



# Security Council

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## Letter dated 6 December 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2701 (2023), the final report on its work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya on 12 November 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 5 December.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Jelena **Plamenac**  
Coordinator

Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

(Signed) Georg **Kerschischnig**  
Expert

(Signed) Ilyas **Oussedik**  
Expert

(Signed) Salma **Arka**  
Expert

(Signed) Pashupati Nath **Pandey**  
Expert

(Signed) Wenlei **Xu**  
Expert



#### 4. 5+5 Joint Military Commission and military reunification

32. The creation of a joint military force under the auspices of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission did not materialize due to several challenges, reflecting the fragmented political and security landscape of Libya. Key stakeholders in Tripoli believed that the Chief of Staff in the east, Abdel Razek al-Nadori, lacked decision-making authority in the process, with those powers being exclusively held by the Haftar family. At the same time, the LAAF general command viewed the Chief of General Staff of the Libyan Army, Mohammed Al-Haddad, as having no effective authority due to the dominance of armed groups in the west. This perception was reinforced by the LAAF position that western armed groups did not possess the military competence or professionalism required to execute the tasks of the joint military force.

33. On 25 August 2024, following a meeting in Sirte, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission issued a unanimous statement confirming that military reunification, including the creation of the joint military force, was outside of the Commission's mandate (see annex 18).<sup>24</sup>

#### 5. Foreign armed groups and fighters

##### (a) Chadian fighters

34. A reduced number of Chadian fighters remained present within HAF, while the majority withdrew to participate in other regional conflicts. LAAF recalibrated its stance towards Chadian opposition groups operating in Libya, previously identified as LAAF allies,<sup>25</sup> expelling them as part of efforts to strengthen relations with the Government of Chad (see para. 29) and to prevent further intra-Chadian clashes from spilling over into Libya (see annex 19). LAAF reached an agreement with the Government of Chad to repatriate some of these Chadian fighters, with logistical support from the Niger.

##### (b) Syrian fighters

35. Syrian fighters backed by Türkiye remained present in several locations around Tripoli, including in the Hamza Camp, Watiyah airbase, Salah Eddine police school and Suq al-Khamis area. However, Libya was no longer seen as a coveted destination for these fighters. A considerable decrease in salaries and the lack of other financial incentives caused Syrian fighters (a) to reduce personnel rotations in late 2023; (b) to seek engagement in active conflict zones, where wages were significantly higher;<sup>26</sup> and (c) to migrate to Europe. The Panel identified 13 cases of Syrian fighters who migrated from Libya to Italy with the assistance of two high-ranking Libyan military officers using Libyan human trafficking networks in Tripoli.<sup>27</sup>

36. In the east, Syrian fighters were present at Khadim airbase, alongside elements that used to be part of the private military company formerly known as ChVK Wagner.

##### (c) Foreign private military companies

37. Although elements of the private military company formerly known as ChVK Wagner rebranded their presence and scaled up their military capabilities in Libya by supplying and equipping their positions with arms and related materiel, the Panel found that no substantial changes were made to the nature of their activities in Libya.

<sup>24</sup> Authenticated by confidential sources of the Panel.

<sup>25</sup> S/2023/673, para. 38.

<sup>26</sup> S/2022/427, para. 30. (All references to S/2022/427 should be understood to encompass S/2022/427/Corr.1.)

<sup>27</sup> Confidential sources (Syrian fighters).