles towards Israel. A comprehensive list of these violations is included in the annex* to the present letter.

These recent months, Hezbollah has attempted to re-establish and rearm itself in Lebanon, both north and south of the Litani River, and rebuild its influence and military capabilities, following the significant setbacks it sustained from Israeli operations.

This resurgence has been marked by several alarming developments, including arms smuggling, contrary to Lebanon's obligation under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), to bolster Hezbollah's military capabilities through smuggling routes along the Lebanon-Syria border. While some of these smuggling activities have been successfully thwarted, the overall efforts to resupply Hezbollah remain a persistent concern. Such was the case of a weapons smuggling tunnel, 3 km long, crossing from Syria into Lebanon in the northeastern Bekaa Valley (37 261405/819952), which was struck by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on 9 February. This tunnel, under Hezbollah's Unit 4400, was designed for transporting and smuggling Iranian weapons

* Circulated in the language of submission only.



into Lebanon. Although it was already struck in October 2024, it was discovered to still be operational.

Hezbollah also continues its attempt to manufacture weapons in designated facilities inside Lebanon. At the same time, there are still active military infrastructures of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Such is a complex located in the mountains east of the Bekaa Valley, between Nabi Chit and Brital, south of Baalbek (37N 231598/3745959), situated near the Syrian border and key weapons smuggling routes. This complex, struck multiple times by the IDF, continues being used by Hezbollah for the production and storage of weapons, including precision munitions. Likewise, as outlined in the annex, Israel has submitted to the mechanism (1 January, lines 150–266) the location of a Hezbollah military complex in the area of Zibkin containing dozens of arms storehouses, rocket launch sites and rockets. Thousands of additional locations throughout Lebanon containing Hezbollah assets, infrastructure and arms, including underground facilities, have yet to be dismantled by LAF.

Also, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of Hezbollah militants operating south of the Litani, conducting reconnaissance and ramping up surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities along the Blue Line. Hezbollah has started assessing the damage to its military infrastructure, with operatives observed performing reconstruction activities and visiting known terrorist sites to recover remaining weapons and restore these locations.

Moreover, Hezbollah has maintained its uncrewed aerial vehicle and drone capabilities as well, as demonstrated in the annex. Some of these uncrewed aerial vehicles crossed the Blue Line into Israeli sovereign territory, in a blatant violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and in a manner that jeopardizes the fragile stability in the area.

In addition, there have been reports of Iranian attempts to financially support Hezbollah's resurgence. As outlined in the annex, there are several instances where commercial flights originated from Iran that have been transporting significant amounts of cash through Beirut International Airport to finance the group's military activities. As shown in the annex, there have been indications that Hezbollah's re-establishment is being financed also through intermediaries in Turkey, which could potentially serve as a financial hub in this ongoing effort.

Another concerning issue is the influence of Hezbollah within certain units inside LAF, notably the Military Intelligence. For instance, LAF's Chief of Military Intelligence for Southern Lebanon, Suhil Bahij Gharb, has been reported to share information gathered by the International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism with Hezbollah. Israel has observed a clear link between some Hezbollah-infiltrated LAF units and the ineffectiveness of LAF implementing its obligations under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). This coordination between certain elements of the LAF and Hezbollah not only weakens the LAF's ability to uphold its obligations, but also enables Hezbollah to continue its military build-up, violating both the Ceasefire Understandings and the terms of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

All of these signs collectively point to a strategic, multifaceted effort by Hezbollah to rebuild its military capabilities and increase its influence. All constituting breaches of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) as well as of the Ceasefire Understandings between Israel and Lebanon.

Israel is committed to implementing the Ceasefire Understandings with Lebanon and is cooperating with the United States-led mechanism established therein. Israel has also withdrawn most of its forces from Lebanon, as stipulated in the Understandings. However, Israel will continue to act as necessary in order to protect itself and its citizens in order to achieve the primary goal of the war in its northern

border: removing the ongoing threat posed by Hezbollah in order to ensure the return of more than 63,000 residents to their homes and communities safely.

Israel expects the Security Council members to assure that the Lebanese government fully implements and enforces the terms of resolution 1701 (2006) and the agreed-upon Understandings, throughout Lebanon in its entirety, both south and north of the Litani River. The Security Council must also take measures against Iran, to deter it from transferring weapons and funds to Hezbollah and hold it accountable. Moreover, the Security Council must ensure that Member States take action, in order to prevent financial transfers to Hezbollah through their territory. This is crucial to preventing a recurrence of the degradation of resolution 1701 (2006), which contributed to the events since 8 October 2023, as well as preserving the Ceasefire Understandings.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations