



TRACING THE SUPPLY OF COMPONENTS USED IN ISLAMIC STATE IEDs

Evidence from a 20-month investigation
in Iraq and Syria

February 2016

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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	4	ANNEXES	44
MAPS AND TABLES	5	ANNEXE A	
INTRODUCTION	6	Gültaş Kimya letter of 31 October 2015	44
KEY FINDINGS	8	ANNEXE B	
50 COMPANIES, 20 COUNTRIES	8	Alba Aluminiu documents provided on	
Agents	11	11 June 2015	46
Turkey	11	ANNEXE C	
India	11	Metkim communication of	
Japan, Switzerland, and the United States	11	21 September 2015	56
Mobile telephones	12	ANNEXE D	
Short chain of custody	12	Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation	
DOCUMENTATION	14	regarding Diversey Kimya	57
CHEMICAL PRECURSORS	15	ANNEXE E	
Aluminium paste	15	Government of Lebanon documents provided on	
Fertilizers	16	15 January 2016	64
CONTAINERS	18	ANNEXE F	
DETONATING CORD AND SAFETY FUSE	21	Message from Premier Explosives regarding	
DETONATORS	26	detonating cord sold to Syria	76
WIRES AND CABLES	31	ANNEXE G	
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS	33	Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile	
MOBILE TELEPHONES	41	telephones	77
		ENDNOTES	103
		REFERENCES	106
		ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	107

ABBREVIATIONS

CAR

Conflict Armament Research

IED

Improvised explosive device

IS

Islamic State

UAE

United Arab Emirates

YPG

Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People's Protection Units)



MAPS AND TABLES

MAPS

Map 1

Countries of origin of identified material

Map 2

Movement of identified items, 2014–15

Map 3

Sites where CAR documented IED components used by IS forces, July 2014–December 2015

Map 4

Chains of custody of aluminium paste and ammonium nitrate used by IS forces in Iraq

Map 5

Chain of custody of urea used by IS forces in Syria

Map 6

Chain of custody of hydrogen peroxide and white petroleum drums used by IS forces

Map 7

Chains of custody of detonating cord used by IS forces in Syria

Map 8

Chains of custody of detonating cord used by IS forces in Iraq

Map 9

Chain of custody of safety fuse used by IS forces in Syria

Map 10

Chains of custody of detonators used by IS forces in Syria

Map 11

Chains of custody of detonators used by IS forces in Iraq

Map 12

Chains of custody of wires and cables used by IS forces

Map 13

Chains of custody of electronic components used by IS forces

Map 14

Chains of custody of mobile telephones used by IS forces

TABLES

Table 1

Companies, countries, and material identified

Table 2

Recovered items with a short chain of custody

Table 3

Known chain of custody of the INTEROX® AG Spray 35 drums, one of which CAR documented in Tikrit in April 2015

Table 4

Reconstructed chronology of events related to detonating cord and detonators that were exported to Lebanon

INTRODUCTION

Since their June 2014 capture of the Iraqi city of Mosul, Islamic State (IS) forces have fought numerous battles along a shifting front line, which spans Iraqi and Syrian territory, and have engaged nearly every armed force there. Despite suffering territorial losses in 2014–15, the group continues to hold significant ground in Iraq and Syria.

Since July 2014, Conflict Armament Research (CAR), an independent organisation mandated by the European Union to investigate the supply of weapons into armed conflicts, has worked in concert with Iraqi and Syrian forces to document materiel recovered in military action against IS forces. These partners include: the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, the Iraqi Federal Police, the Kurdistan Region Security Council, the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the Military Council of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. CAR documented the components presented in this report following their recovery during major battles around the Iraqi towns of al Rabia, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tikrit and the Syrian town of Kobane.

IS forces have manufactured and deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) across the battlefield on a quasi-industrial scale. Responsible for a large number of civilian and military casualties, these improvised bombs endanger and significantly delay ground operations against IS positions, while threatening the safe return of displaced populations. Made of components that are cheap and readily available, IEDs have become IS forces' signature weapon. Their chains of supply differ from those of military weapons. Indeed, for the most part, IED components are commercial goods that are not subject to government export licences and whose transfer is far less scrutinised and regulated than the transfer of weapons.

**IED COMPONENTS ARE
COMMERCIAL GOODS THAT ARE
NOT SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT
EXPORT LICENCES.**





Improvised explosive devices captured by the Iraqi Federal Police in Tikrit, Iraq

Tikrit, April 2015

Over a period of 20 months, from July 2014 to February 2016, CAR field investigation teams in Iraq and Syria examined more than 700 components used by IS forces to manufacture IEDs, identified their provenance, and traced their chains of custody. While this report focuses on the origin of supplies captured from IS forces, there is no evidence to suggest, nor does CAR in any respect imply, any direct transfer of goods to IS forces by the countries and companies mentioned in this report. CAR's investigations map out the legal trade in component parts across the region. In all identified cases, producers have lawfully traded components with regional trade and distribution companies. These companies, in turn, have sold them to smaller commercial entities. By allowing individuals and groups affiliated with IS forces to acquire components used in IEDs, these small entities appear to be the weakest link in the chain of custody.

A focus on lawfully traded commodities is thus critically important to an understanding of how IS forces fuel their large-scale manufacture of IEDs. Many components that can be used in the manufacture of homemade explosives, such as aluminium paste and urea, are not subject to transfer controls, including export licensing. As such, their supply within the region is largely

PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FINDING OF THIS REPORT CONCERNS THE SPEED WITH WHICH ISLAMIC STATE FORCES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACQUIRE IED COMPONENTS.

unregulated and weakly monitored. Other components, such as detonators and detonating cord, are subject to export licensing, but are also commonly used in commercial activities, such as mining and industry. Licensing alone has not been sufficient to prevent acquisition by IS forces. Ostensibly civilian components, such as mobile telephones and telecommunications cable, are also investigated in this report because their supply serves as a 'marker' for understanding the acquisition networks used by IS forces.

Unsurprisingly, IS acquisition networks draw most heavily on lawful commerce in the countries that border their territory. Proximity is a major reason why the goods traded by Iraqi and Turkish companies appear throughout the supply chains of components that IS forces use to manufacture IEDs. Both Iraq and Turkey have large agricultural and mining sectors, in which many such chemicals and explosive components are employed extensively. At the same time, many small-scale commercial enterprises appear to have sold, whether wittingly or unwittingly, components to parties linked to, or employed by, IS forces.

Perhaps the most significant finding of this report concerns the speed with which IS forces have been able to acquire IED components. The appearance of these components in possession of IS forces, as little as one month following their lawful supply to commercial entities in the region, speaks to a lack of monitoring by national governments and companies alike. It may also indicate a lack of awareness surrounding the potential use of these civilian-market components by terrorist and insurgent forces. At the very least, the evidence presented in this report serves to spotlight which chemical precursors and components IS forces use consistently in their construction of IEDs.

CAR continues to investigate the supply of many of the components discussed in this report and to document IED components recovered from IS forces.

KEY FINDINGS

50 COMPANIES, 20 COUNTRIES

CAR has identified 50 commercial entities and 20 countries involved in the supply chain of components used by IS forces to construct IEDs. The companies produced, sold, or received critical

material, such as chemical precursors, detonating cord, detonators, cables, wires, and other electronic components (see Table 1 and Map 1).

Table 1
Companies, countries, and material identified


Type of material	Company	Country
Chemical precursors	Aldoro	Brazil
Chemical precursors	Gültaş Kimya	Turkey
Chemical precursors	Alba Aluminiu	Romania
Chemical precursors	3D Lojistik	Turkey
Chemical precursors	Marikem Kimyevi ve Endüstriyel Ürünler	Turkey
Chemical precursors	Sunrise Aluminium Pigments	China
Chemical precursors	Metkim	Turkey
Chemical precursors	Unknown	Russian Federation
Chemical precursors	Mert Global	Turkey
Chemical precursors	EKM Gübre	Turkey
Container/chemical precursors	Solvay Chemicals International	Belgium (headquarters)
Container/chemical precursors	Solvay Chemie	Netherlands
Container/chemical precursors	Diversey Kimya	Turkey
Container/chemical precursors	Diversey Gulf	United Arab Emirates
Container/chemical precursors	Mazen Khanati Serrieh Trading & Distributing	Iraq
Container/chemical precursors	Karwanchi Group	Iraq

Type of material	Company	Country
Container/chemical precursors	Al Safi Danone	Iraq
Containers/chemical precursors	Ehsan Chemi Company	Iran
Detonating cord	İlci	Turkey
Detonating cord	Nitromak Dyno Nobel	Turkey
Detonating cord and detonators	Maybel	Lebanon
Detonating cord	Gulf Oil Corporation	India
Detonating cord	Solar Industries	India
Detonating cord and detonators	Premier Explosives	India
Detonating cord and detonators	Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals	India
Safety fuse	Chamundi Explosives	India
Detonators	Economic Explosives	India
Detonators	IDEAL Industrial Explosives	India
Detonators	Schaffler	Austria
Detonators	Zbrojovka Vsetin	Czech Republic
Cables and wires	Hes Kablo	Turkey
Cables and wires	Kablo Türk	Turkey
Cables and wires	Erikoğlu	Turkey
Cables and wires	Ünal Kablo	Turkey
Signal relays	NEC TOKIN	Japan
Microcontrollers	Microchip	United States
Transistors	STMicroelectronics	Switzerland
Mobile telephones	Nokia/Microsoft Mobile	Finland (headquarters)
Mobile telephones	Nokia Telecommunications	China
Mobile telephones	Nokia Solutions and Networks India	India
Mobile telephones	Nokia Vietnam	Vietnam

Type of material	Company	Country
Mobile telephones	Al Areen Computers	United Arab Emirates
Mobile telephones	Ghamdan General Trading & Import	Yemen
Mobile telephones	Al Watani Telecom	Iraq
Mobile telephones	Fastlink	Iraq
Mobile telephones	Derinton International	United Arab Emirates
Mobile telephones	Hawk Freight Services	United Arab Emirates
Mobile telephones	Brightpoint Middle East	United Arab Emirates
Mobile telephones	Onesto	United Arab Emirates
Mobile telephones	Midcom	United Arab Emirates



Map 1
Countries of origin of identified material



Turkey

With 13 companies involved in the supply chain, Turkey is the most important choke point for components used in the manufacture of IEDs by IS forces. These components include chemical precursors, containers, detonating cord, cables, and wires, which Turkish companies either manufactured or sold in Turkey before IS forces acquired them in Iraq and Syria.

Agents

Among the 13 Turkish companies identified, eight are intermediaries that have re-transferred components produced in Brazil, China, India, the Netherlands, Romania, and the Russian Federation. The companies serve the Turkish market and most of them do not export goods to Iraq or Syria. Evidence gathered by CAR suggests that IS forces, or intermediaries acting on their

behalf, acquired the components in Turkey and subsequently transferred them to Iraq and Syria.

India

Seven Indian companies manufactured most of the detonators, detonating cord, and safety fuses documented by CAR's field investigation teams. Under Indian law, transfer of this material requires a licence. All components documented by CAR were legally exported under government-issued licences from India to entities in Lebanon and Turkey.

Japan, Switzerland, and the United States

IS forces consistently employed the same electronic components in the construction of one type of remote-controlled IED used in Iraq. Companies headquartered in Japan, Switzerland, and the United States manufactured the microcontrollers, signal relays, and transistors used in the devices.

IN SOME INSTANCES, THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY FROM THE ACQUISITION BY THE CLIENT TO THE USE BY IS FORCES COVERED A VERY SHORT TIME PERIOD (1-6 MONTHS).

EVIDENCE GATHERED BY CAR FIELD INVESTIGATION TEAMS AND DOCUMENTS OBTAINED BY CAR THROUGH FORMAL TRACE REQUESTS INDICATE THAT ISLAMIC STATE FORCES ACQUIRED MANY COMPONENTS RAPIDLY FOLLOWING THEIR LAWFUL SUPPLY TO DISTRIBUTORS AND END USERS.

Mobile telephones

IS forces in Iraq use a Model 105 Type RM-908 Nokia mobile telephone in the manufacture of a specific type of remote-controlled IED. Of ten such telephones captured from IS forces and documented by CAR, eight had been supplied to intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates (where CAR investigations are ongoing) and two had been sent to distributors in the city of Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Short chain of custody


Evidence gathered by CAR field investigation teams and documents obtained by CAR through formal trace requests indicate that IS forces acquired many components rapidly following their lawful supply to distributors and end users (see Table 2 and Map 2). In some instances, the chain of custody from the acquisition by the client to the use by IS forces covered a very short time period (1–6 months).

Table 2
Recovered items with a short chain of custody

Company	Product	Date of legal transfer or acquisition	Use by IS forces	Chain of custody (duration)
Marikem	Aluminium paste	10 October 2014	March–April 2015	5–6 months
Metkim	Aluminium paste	10 October 2014	March–April 2015	5–6 months
Microsoft Mobile	Nokia 105 RM-908	May–November 2014	Early December 2014	1–7 months
Gültaş Kimya	Aluminium paste	August 2014	March–April 2015	7–8 months
İlci	Detonating cord	27 February 2014	September 2014–January 2015	7–11 months
EKM Gübre	Urea	2014	September 2014–January 2015	1–12 months
Al Safi Danone and Karwanchi Group	Hydrogen peroxide	March–September 2014	March–April 2015	5–12 months
Mert Global	Ammonium nitrate	2014	March–April 2015	3–16 months

Map 2

Movement of identified items, 2014–15




DOCUMENTATION

This section provides information regarding IED components that were captured from IS forces and subsequently documented by CAR field investigation teams in Iraq and Syria.

Map 3

Sites where CAR documented IED components used by IS forces, July 2014–December 2015



CHEMICAL PRECURSORS

Aluminium paste

Aluminium mixed with fertilizer is one of the most common forms of homemade explosive used by IS forces in Iraq and Syria.

During the second battle of Tikrit (2 March–17 April 2015), the Iraqi Jund al-Imam brigade captured a warehouse (GPS: 34.5877149794, 43.6891239882) in which IS forces had mixed aluminium paste with ammonium nitrate in the manufacture of explosives. A CAR field investigation team documented the warehouse's contents on 29 April 2015.

The labels affixed to several drums of aluminium paste found at the location indicated production in August and October 2014 by three different manufacturers: Aldoro, Brazil; Alba Aluminiiu, Romania; and Sunrise Aluminium Pigments, China. The three companies sold the aluminium paste to three Turkish companies based in Istanbul: Gültaş Kimya, Marikem Kimyevi ve Endüstriyel Ürünler (hereafter 'Marikem'), and Metkim.



A drum of aluminium paste produced in Brazil and shipped to Turkey in 2014

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015



A drum of aluminium paste produced in Romania and shipped to Turkey in 2014

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015



A drum of aluminium paste produced in China and shipped to Turkey in 2014

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015

CAR's requests for information from the three companies yielded the following responses and details:

- On 15 May 2015, CAR sent a formal request for information to Gültaş Kimya. On 18 May 2015, a Gültaş Kimya representative telephoned CAR and stated that Gültaş Kimya did not export any products and sold only to Turkish companies. Further, on 31 October 2015, Gültaş Kimya wrote to CAR stating that:
 - » It does not authorise any client trading company to resell or export its imported aluminium paste, whether in whole or in part;
 - » the company does not control any post-sale re-transfer of its products by clients;
 - » it has not exported any material of the type subject to CAR's trace request to Syria or Iraq; and
 - » the company is unaware of any legislation that might bind it to enter into an end-user agreement with its clients, which might

prohibit them from forwarding the material concerned to any third party, whether directly or indirectly (see Annexe A).

- Documents sent by Alba Aluminiiu to CAR on 11 June 2015 indicate that, on 10 October 2014, the company dispatched 792 metal drums of aluminium paste by road from Zlatna, Romania, to Çayırova, Turkey (see Annexe B). A Turkish company, 3D Lojistik, acted as a consignee for the buyer, Marikem. On its website, Marikem indicates that its products are stored at 3D Lojistik's warehouse. In an email sent to CAR on 3 November 2015, Marikem states that it does not export to Syria or Iraq and, beyond Turkish domestic sales, exports only to Azerbaijan. As of the publication of this report, 3D Lojistik had not responded to CAR's request for information.

- In a message sent on 21 September 2015 in response to a CAR request for information, Metkim states that it was unable to determine to which client it had sold items in the lot documented by CAR (see Annexe C). The message also asserts that Metkim does not export its products and that its sales are destined exclusively to the Turkish market. In an email to CAR dated 23 October 2015, Metkim confirms that the lot number of the item indicates manufacture on 10 October 2014.

At this stage, CAR is unable to document the full chain of custody of the drums of aluminium paste following their resale by Gültaş Kimya, Marikem, and Metkim.

Fertilizers

IS forces operating in Iraq and Syria almost exclusively use homemade explosives made from fertilizers, such as ammonium nitrate and urea, mixed with other chemical precursors.

During the second battle of Tikrit, the Iraqi Jund al-Imam brigade captured a warehouse (GPS: 34.5877149794, 43.6891239882) in which IS forces had mixed ammonium nitrate produced in Turkey in 2014 by Mert Global, Antakya, in the manufacture of explosives. A CAR field investigation team documented the warehouse's contents on 29 April 2015.

CAR sent requests for information to Mert Global on 8 October and 4 November 2015, but did not receive a written response from the company.


During the siege of Kobane (September 2014–January 2015), IS forces used urea that was distributed by the Turkish company EKM Gübre, and produced in the Russian Federation in 2014, to make improvised explosives for use against Kurdish YPG forces. A CAR field investigation team documented the product in Kobane on 25 February 2015 (GPS: 36.8897040188, 38.3421630319).

CAR was unable to locate the company. Repeated attempts to reach the company through the phone number printed on the bag yielded no results.




A bag of ammonium nitrate produced in Turkey in 2014

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015



A bag of prilled urea imported from the Russian Federation to Turkey in 2014

Kobane, Syria, February 2015

Map 4**Chains of custody of aluminium paste and ammonium nitrate used by IS forces****Map 5****Chain of custody of urea used by IS forces in Syria**

CONTAINERS

During the second battle of Tikrit, Iraqi Federal Police units recovered a hydrogen peroxide drum filled with homemade explosive. CAR documented the item in Tikrit on 29 April 2015. The hydrogen peroxide (INTEROX® AG Spray 35) had been produced in the Netherlands in 2014 before being imported to Turkey. The exact nature of the homemade explosives is unknown, but hydrogen peroxide is often used as a chemical precursor in improvised explosives. Among its civilian applications, hydrogen peroxide solution is used in aseptic packaging processes to sterilize cartons and plastic packaging materials.

The Government of the Netherlands has confirmed that the Belgian company Solvay Chemicals International, Brussels, consigned the hydrogen peroxide solution to the Turkish company Diversey Kimya, Gebze.¹ On 20 February 2014, the Dutch subsidiary of Solvay Chemicals, Solvay Chemie B.V., Herten, sent 180 65 kg drums of INTEROX® AG Spray 35 (Divosan HS 35 VT68), by road to Antwerp, Belgium, where they were loaded onto the

container ship *MSC Sarah*. The ship left Antwerp on 23 February 2015.

According to the Dutch authorities, Diversey Kimya is a regular client of Solvay Chemicals International and receives large quantities of hydrogen peroxide produced by Solvay Chemie B.V.

The Sealed Air Corporation Group provided further information on behalf of its affiliate, Diversey Kimya, regarding the chain of custody of the hydrogen peroxide drums (see Table 3 and Annex D).² The company confirmed that the drum that CAR documented in Tikrit was part of a batch transferred by Diversey Kimya to Mazen Khanati Serrieh Trading & Distributing (hereafter 'Serrieh Trading'), a distributor based in Erbil, Iraq. From there, the distributor transferred drums from the batch to two end users in Iraq: Al Safi Danone, also based in Erbil, and the Karwanchi Group, based in Kirkuk. The two Iraqi end users did not reply to CAR's requests for information.

Table 3

Known chain of custody of the INTEROX® AG Spray 35 drums, one of which CAR documented in Tikrit in April 2015

Date	Activity
31 January 2014	Diversey Kimya agrees to sell 180 drums of hydrogen peroxide to Diversey Gulf.
20 February 2014	Solvay Chemie B.V. in the Netherlands sends 180 drums to Antwerp, Belgium, by road.
23 February 2014	180 drums are shipped from Antwerp to Diversey Kimya in Istanbul, Turkey.
19 March 2014	180 drums are resold by Diversey Gulf to Serrieh Trading (Erbil, Iraq), shipped by road from Diversey Kimya, Turkey.
26 March 2014	65 drums are resold by Serrieh Trading to the Karwanchi Group, Kirkuk, Iraq.
7 May 2014	20 drums are resold by Serrieh Trading to Al Safi Danone, Erbil.
21 May 2014	70 drums are resold by Serrieh Trading to the Karwanchi Group, Kirkuk.
13 August 2014	20 drums are resold by Serrieh Trading to the Karwanchi Group, Kirkuk.
8 September 2014	5 drums are resold by Serrieh Trading to the Karwanchi Group, Kirkuk.
2 March–17 April 2015	1 drum is used in the manufacture of IEDs by IS forces in Tikrit, Iraq.
29 April 2015	CAR documents 1 drum in Tikrit.



This hydrogen peroxide drum was produced in the Netherlands, shipped to Turkey, and then transported to Iraq in 2014. In this photo the drum was filled with homemade explosives

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015



A detail of the hydrogen peroxide drum filled with homemade explosives. Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015

On 19 January 2015 in Makhmour, Iraq, and again near the Mosul Dam on 14 February 2015, CAR documented white petroleum drums, manufactured in Iran for export by the Ehsan Chemi Company, and filled with homemade explosives. The exact nature of the homemade explosives is unknown at this stage, but petroleum jelly is often used as a chemical precursor in improvised explosives.

Peshmerga forces recovered the barrels in January and February 2015 in Khazr (GPS: 36.306272, 43.537445) and near the Mosul Dam (GPS: 36.6202160250, 42.7944870014). As no dates of manufacture or batch numbers are visible, CAR is unable to trace the chain of custody of these items. CAR sent a request for information to the Ehsan Chemi Company on 5 December 2015, but at the time of this report's publication, no response had been received.



White petroleum drums, manufactured in Iran

Near the Mosul Dam, Iraq, February 2015




A detail of a white petroleum drum, manufactured in Iran

Makhmour, Iraq, January 2015

Map 6

Chains of custody of hydrogen peroxide and white petroleum drums used by IS forces.



DETONATING CORD AND SAFETY FUSE

IS forces regularly employ detonating cord in their IEDs to complete the explosive train between the detonator and the main explosive charge. The examples documented by CAR are commercial variants, which are used in both the mining and industrial sectors.

During the siege of Kobane, Kurdish YPG forces captured detonating cord from IS forces in Kobane, Syria (GPS: 36.892334, 38.352662). A CAR field investigation team documented the components in Kobane on 24 February 2015.

Solar Industries, India, produced one spool of detonating cord on 27 February 2014 and exported it to the Turkish company İlci, Ankara. Two months earlier, on 31 December 2012, the Gulf Oil Corporation, India, had produced a spool and exported it to the Turkish company Nitromak Dyno

Nobel, Ankara. Solar Industries, India, produced a further two spools, on 21 and 23 October 2012, and exported them (on an unspecified date) to the Lebanese company Maybel, headquartered in Beirut.

CAR also documented the use of Solar Industries detonating cord by IS forces on the Makhmour front line in Iraq at the end of 2014. There is no evidence to indicate to which regional entity Solar Industries supplied the cord.



A spool of detonating cord produced in India and exported to Turkey in 2014

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



A spool of detonating cord produced in India and exported to Turkey in 2012 or 2013

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



A spool of detonating cord produced in India in 2012 and exported to Lebanon

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



A spool of detonating cord produced in India in 2012 and exported to Lebanon

Kobane, Syria, February 2015

A representative of İlci explained to CAR that the company only sold its products to licensed companies in Turkey and the Balkans, and that the Turkish government prohibited the export of detonating cord to Iraq and Syria.³

A representative of Nitromak Dyno Nobel told CAR that the company was forbidden by Turkish law to export such items, that it sold detonating cord to licensed Turkish companies only, and that it did not control the re-transfer of its products.⁴

The Turkish authorities failed to respond to repeated requests for information, leaving CAR unable to document the chain of custody of the various brands of detonating cord from Ankara, Turkey, to Kobane, Syria.

According to documents provided by Lebanon to CAR on 15 January 2016, Maybel received a licence to import the spools of detonating cord as well as detonators (see below) on 13 May 2014. These spools were part of a batch of six million metres of cord that received an import authorisation from the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade on 3 February 2015 (see Table 4 and Annexe E).

Table 4
Reconstructed chronology of events related to detonating cord and detonators that were exported to Lebanon

Date	Activity
10 September 2008	An import licence for explosives is delivered to Maybel.
21 and 23 October 2012	In India, Solar Industries produces detonating cord for Maybel.
25 December 2012	In India, Economic Explosives produces detonators for Maybel.
21 February 2014	Maybel requests a renewal of its import licence for explosives.
13 May 2014	The import licence renewal is granted to Maybel.
24 June 2014	The Lebanese Ministry of Defence issues a letter based on which the Ministry of Economy grants an import authorisation to Maybel.
31 July 2014	The Lebanese Ministry of Interior issues a letter based on which the Ministry of Economy grants an import authorisation to Maybel.
6 September 2014	The Lebanese Ministry of Defence sends a letter to Maybel to ensure that the company meets technical conditions.
3 February 2015	Maybel receives approval to import the goods from the Lebanese Ministry of Economy.
24 February 2015	CAR documents the items in Kobane, Syria.
1 June 2015	Maybel sends a request to import the goods to the Lebanese Ministry of Interior.
22 June 2015	Maybel sends a request to import the goods to the Lebanese Ministry of Defence.
6 August 2015	Maybel receives the approval to import the goods from the Ministry of Defence.
10 September 2015	Maybel receives the approval to import the goods from the Ministry of Interior.

CAR has noticed some discrepancies in the dates and numbers mentioned in the documents provided by the Lebanese authorities and is investigating the matter.⁸


On 24 February 2015, a CAR field investigation team in Kobane documented a spool of detonating cord produced by Premier Explosives Ltd., India (see image 1). Premier Explosives has confirmed that it sold 6 million metres of detonating cord to the Mechanical Construction Factory, Syria, in 2009 and 2010 (see Annexe F).⁹

In December 2011, the European Union placed the Mechanical Construction Factory on a sanctions list for acting as a front company for the acquisition of sensitive equipment by the Syrian government's Scientific Studies and Research Center.¹⁰

In the absence of serial, batch, and lot numbers, and of dates of manufacture, CAR is unable to assess whether the detonating cord documented in Kobane originated in Syrian government stockpiles.

CAR field investigators also documented Premier Explosives detonating cord among items that Kurdistan Regional Government security forces seized from an IS cell in early December 2014 in Erbil (see image 2). Premier Explosives has told CAR that it never supplied explosive components to Iraq.¹¹

A CAR field investigation team in Kobane documented a spool of detonating cord produced by Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals, India (see image 3). In the absence of serial, batch, and lot numbers, and of a manufacturing date, CAR is unable to further document the chain of custody of this item. Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals has not responded to a request for information.¹²



1. A spool of detonating cord produced in India.

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



3. A spool of detonating cord produced in India.

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



2. Detonating cord produced in India.

Erbil, Iraq, January 2015

The CAR team in Kobane also documented a spool of safety fuse produced by the Indian company Chamundi Explosives. In the absence of serial, batch, and lot numbers, and of a manufacturing date, CAR is unable to document the item's full chain of custody. Chamundi Explosives has stated that the company had not supplied any product to either Iraq or Syria.¹³ CAR awaits further correspondence from Chamundi Explosives.




A spool of safety fuse produced in India


Kobane, Syria, February 2015

Map 7


Chains of custody of detonating cord used by IS forces in Syria



Map 8
Chains of custody of detonating cord used by IS forces in Iraq



Map 9
Chain of custody of safety fuse used by IS forces in Syria



DETONATORS

IS forces employ a combination of electric and non-electric (plain) detonators during the fabrication of their IEDs, fuses, and improvised weapon systems (such as rockets, rocket-assisted mortars, and other improvised projected weapons). As with detonating cord, the examples documented by CAR are commercial variants used in both the mining and industrial sectors.

During the siege of Kobane, Kurdish YPG forces captured plain detonators from IS forces (GPS: 36.892334, 38.352662). A CAR field investigation team documented the items in Kobane on 24 February 2015.

The Indian company Economic Explosives manufactured the detonators on 25 December 2012 and exported them (on an unspecified date) to the Lebanese company Maybel, Beirut.

According to documents provided by Lebanon to CAR on 15 January 2016, Maybel received a licence to import the detonators as well as

detonating cord (see above) on 13 May 2014. These detonators were part of a batch of three million detonators¹⁴ for which an import authorisation from the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade was received on 3 February 2015 (see Table 4 and Annexe E).

YPG forces also captured electric detonators produced by Economic Explosives, but in the absence of serial, batch, and lot numbers, and of a manufacturing date, CAR is currently unable to trace this item's chain of custody. Economic Explosives did not reply to a request for information.¹⁵



A box of plain detonators produced in India in 2012 and exported to Lebanon

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



Electric detonators produced in India

Kobane, Syria, February 2015

ISLAMIC STATE FORCES EMPLOY A COMBINATION OF ELECTRIC AND NON-ELECTRIC DETONATORS DURING THE FABRICATION OF THEIR IEDS, FUSES, AND IMPROVISED WEAPON SYSTEMS.

At the same location, CAR field investigators observed plain and electric detonators produced by Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals, India; plain detonators produced by Premier Explosives, India; and electric detonators produced by IDEAL Industrial Explosives, India. Again, in the

absence of serial, batch, and lot numbers, and of manufacturing dates, CAR is unable to document the full chain of custody of these items. Neither Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals nor IDEAL Industrial Explosives has responded to requests for information.¹⁶



Plain detonators produced in India

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



Electric detonators produced in India

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



Plain detonators produced in India

Kobane, Syria, February 2015



Electric detonators produced in India

Kobane, Syria, February 2015

COMPONENTS, SUCH AS DETONATORS AND DETONATING CORD, ARE SUBJECT TO EXPORT LICENSING, BUT ARE ALSO COMMONLY USED IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS MINING AND INDUSTRY.

Premier Explosives responded promptly to CAR's request for information, stating that it had sold 2 million plain detonators of the type documented in Kobane to the Syrian Ministry of Defence in 2006 (see Annexe F).¹⁷

CAR also documented electric detonators manufactured by Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals in Tuz Khurmatu, Iraq, in October 2014; electric detonators manufactured by Economic Explosives in Erbil in October 2014; electric detonators manufactured by IDEAL Industrial Explosives in Erbil in January 2015; and plain detonators manufactured by Economic Explosives in Kirkuk in April 2015. Due to the absence of shipping information, CAR is currently unable to further document the chain of custody of these items.



An electric detonator produced in India

Kirkuk, Iraq, October 2014



An electric detonator produced in India

Erbil, Iraq, September 2014



A plain detonator produced in India.

Kirkuk, Iraq, April 2015



An electric detonator produced in India

Erbil, Iraq, January 2015

In November and December 2014 in the vicinity of Makhmour, as well as in early 2015 near Kirkuk, Peshmerga forces recovered electric detonators from IS forces. These devices had been produced by Schaffler, Austria. An absence of

shipping information prevents CAR from further documenting the chain of custody of the items at this time. Schaffler has not responded to a request for information.¹⁸



An electric detonator produced in Austria

Near Makhmour, Iraq, December 2014



An electric detonator produced in Austria

Kirkuk, Iraq, April 2015

In February 2015 in Kobane, and in April 2015 in Kirkuk, CAR field investigation teams documented zero-delay electric detonators that were produced by Zbrojovka Vsetin – INDET before 1998, or before 1992 by its predecessor Zbrojovka Vsetin

or ZVS – Zbrojovka Vsetin, according to the Czech authorities¹⁹, and subsequently captured from IS forces. Without packaging or shipping documents, CAR is not able at this stage to reconstruct the chains of custody of these items.



An electric detonator produced in the Czech Republic


Kobane, Syria, February 2015




An electric detonator produced in the Czech Republic

Kirkuk, Iraq, April 2015

Map 10
Chains of custody of detonators used by IS forces in Syria



Map 11
Chains of custody of detonators used by IS forces in Iraq



WIRES AND CABLES

IS forces use wire and cable in the construction of IEDs in Iraq and Syria: copper wire for command-wire IEDs, and telecommunications cable for anti-handling devices.

During the second battle of Tikrit, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units captured copper wire from IS forces in Tikrit (GPS: 34.6427809820, 43.6556829605). On 28 and 29 April 2015 in Tikrit,

a CAR field investigation team documented three spools manufactured by three Turkish companies: Hes Kablo of Hacilar, Erikoğlu of Denizli, and Kablo Türk of Istanbul.



A spool of copper wire produced in Turkey in 2013

Tikrit, Iraq, March 2015



A spool of copper wire produced in Turkey in 2014 (left)

Tikrit, Iraq, March 2015

A Hes Kablo representative confirmed that the company exported around USD 70 million worth of wire to Iraq between 2012 and 2015. Given the volume of exports, it is not possible to identify individual consignments, and this particular item's chain of custody from Hacilar, Turkey, to Tikrit, Iraq, remains unclear. Hes Kablo manufactured the item on 18 December 2013.²⁰

The spool of copper wire produced by Erikoğlu was manufactured on 8 March 2014. A company representative confirmed that Erikoğlu exported its products to Syria, but not to Iraq.²¹ CAR is unable to document this item's chain of custody from Denizli, Turkey, to Tikrit.

The Turkish company Kablo Türk produced the third spool of wire documented by CAR's field investigation team in Tikrit. Kablo Türk has not responded to a request for information, and CAR is therefore unable to provide further information on the item's chain of custody from Istanbul to Tikrit.²²



A spool of copper wire produced in Turkey in 2014 (right)

Tikrit, Iraq, March 2015

In January 2015, Iraqi Peshmerga forces captured pressure plates manufactured by IS forces for use as IED switches near Tuz Khurmatu, south of Kirkuk (GPS: 35.3029355, 44.310715). A CAR field investigation team documented the items in a Peshmerga base near Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, on 10 April 2015.

IS forces had connected the pressure plates to the IEDs with telecommunications cable produced by the Turkish company Ünal Kablo, Istanbul, in May 2013. Ünal Kablo has stated that it exports telecommunications cable to Iraq and Syria.²³ CAR is currently unable to document the item's full chain of custody from Istanbul to Tuz Khurmatu.




A telecommunications cable produced in Turkey in 2013

Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, April 2015

Map 12

Chains of custody of wires and cables used by IS forces



ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS

IS forces have used electronic components such as signal relays, transistors, and microcontrollers to initiate IEDs.

Between October 2014 and April 2015, CAR field investigation teams in Iraq documented dozens of EC2 signal relays produced by the Japanese company NEC TOKIN, microcontrollers fraudulently labelled 'Shindengen'* , TIP102 and BDX53C transistors built by the Swiss company STMicroelectronics, and PIC16F1827 microcontrollers produced by the US company Microchip Technology. These electrical components were all used in IEDs deployed by IS forces against Peshmerga forces, Popular Mobilization Units, and Iraqi Federal Police.

In its response to a CAR information request, NEC TOKIN states that:


- The company has a bulk export licence, which allows it to export less sensitive items to less sensitive destinations without individual licence applications;


- the company does not supply its products to countries and destinations that threaten international peace and security;
- the signal relay is a general-purpose device; and
- the company has a record of all customers that have purchased EC2 signal relays, but will not disclose any information on these customers due to contractual agreements.

Microchip Technology stated that the information documented by CAR was 'not sufficient to identify a recipient of each of the devices'.²⁴ Armed groups that targeted US troops in Iraq used Microchip Technology microcontrollers in IEDs during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which indicates some continuity, and possibly a technology transfer, between different groups in the Iraq conflict.²⁵

STMicroelectronics has not replied to requests for information.²⁶


* On 26 February, Shindengen Electric Manufacturing Co. Ltd. informed CAR that the 'the microcontrollers in question are counterfeit products. Shindengen neither manufactured the products, nor was involved in any way in the supply chain.' Having commissioned an independent investigation, CAR concludes that the items are Microchip PIC16f1827 microcontrollers. Unknown parties removed the original information printed onto these microcontrollers by abrasion and fraudulently applied the name 'Shindengen' and the part number 'MCZ3001DB' to each. Shindengen did not manufacture the products and was not involved, in any capacity, in their supply.







TIP102 transistors produced by STMicroelectronics

Erbil, Iraq, October 2014



PIC16F1827 microcontrollers produced by Microchip Technology

Erbil, Iraq, October 2014




Microchip PIC16f1827 microcontrollers fraudulently re-labelled as Shindengen MCZ3001DB microcontrollers

South of Erbil, Iraq, December 2014



EC2 signal relays produced by NEC TOKIN

South of Erbil, Iraq, December 2014



TIP102 transistors produced by STMicroelectronics

South of Erbil, Iraq, December 2014




A BDX53C transistor produced by STMicroelectronics

South of Erbil, Iraq,
December 2014



PIC16F1827 microcontrollers produced by Microchip Technology


Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, April 2015



A Microchip PIC16f1827 microcontroller fraudulently re-labelled as a Shindengen MCZ3001DB microcontroller

Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, April 2015





TIP102 transistors produced by STMicroelectronics

Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, April 2015



A Microchip PIC16f1827 microcontroller fraudulently re-labelled as a Shindengen MCZ3001DB microcontroller

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015



An EC2 signal relay produced by NEC TOKIN

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015





A TIP102 transistor produced by STMicroelectronics

Tikrit, Iraq, April 2015

Map 13

Chains of custody of electronic components used by IS forces²⁷





MOBILE TELEPHONES

IS forces have consistently used a specific model of mobile telephone in one type of remote-controlled IED employed in Iraq.

IS forces in Iraq consistently use a Model 105 Type RM-908 Nokia mobile telephone in the manufacture of a specific type of remote-controlled IED. Since Microsoft's acquisition of Nokia in 2014, newer models of this telephone have been branded Microsoft Mobile.

Microsoft Corporation, of which Microsoft Mobile is an affiliate, has provided CAR with extensive information on the chain of custody of ten mobile telephones seized from IS forces in Iraq (see Annex G).²⁸

Peshmerga forces seized five of the telephones from IS forces near Makhmour in early December 2014. CAR documented the items on 12 December 2014 near Erbil. The five telephones were part of a batch of Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile phones purchased by Ghamdan General Trading & Import, based in Yemen, and delivered on 23 July 2014 to Al Areen Computers, based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.²⁹



Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephones

Near Erbil, Iraq, December 2014

Peshmerga forces seized another mobile telephone from IS forces near Makhmour in early December 2014; CAR documented the item on 12 December 2014 near Erbil. This phone was one of a batch of Nokia 105 RM-908 telephones bought by Al Watani Telecom, Baghdad, and delivered on 21 May 2014 to Al Watani Telecom, based in Erbil.³⁰



A Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephone captured from IS forces near Makhmour, Iraq

Near Erbil, Iraq, December 2014.

Peshmerga forces seized another Nokia 105 RM-908 telephone from IS forces near Makhmour in early December 2014; CAR also documented this item on 12 December 2014 near Erbil. This telephone was shipped in a batch of Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile phones bought by Derinton International, based in the United Arab Emirates, and delivered on 15 June 2014 to Fastlink, a company based in Erbil.³¹



A Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephone captured from IS forces near Makhmour, Iraq

Near Erbil, Iraq, December 2014.

Kurdish security forces seized another telephone during a counter-terrorism operation in Erbil in early December 2014. CAR documented the phone on 28 January 2015 in Erbil. This phone was shipped in a batch of Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephones bought by Brightpoint Middle East, based in the United Arab Emirates, and delivered on 14 November 2014 to Hawk Freight Services, based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.³²



A Microsoft Mobile 105 RM-908 mobile telephone captured from IS forces in Erbil, Iraq

Erbil, January 2015

ISLAMIC STATE FORCES IN IRAQ CONSISTENTLY USE A MODEL 105 TYPE RM-908 NOKIA MOBILE TELEPHONE IN THE MANUFACTURE OF A SPECIFIC TYPE OF REMOTE-CONTROLLED IED.

Kurdish security forces seized another two telephones during the counter-terrorism operation in Erbil in early December 2014. CAR documented the telephones on 28 January 2015 in Erbil. The two phones were part of a batch of Nokia 105


RM-908 mobile phones bought by Midcom, based in the United Arab Emirates, and delivered on 19 September 2014 to Onesto, based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.³³



As of this report's publication, Al Areen Computers, Ghamdan General Trading & Import, Al Watani Telecom, Fastlink, Derinton International, Hawk Freight Services, Brightpoint Middle East, Onesto,

and Midcom had not responded to CAR's requests for information about the subsequent purchasers of these telephones.


Map 14
Chains of custody of mobile telephones used by IS forces



ANNEXES


ANNEXE A

Gültaş Kimya letter of 31 October 2015 (1/2)



ANNEXE A

Gültaş Kimya letter of 31 October 2015 (2/2)



ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (1/10)

DOCUMENT ELECTRONIC DE EXPORT				DECLARAȚIE		A. BROL DE EXPORTARE / DE DESTINAȚIE	
3 Expeditor / Expeditor ALBA ALUMINIU SRL CARII 10 RO 516100 ZLATNA Limba: RO		Nr. RO12401154		EX	A	MFR AROBV0300E006435 Data MFR: 10/10/2014 BROL vama: ROBV0300 ALBA IULIA	
9 Destinatari SD LOGISTIK CUMHURİYET MAH. SEVINDIR SOY. NO. 8 TR KOCAELI GAYIROVA-KOCAELI Limba: TR		No.		11 Ormulari 1	4 Lista de incarcari 2	Mantua 7 Nr. de prezentare Linh: 14-13719157-2003 10/10/2014 CARN	
14 Declarant / Reprezentant ALBA - SPED SRL STR. REPUBLICII NR. 26 RO		[2] Nr. RO15719157		9 Responsabil financiar BANCA COMERCIALA ROMANA SUCURSALA ZLATNA RO ZLATNA Limba: RO		10 Tasa p. dest. / a. prov. RO / pret	
18 Identitatea si nationalitatea mijlocului de transport la plecarea / iesire B200W0SB005CN RO RO 0		19 C.S.		16 Tasa de origine Romania		12 Efectuata pentru valoare	
17 Identitatea si nationalitatea mijlocului de transport acelor care trece frontiera B200W0SB005CN RO RO R		20 Conditi de incarcare FCA ZLATNA Limba: RO		11 Tasa de origine / a. prov. RO / pret		13 P.A.C.	
23 Mod de transport la frontiera 3	25 Mod de transport interior 3	27 Locul de incarcare / descarcare		22 Moneda si valoarea totala factura EUR	23 Curs de schimb 4.4195	21 Natura activitatii 1 1	
29 Brol de iesire BG003103	30 Localizarea marfurilor Funcii vama: ROBV0300 Loc exportării:		28 Informati financiare si bancare Bancă: Firma: Cont nr.:		17 Tasa de destinatie Turcia		
Limba documentului de intrare la export: RO		Limba de dialog la export: RO		Valoarea tehnica: 227897.56			
Tara destinatie Cod tara: BG Bulgaria		Destinatie					
34 Raport de plata				48 Identificarea antrepozitului			
50 Principalul colet reprezentat prin Tipul si data:		51		Semnatura		C BROL DE PLECAR	
52 Garantie nevasabila pentru		53		Funcție		53 Brol de destinatie (si tara)	
60 / CONTROLUL LA BROL DE PLECAR / DE DESTINATIE Rezultat: Agrii aplicării: Nume: D				61 Stampila		64 Locul si data: ALBA IULIA 10/10/2014 Semnatura si numele declarantului / reprezentantului IODORAN	
62 Referinta sigla		63 Semnatura		64 Limba: RO			
66 Semnatura (data semnata): 08/10/2015		67 Semnatura:					



Regulamentul la data: 30/10/2011 (1/13/0)

ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (3/10)


COMUNITATEA EUROPEANĂ				TITLUL DE DECLARAȚIE		MRN
T S A D	2 Expeditor/Expeditor Nr. RO12401154		A3 Val: C		T2	
	ALBA ALUMINIU SRL GARII 10 ZLATNA RO		Formularul(2) (inc. inc. 2000)		14ROBV030000004476	
	8 Destinatar (N)		Anexa(3) 1		Total Călești(5) 24	
	3D LOGISTIK CUMHURİYET MAH. SEVİNDİK SOK. 9 KOCAELI TR		Număr de Calând(7)		Greutate Brută(kg)(35) 22176	
	Data și ora venii la primul loc de avans pe teritoriul țării(512)		Cod țară exp. (515) ROMANIA		Cod țară dest. (17) TURCIA	
	Cod modalitate de plată cheie/ă de transport (529)		Se Alte-pacurile în cursul transportului		G VIZA AUTORITĂȚILOR	
	Identitatea și naționalitatea mijlocului de transport la plecarea (18) B200W05 B500SCN RO		Retinerea înțeleasă și înțeleasă înțeles		COMPETENTE	
	Identitatea și naționalitatea mijlocului de transport altă decât înțeles(21) B200W05 B500SCN RO		Codul țării(țării) de pe stivă(213)			
	Stat de proveniență (516) 9		Locul de decizie(519) TR			
	Număr de înțeles(517) RO		Număr de referință al transportului(510)		RO BG TR	
Destinatar (secundate) S/A Nr.		Expeditor (secundate) S/A Nr. RO12401154				
3D LOGISTIK CUMHURİYET MAH. SEVİNDİK SOK. 9 KOCAELI TR		ALBA ALUMINIU SRL GARII 10 ZLATNA RO				
Transportator(507) Nr. RO27310925		Număr de plecare(508)				
INTERACOS TIM SRL TINTESTI 48 BUZAU 127840 RO						
Țările de destinație(55)	Locul și țara		Locul și țara			
	Identitatea și naționalitatea noului mijloc de transport		Identitatea și naționalitatea noului mijloc de transport			
ȚARA AUTO- RITĂȚII PENTRU COMPETE- TENȚE (P)	Că(1) Identitatea noului container		Că(1) Naționalitatea noului container			
	Nume sigilă: Număr mărci		Nume sigilă: Număr mărci			
Sensul(50) Sistemă		Sensul(50) Sistemă				
<input type="checkbox"/> Date deja înregistrate în sistem		<input type="checkbox"/> Date deja înregistrate în sistem				
Principala de legătură(50) Nr. RO3451552		BIROU DE PLECARĂ(C) ROBV0300				
SGS Romania S.A. Calea Serban Voda 38 Bucuresti 040212 RO		Data acceptării: 2014-10-10				
Biroul de inspecție prezidențială (si din)(51)		TR220200 2017-09-20				
52 Gară nevalabilă pentru		06ROANV0031000476		Că(1) Birou de destinație (si țara)(53) GEBZE GÜMRÜK MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ		
CONTROLAT LA BIROU DE PLECARĂ (D)		CONTROLAT LA BIROU DE DESTINAȚIE (D)				
Rezultat: A2 Considerat satisfăcător		Data sistemului Că(1) înțeles(51)		Exemplari de retur remis la data de după înregistrarea solu- ției		
Sigiliu aplicat: Număr 1 mărci: 0044173 Termen (data limită): 2014-10-15		Observații		Semnătura Stampilă		

ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (4/10)

B Plecare: ROBV0300

Data: 2014-10-10


 14ROBV030000004478

LISTĂ ARTICOLE TRANZIT/SECURITATE		Formular(3)		2	
Art. Juri(32)	Nr. și natura coletelor/bucări/mercii și nr. colete(31/1)	Descrierea mărfurilor(31/2)			
Expeditoare/Exportator(2)		Destinatari(6)			
Expeditoare/Securitate(X504)		Destinatari/Securitate(X506)			
Documente prezentate/certificate(44/1)		Declarație Sumară/Document Precedent(46)			
Menzionare și nr. mijloc transport în plecare(18)		Menzionări Speciale(44/2)			
Identitatea și nr. mijloc transport acty care trece frontiera(21)		Număr de identificare unic pe loturi(?)			
Local de descărcare(316)		Nr. Contabilizator(31/3)	Numărul sigilării(308)		
UNYD(44/4)		Cod ven.(31/4)	Cod mod.pă. chitană(329)	Circulație Internă(335)	
1	24 FARA MARCA	TIPUL Decl(1)		Cod ț. exped/imp (15)	Cod ț. destina(17)
		Circulație internă(336)			
730 FN					
B200W0S.B500SCN					
I200W0S.B500SCN					
RO		32129000		22175	

PASTA DE ALUMINIU PENTRU INDUSTRIA LACURILOR
SUDPRELITON

ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (5/10)

CERTIFICAT DE CIRCULAȚIE		
1. Exportator (Nume, adresă completă, țară) ALBA ALUMINIU SRL STR. GARII NR.10 516100 ZLATNA JUD. ALBA ROMANIA		A.TR. Nr. E 0000953
3. Destinatari (Nume, adresă completă, țară) (mențione facultativă) 3D LOGISTIK CUMHURIYET MAH. SEVINDIK SOK, NO.9 CAIROVA - KOCABLI TURKEY		2. Document de transport (mențione facultativă) Nr. _____ Data _____
7. Informații privind transportul (mențione facultativă)		4. ASOCIERE între COMUNITATEA EUROPEANĂ și TURCIA 5. Țara de export: ROMANIA 6. Țara de destinație (1): TURCIA
9. Nr. de ordine 1.	10. Marca, numerotarea, numărul și natura ambalajelor (Pentru mărfuri în vrac, indicați numele navei, numărul vagonului de cale ferată sau numărul autovehiculului) Descrierea mărfurilor 24 PALLETS/792 METALLIC DRUMS AND 1 CARTON BOX INSIDE WITH METALLIC CANS - ALUMINIUM PAST	11. Greutatea brută (Kg) sau alte unități de măsură (mc, ltr, etc.) 22175,00KG.
12. VIZA VĂMI Declarație certificată conform Document export (1) Model EXA Nr. MAN E4135 Din 10.10.2014 Unitatea vamală BB BVI ALBA Țară sau teritoriul de eliberare ROMANIA Stampila Locul ALBA IULIA data 10.10.2014 (Semnătura) E. G.		13. DECLARAȚIA EXPORTATORULUI Subsemnatul declară că mărfurile descrise mai sus îndeplinesc condițiile prevăzute pentru comerțul prezentului certificat. Locul ZLATNA data 10.10.2014

(1) Completat la Statul Membru sau, Turcia

(2) Completat în limba țării când reglementările țării exportatoare o cer

Table 14. Topografia Științifică Com. 3R, Billa, Str. Mărcușii, nr. 10, Sibiu









ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (6/10)

Seller: S.C. ALBA ALUMINIU S.R.L. Gara Street No.10, Alba County 516100-Zlatna, ROMANIA ID: 12401154 VAT: RO12401154 Nr. de inregistrare la Reg. Comertului: 01/423/1999 Capital social: 510 000 lei Bank: Romania Commercial Bank, Zlatna Branch Account: [REDACTED] IBAN: [REDACTED] SWIFT: [REDACTED] Correspondent bank: Erste Group Bank AG, Vienna SWIFT: GIBA AT WG Payment terms: In advance Please mention Correspondent Bank!!!		Invoice no. AA2965/10.10.2014 Buyer: MARIKEM KIMYEVİ VE ENDUSTRIYEL URUNLER BILISIM HIZMETLERI TICARET TARKAN SARUHAN Visnezade Mah. Catakcesme Sok. NO:23/11 BEŞIKTAŞ 34357, İSTANBUL, TURKEY Tel. +90 532 277 64 68 ID: VAT:		
Order, contract number: 2014-03/15.08.2014		Consignee: 3D LOJISTIK Cumhuriyet Mah. Sevindik Sok. No. 9 Çayırova- Kocaeli Turkey Date of issue: 10.10.2014 Due date: Taxable date: 10.10.2014		
Goods description and/or code	Quantity/unit	Price per unit in EUR net	Total netto price	VAT rate
1. Aluminium paste ALBA 5L (65%NV) customs tariff No. 32.12.9000	18.975 kg	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	0%
2. Aluminium paste ALBA 8M (WS low odor) customs tariff No. 32.12.9000	825 kg	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	0%
		Amount without VAT	Amount VAT	Total amount to be paid
		[REDACTED]	0,00	[REDACTED] EUR
Seal: Packing list no. 1507/10.10.2014				
Plan no. Header: SC INTERACOS TMI SRL Netto: 19.800,00 kgs Bruto: 22.174,06 kgs Country of origin: ROMANIA Parity: FCA Zlatna				
	Netto in RON - VAT	Total RON	Total in EUR	
VAT amount	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
Sums	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
Total amount to be paid	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
Current value: 1 EUR = 4,4061 RON				
Tel. +40258856027 E-mail: logistics@albaaluminii.ro		Fax: +40258856556		

ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (7/10)

	S.C. ALBA ALUMINIU S.R.L. ALUMINIUM POWDERS AND PASTES Gării Street No. 10 516100 – ZLATNA, Alba County ROMANIA Tel. / Fax: 0040-258-856027, 856028, 856536 V.A.T.: [REDACTED] IBAN: [REDACTED] e-mail: office@albaaluminiiu.ro	    	
	PACKING LIST NO. 1507/10.10.2014 ref. INVOICE no. AA2965/10.10.2014		
	GOODS: ALUMINIUM PASTES, type ALBA 5L (65%NV), ALBA 8M (WS low odor) and samples of ALUMINIUM PASTES type ALBA 5L, ALBA 7M.		
	MATERIAL: PASTĂ DE ALUMINIU tip ALBA 5L (65%NV), ALBA 8M (WS low odor) și mostre de PASTĂ DE ALUMINIU tip ALBA 5L, ALBA 7M.		
	PACKING: 24 PALLETS WITH 792 METALLIC DRUMS of 25 kg NET and 1 CARTON BOX inside with 4 METALLIC CANS		
AMBALAJ: 24 PALEȚI CU 792 GĂLEȚI METALICE de 25 kg NET și 1 CUTIE DE CARTON înăuntru cu 4 CUTII METALICE.			
NUMBER OF PACKAGES: 24 PALLETS NUMĂR DE AMBALAJE: 24 PALEȚI			
QUANTITY: - 19.800,60 kg NETT WEIGHT - 792 metallic drums x 1,7 kg/drum = 1.346,40 kg. - 24 pallets x 29 kg/pallet = 696,00 kg - 24 small wooden pallets x 12 kg/pallet = 288,00 kg stretch folio for packing (26 pcs. x 1,5 kg/folio) = 39,00 kg. - polyethylene tape for packing = 0,50 kg - metal staples for packing = 0,20 kg - labels (792 pcs. x 0,005 kg/label) = 3,96 kg - 4 metallic cans x 0,035 kg/can = 0,14 kg - 1 carton box x 0,20 kg/box = 0,20 kg.			
CANTITATEA: - 19.800,60 kg NET - 792 găleți metalice x 1,7 kg/găleată = 1.346,40 kg. - 24 paleți x 29 kg/palet = 696,00 kg - 24 paleți mici x 12 kg/palet = 288,00 kg - folie pentru împachetat (26 buc. x 1,5 kg/folie) = 39,00 kg. - bandă de polipropilenă pt împachetat = 0,50 kg. - capace metalice = 0,20 kg - etichete (792 buc. x 0,005 kg/etichetă) = 3,96 kg. - 4 cutii metalice x 0,035 kg/cutie = 0,14 kg. - 1 cutie de carton x 0,20 kg/cutie = 0,20 kg.			
	22.175,00 kg BRUT		
RECEIVER: 3D LOGSTIK DESTINATAR: Cumhuriyet Mah. Seyindik Sok. No.9 Cayirova – Kocaeli TURKEY			
	Issued by:  		

ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminiiu documents provided on 11 June 2015 (8/10)

FORMULE CADRE POUR LE TRANSPORT MULTIMODAL DE MARCHANDISES DANGEREUSES				
MULTIMODAL DANGEROUS GOODS FORM				
1. EXPÉDITEUR/SHIPPER/CONSIGNOR/SENDER SC ALBA ALUMINIU SRL 516100, GARIJ ST. No.10 ZLATNA, ALBA COUNTY ROMANIA Tel. 0040-258856556		2. NUMÉRO DU DOCUMENT DE TRANSPORT/TRANSPORT DOCUMENT NUMBER		3. Page 1 de/of 1 pages
6. DESTINATAIRE/CONSIGNEE 3D LOGISTIK Cumhuriyet Mah. Sevindik Sok. No. 9 Cayirova- Kocaeli Turkey		4. NO DE REFERENCE EXPÉDITEUR SHIPPER'S REFERENCE		
DECLARATION DE L'EXPÉDITEUR/ SHIPPER'S DECLARATION (voir 23) Je déclare que le contenu de ce chargement est décrit ci-dessous de façon complète et exacte par la désignation officielle de transport et qu'il est convenablement classé, emballé, marqué, étiqueté, placardé et à tous égards bien conditionné pour être transporté conformément aux réglementations internationales et nationales applicables. I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment are fully and accurately described below by the proper shipping name, and are classified, packaged, marked, labeled, placarded and are in all respects in proper condition for transport according to applicable regulations.		5. NO DE REFERENCE TRANSMITTEUR FREIGHT FORWARDER'S REFERENCE		
8. CET ENVOI EST CONFORME AUX LIMITES ACCEPTABLES POUR: (à biffer la mention non-applicable) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		9. INFORMATIONS COMPLÉMENTAIRES ** ADDITIONAL HANDLING INFORMATION IMDG-AUTORISATION DE TRANSPORT (provisoire, spéciale...) Carriage approval ADR- Dérogation nationale ou accord multilatéral (multilateral agreement) * transport selon 1.1.4.2 Carriage in accordance with 1.1.4.2 * transport ne dépassant pas les limites libres prescrites au 1.1.3.6/Load not exceeding the exemption limits prescribed in 1.1.3.6		
10. NAVIRE/No. DE VOILET DATE VESSEL/FLIGHT & DATE		11. PORT-LIEU DE CHARGEMENT LOADING		
12. PORT-LIEU DE DECHARGEMENT DISCHARGE		13. DESTINATION		
14. MARQUES D'EXPÉDITION Shipping Marks		NOMBRE ET TYPE DE COLIS, DESCRIPTION DES MARCHANDISES, QUANTITE NETTE PAR EMBALLAGE INTERIEUR (combines) NUMBER AND KIND OF PACKAGES, DESCRIPTIONS OF GOODS		AUTRES (accidents par exemple la fumigation) OTHERS HANDLING INFORMATION
1/1/125, Flammable solids, organic, N.O.S. (Solvent White Spirit), 4.1, PACKING GROUP II, (c) IMDGS PAS-G		MASSE BRUTE (kg) GROSS MASS	MASSE NETTE (kg) NET MASS	CUBAGE VOLUME (m ³)
24 pallets with 792 metallic drums of 25 kg Net and 1 carton box inside with 4 metallic cans of 0,15 kg Net				
759 metallic drums of 25 kg net: Aluminium Paste ALBA 5L(65%NV) -		20.265,30 KG	18.975,00 KG	
33 metallic drums of 25 kg net: Aluminium Paste ALBA 8M(WS low odor)-		881,10 KG	825,00 KG	
4 metallic cans of 0,15 kg net: Aluminium Paste ALBA 5L, ALBA 7M-		0,74 KG	0,60 KG	
24 pallets + 24 small wooden pallets + stretch folio for packing + metal staples + polypropylene tape for packing + labels + 1 carton box		1.027,86 KG		
MASSE BRUTE TOTALE: 22.175,00 KG				
15. No. D'IDENTIFICATION DU CONTENEUR No. D'IMMATRICULATION DU VEHICULE CONTAINER/VEHICULE IDENTIFICATION		16. NUMÉROS DES CELLULES AFAL NUMBER(S)	17. DIMENSIONS ET TYPE DU CONTENEUR/VEHICULE CONTAINER/VEHICULE SIZE AND TYPE	18. TARIF (kg)
CERTIFICAT D'EMPOTAGE/CHARGEMENT CONTAINER-VEHICULE PACKING CERTIFICATE Je déclare que les marchandises décrites ci-dessus ont été empotées/chargées dans le conteneur/vehicule identifié ci-dessus conformément aux dispositions applicables. I hereby declare that the goods described above have been packed/loaded into the container/vehicle identified above in accordance with the applicable provisions.		23. ENGAGEMENT DU CONDUCTEUR Je certifie que: - au chargement des marchandises, mon véhicule était équipé, étiqueté et signalé conformément aux prescriptions de l'arrêté ADR du 1er juin 2001, modifié - les marchandises chargées n'étaient pas incompatibles entre elles et les colis étaient convenablement calés et arrimés. Je reconnais qu'en cas de retrait de la signalisation ou de l'étiquetage de mon véhicule, de modification du calage ou de l'arrimage des colis ou de chargement/l'arrivée à bord de produits incompatibles avec ceux remis par cette société, la responsabilité seule serait engagée.		
22. NOM DE LA SOCIÉTÉ/NOME OF COMPANY SC ALBA ALUMINIU SRL		NOM DU TRANSPORTEUR SC INTERACOSTIM SRL No. D'IMMATRICULATION DU VEHICULE B-200-WO/SB-500-S CN NOM DU CHAUFFEUR ■■■■■		23. NOM DE LA SOCIÉTÉ EXPÉDITEUR - NAME OF COMPANY (SHIPPER) SC ALBA ALUMINIU SRL NOM et Adresse de la Société ■■■■■
Lieu et date (Place and Date) ZLATNA, 10.10.2014		Date: 10.10.2014		Lieu et date (Place and Date) ZLATNA, 10.10.2014
Signature du déclarant ■■■■■		Signature du chauffeur ■■■■■		Signature du déclarant ■■■■■

ANNEXE B


Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (9/10)


9/10/15 / 10.10.2014

**SCRISOARE DE TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONALER FRACHTBRIEF** **CMR**

ROU / 052 / 6987
S.C. INTERAGOS TIM S.R.L.
Timisoara, Nr. 48, Camera 1, Buzau
EORI : RO 27310925

<p>1 Expeditor (nume, adresă, țară) Aluminii (Pasta Alumina) S.A. S.C. ALBA ALUMINIU S.R.L. STR. GERIL, NR. 10, ZLATNA 516100, ALBA COUNTY, ROMANIA</p>	<p>16 Transportator Adresa / Anschrift Timisoara, Nr. 48, Camera 1, Buzau EORI : RO 27310925</p>
<p>2 Destinatari (nume, adresă, țară) Emplăcări (Nume, Adresă, Țară) 3D LOGISTIK CUMHURİYET MAH. SEVINDIK SOK. NO.9 CAYIROVA - KOCAELI TURKEY</p>	<p>17 Transportator Adresa / Anschrift Timisoara, Nr. 48, Camera 1, Buzau EORI : RO 27310925</p>
<p>3 Locul prevăzut pentru încalzirea marii Anheftungsort der Güter Localitatea / Ort CAVIROVA Țara / țară TURKEY Data / Datum</p>	<p>Autovehicul / marca MAN Țara Număr de circulație B. 200 VPS / B. 500 SEN Etichetă 1 FRATIA MIHA 2</p>
<p>4 Locul în care încalzita marii Ort und Tag der Anheftung der Güter Localitatea / Ort ZLATNA Țara / țară ROMANIA Data / Datum 10.10.2014</p>	<p>18 Rețevă și răspuns al transportatorilor Versand- und Empfangsbekanntgaben des Frachtbrieftellers</p>
<p>5 Documente însoțite Begleitende Dokumente INVOICE, PACKING LIST, COA, PROFORMA INVOICE, B.G.D., ATR & CERTIFICATE</p>	
<p>6 Nume și număr Bezeichnung und Nummer</p>	<p>7 Nr. de serie Anzahl der Packstücke</p>
<p>8 Mod de ambalare Art der Verpackung</p>	<p>9 Număr marfă Bezeichnung des Gutes</p>
<p>10 Nr. statistic Statistisches Zeichen</p>	<p>11 Greutate brută kg Bruttogewicht kg</p>
<p>12 Cădere m Längenangabe in m</p>	
<p>24 PALLETS / 792 METALLIC DRUMS AND 1 CARTON BOX INSIDE WITH 4 METALLIC CANS - ALUMINIUM PASTE</p>	
<p>UN 1385 FLAMMABLE SOLIDS ORGANIC NO.3 (SOLVENT WHITE SPIRIT) 4.1, II, CE) INDG. PS: F+P, 3-G</p>	
<p>13 Instrucțiunile expeditorului (normalizat, varianta în circulație) Anweisungen des Absenders (Zoll- und Befreiungstext)</p>	<p>19 Conținutul spațiilor Besetzung</p>
<p>14 Prezența de însoțire Begleitungsmitteilungen Formă / Form Non-transport / Ja</p>	<p>20 Prezența de însoțire Begleitungsmitteilungen Formă / Form Non-transport / Ja</p>
<p>21 Nume și număr Bezeichnung und Nummer</p>	<p>22 Nume și număr Bezeichnung und Nummer</p>
<p>23 Nume și număr Bezeichnung und Nummer</p>	<p>24 Nume și număr Bezeichnung und Nummer</p>






ANNEXE B

Alba Aluminii documents provided on 11 June 2015 (10/10)

PROFORMA INVOICE No. 1509 Date 10.10.2014		CONTRACT NO. Date:			
Seller: S.C. ALBA ALUMINIU S.R.L. Vânzător:		Buyer: MARIKEM KIMYEVI VE ENDUSTRIYEL URUNLER BILISIM HIZMETLERI TICARET TARKAN SARUHAN			
Address: 10, Garii St. 516100-Zlatna Alba County ROMANIA		Address: Visnezade Mah. Cadakcesme Sok. NO:23/11 BEŞIKTAŞ 34357, ISTANBUL, TURKEY			
Mode of transport: by truck Modalitate de transport: cu camionul		Receiver: 3D LOJISTIK Cumhuriyet Mah. Sevindik Sok. No. 9 Cayirova- Kocaeli Turkey			
Loading place: Zlatna, Romania Locul de încărcare:		Delivery conditions: FCA Zlatna Condiția de livrare:			
Final destination: Cayirova- Kocaeli, Turkey Destinația finală:		Delivery date: 10.10.2014 Data de livrare:			
Payment conditions: - sample with the amount only for the customs - sample for research Condiții de plată: - mostră cu valoare numai pentru vamă - mostră pentru cercetare					
Marking packing, number of packages. Goods description and/or code			Weight Net	Weight Brut	Volume m ³
1 carton box inside with 4 metallic cans of 0.15 kg Net			0.60 kg	0.94 kg	
Code and description of goods		Tariff no.	U/M	Quantity kg	Unit price EUR
Aluminium Paste ALBA 5L		3212.90.00	Kg	0,30	■
Aluminium Paste ALBA 7M		3212.90.00	Kg	0,30	■
Signature: ■		Total invoice amount:			■ EUR

ANNEXE C

Metkim communication of 21 September 2015



ANNEXE D

Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation regarding Diversey Kimya (1/7)

APPENDIX 1



Diversey Kimya Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. Değişiminyolu, Caddeesi Hızır Hoca Sokak No: 84 34752 İğrenköy/İSTANBUL Telefon: 0 216 578 64 00 Faks: 0 216 578 64 01

PROFORMA INVOICE

SOLD TO: DIVERSEY GULF FZE P O BOX 61485 JEBEL ALI FREE ZONE DUBAI UAE DATE: 31.01.14

SHIP TO: Mazen Khayat Serrieh Trading & Distributing Ain Kawa, Musafaha St. Erbil - Iraq PROFORMA INVOICE NO: Z0140K13-D883

CODE	PRODUCT NAME	QTY	NET KG	GROSS KG	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL PRICE	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	Shipping Price / Unit (€)
70021962	DIVOSAN HS 35 V768 60 L 65 KG	180	11.700,00	12.300,00			Holland	
7510477	Divosan Hypoclorite (V73200LL)	132	4.310,00	4.800,00			Turkey	
7514261	DRY TECH 4 VL83 20L/22,8KG	32	723,60	770,04			Turkey	
1000092	Disoluble SDA TRACK VL15-200	10	3.232,00	3.530,00			Turkey	
TOTAL			20.192,60	21.406,04				

FREIGHT: 0,00 EUR

INSURANCE: 0,00 EUR

NET INVOICE VALUE: EUR

PO Number: 13-D883

Delivery Terms: EXW CERZE

Bank Name/ Branch/ Account/ IBAN: CITIBANK CENTRE

Collection address: Diversey Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş. Deposu DOSS (Dilovası Organize Sanayi Bölgesi) 3. Katım Muallimköy Cad. no:1/1 Gebze KOCAELI

Collection Week: WEEK 11

Sıfır Numarası: 301751-249333

ANNEXE D

Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation regarding Diversey Kimya (2/7)

Diversey Kimya Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.									
Değirmenyolu Caddesi Hızır Hoca Sokak No: 85 34752 İçerenköy/İSTANBUL									
Telefon: 0 216 578 64 00 Faks: 0 216 578 64 01									
APPENDIX 2									
SHIPPING INVOICE									
Diversey									
CONSIGNEE:									
Mazen Khattabi Seriah Trading & Distributing Aln Kawi, Musafaha					DATE		19.03.2014		
St. Erbil - Iraq					REF. TO INV. NO		C 701687		
CODE	PRODUCT NAME	PACK SIZE	QTY IN PACK	NET KG	GROSS KG	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL PRICE	Customs Tariff	Country of Origin
70021902	DIVOSAN HS 35 VTS8 80 L 85 KG	80LT	180	11700.00	12380.00			284700001000	Holland
7510577	Divosan Hypochlorite (VT3)20L(23,6 KG)	20LT	192	4531.20	4807.00			380894900019	Turkey
7514091	DRY TECH 4 VL83 20L/22.5KG	20LT	32	729.60	779.04			340399000000	Turkey
5600092	Dicelube Star Track VL 15 200 L(202 KG)	200LT	16	3232.00	3530.00			340399000000	Turkey
TOTAL			420	20.192,80	21.496,04				
						FREIGHT	EUR		
						INSURANCE	EUR		
						NET INVOICE VALUE	EUR		
PO Number: 13-0883									
Delivery Terms: EXW CERZE									
Collection address: Diversey Kimya San. ve Tic. A.Ş. Deposu DOSE I									
Dilovası Organize Sanayi Bölgesi 3. kısım									
Muallimköy Cad. no:1/1 Gebze KOCAELİ									
Diversey Kimya Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.									

ANNEXE D

Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation regarding Diversey Kimya (3/7)

APPENDIX 3

ORIGINAL INVOICE TO: Diversey

Karawanchi Group الكرونجي

ACCOUNT NO:
INVOICE NO: 105
INVOICE DATE: 26-3-2014

TERMS: CIF ERBIL
PAYMENT:
REFERENCE: 24

CODE	QTY	PACKING	DESCRIPTION	CURRENCY PRICE \$/kg	U.S.D VALUE
	65	65 kg	Carton Sterilisation Divosan HS35 VT68	5	

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Stamp]



COLIS			SUB TOTAL		U.S.D
G.W:					U.S.D
N.W:				TOTAL	U.S.D
		ORIGIN			
			Previous balance		
			Blance after this invoice		
N.B:					

SERRIEH TRADING & DISTRIBTING, Italian City 617 - Erbil - IRAQ
PHONE 0750 144555

ANNEXE D

Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation regarding Diversey Kimya (4/7)

APPENDIX 4


0.2 12 14


ORIGINAL INVOICE TO:				Diversey	
AL Safe Danone Erbil				ACCOUNT NO:	
TERMS: CIF ERBIL				INVOICE NO:	401
PAYMENT:				INVOICE DATE:	7-5-2014
REFERENCE:					
				CURRENCY	U.S.D
Note	QTY	PACKING	DESCRIPTION	PRICE S/pack	VALUE
2	4	20 L	EasyFoam VF32	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	2	25 L	Acifoam VF10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2 Five 2 bottles	4	20 L	Filler Ceaneer VK12	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	2.8	5 L X 2	Jontie 300	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	10	5 L X 2	H400	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	10	5 L X 2	H500	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	10	25 L	Divosan Active VT5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	4.00	5 L X 4	Suma Light 1.2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	20.00	6 roll 1kg	Roll Tissue	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	20.00	60 L	HS 35 H2O2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2 delivered before	275.00	20 L	Suma Drain	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2	10	262 kg	Pascal VA5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
F.O.L	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	Soap Desbenser		0
COLIS				[REDACTED]	
SUB TOTAL					U.S.D
G.W:					U.S.D
N.W:				TOTAL	U.S.D
ORIGIN					[REDACTED]
				Previous balance	
				Blance after this invoice	[REDACTED]
N.B:					S


ERBIL TRADING & DISTRIBUTING, Italian City 617 - Erbil - IRAQ
 PHONE 0750-1446555


#15/2014

ANNEXE D

Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation regarding Diversey Kimya (5/7)

APPENDIX 5




ORIGINAL INVOICE TO:				Diversey	
Karawanchi Group الكرونجي				ACCOUNT NO:	
TERMS: CIP ERBIL				INVOICE NO:	116
PAYMENT:				INVOICE DATE:	21/05/2014
REFERENCE:					
CODE	QTY	PACKING	DESCRIPTION	CURRENCY PRICE \$/kg	U.S.D VALUE
	70	65 kg	ماء اوكسجين Divosan HS35 VT68	\$	
	4	258 kg	كوستيك سائل VCI	\$	
	70	29.4 kg	كوستيك سائل VCI	\$	
	2	200 kg	مزيل سبور نافثة كونفوير Star Teack VL 15	\$	
					
COLIS			SUB TOTAL		U.S.D
G.W:					U.S.D
N.W:				TOTAL	U.S.D
ORIGIN					
			Previous balance		
			Blance after this invoice		
N.B:					

SERRIEH TRADING & DISTRIBTING, Italian City 617 - Erbil - IRAQ

ANNEXE D





Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation regarding Diversey Kimya (6/7)

ORIGINAL INVOICE TO:				Diversey	
Karawanchi Grouo الكرونجي TERMS: CIF ERBIL PAYMENT: REFERENCE:				ACCOUNT NO:	
				INVOICE NO:	811
				INVOICE DATE:	13-8-2014
CODE	QTY	PACKING	DESCRIPTION	CURRENCY PRICE \$/kg	U.S.D VALUE
	20	65 kg	Carton Sterilisation Divosan HS35 VT68	\$	
					
COLIS			SUB TOTAL		U.S.D
G.W:					U.S.D
N.W:			TOTAL		U.S.D
ORIGIN					
			Previous balance		
			Blance after this invoice		
N.B:					

SERRIEH TRADING & DISTRIBTING, Italian City 617 - Erbil - IRAQ

ANNEXE D

Sealed Air Corporation Group documentation regarding Diversey Kimya (7/7)

APPENDIX 7					
 			مجموعة مازن رضا خانقاري		
ORIGINAL INVOICE TO:				Diversey	
Karawanchi Group الكرونجي TERMS: CIF ERBIL PAYMENT: REFERENCE:				ACCOUNT NO:	
				INVOICE NO:	342
				INVOICE DATE:	08/09/2014
CODE	QTY	PACKING	DESCRIPTION	CURRENCY PRICE S/kg	U.S.D VALUE
	5	65 kg	ماء اوكسجيني Divosan HS35 VT68	\$	
X	10	32.5 kg	ماء اوكسجيني Divosan HS35 VT68	X \$	X
	5	23.6 kg	كلور سائل VT3	\$	
 					
COLIS			SUB TOTAL		U.S.D
G.W:					U.S.D
N.W:			TOTAL		U.S.D
ORIGIN					
Previous balance					
Blance after this invoice					
N.B:					

SFRRIFH TRADING & DISTRIBTING. Italian Citv 617 - Erbil - IRAQ

ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (1/12)

***Permanent Mission of Lebanon
to the United Nations***

Ref: 98/16

The Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Director of Conflict Armament Research and, with reference to its note # CAR-FC-15-224 dated October 7, 2015, has the honor to forward information received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon from the Lebanese competent authorities regarding the origins and supply routes of the commercial stores listed in your trace requests.

The Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Director of Conflict Armament Research the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, January 15, 2016



Attn: [REDACTED]
Conflict Armament Research
Administration Officer
London, United Kingdom
Tel: (44) 207-833-5831
Fax: (44) 207-278-3091
Email: [REDACTED]

866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 531, New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212)353-5460, Fax: (212)838-2819

ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (3/12)

مرسوم رقم ١١٤٤٩
تجديد رخصة استيراد ديناميت ولوؤزها واستثمار مخزون

إبـت رئيس الجمهورية
بـتـاء عن البـتـاء

بناء على قانون الأسلحة والذخائر الصادر بالمرسوم الاستراتيجي رقم ١٣٧ تاريخ ١٩٥٩/٦/١٢، ولا سيما المادة الثالثة منه المعدلة بموجب القانون رقم ١٩٠ تاريخ ٢٠٠٠/٥/٢٤.

بناء على المرسوم رقم ١٢٢١ تاريخ ١٩٥٣/٣/٣.

بناء على الاستفتاء المقدم من شركة مايل س.م.م. المسجل برقم ٣٢٥٦ تاريخ ٢٠١٤/٢/٢١ والمتعلق بطلب تجديد رخصتها لاستيراد ديناميت ولوؤزها واستثمار مخزون.

بناء على المرسوم رقم ٢٠٢ تاريخ ٢٠٠٨/٩/١٠ القاضي بإعطاء رخصة للمستدعية باستيراد ديناميت ولوؤزها واستثمار مخزون.

بناء على اقتراح وزير الداخلية والبلديات ووزير الدفاع الوطني.

برسم ما يلي:

المادة الأولى: يجدد العمل بالرخصة الممنوحة لشركة مايل س.م.م.، الكاتبة على العقار رقم ١١٨ من منطقة قديشونية العقارية - المنصورية - قضاء المتن - محافظة جبل لبنان، باستيراد ديناميت ولوؤزها واستثمار مستودعات لحزنها.

المادة الثانية: على لشركة المرخص لها التقيد بالقرنين والأنظمة الفرعية الاجراء.

المادة الثالثة: يعمل بهذه الرخصة لمدة خمس سنوات اعتباراً من تاريخ ٢٠١٣/٩/١٠.

المادة الرابعة: ينشر هذا المرسوم ويبلغ حيث تدعو الحاجة %

صدر عن رئيس الجمهورية
رئيس مجلس الوزراء
الامضاء: [Redacted]


بجذا في ١٣ أيار ٢٠١٤
الامضاء: [Redacted]

وزير الداخلية والبلديات
الامضاء: [Redacted]

وزير الدفاع الوطني
الامضاء: [Redacted]


ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (4/12)




ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (5/12)



ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (7/12)



ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (8/12).

Help in tracing the origins and supply routes of weapons on Lebanese soil

Based on the attached trace request, the necessary research was done to discover the authorities and laws related to the import of these weapons, this research revealed:

The company MAYBEL CO. SARL, having its residence in Beirut, has presented a request to import

5000000 (five million capsule detonator number 8) detonators

3000000 (three million meters) of slow fuses for explosives

3000000 (three million meters) of fast fuses for explosives

After collecting information from the relevant authorities it became clear that the company has obtained:

- Import license from the Presidency of Republic of Lebanon on date of 13 May 2014 and has received a decree (number 11449) signed by the former President of the Republic, [REDACTED], copy of the decree attached.

- Approval to import a quantity of explosives and accessories mentioned above from the Ministry of National Defence – Military Command – authorisation number 2909/RA/W (2909/9/ε غ), on 10 August 2015, signed by the Minister of National Defence, [REDACTED], copy of the approval attached.

- Approval to import a quantity of explosives and accessories mentioned above from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (number 10294), on 22 June 2015, signed by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, [REDACTED], copy of the approval attached.

- Import authorisation number 30/2015 issued by the Ministry of Economy and Trade – The General Department of Economy and Trade – number 1539/2015 on 23 February 2015, under the name of MAYBEL CO. SARL [REDACTED] we attach a copy signed by the Director of the Department Foreign Trade, [REDACTED], and that the exporting company is a civil company involved in the sale of explosives, called MAXAM GROUP, we attach a copy of the logo of the company.

Based on what is presented and after studying the licenses the company MAYBEL CO. SARL owns allows it to import the listed quantities of explosives and accessories, it is clear that it is correct and issued by official authorisations in the Republic of Lebanon and that the mentioned company is known for its integrity concerning its collaboration with the different Lebanese armed forces in securing weapons and ammunition for these forces.

The President of the Section Data

[signature]

Translation of original documents

ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (9/12)

Decree number 11449

Renewal License to import dynamite and its accessories and to invest in its storage

The President of the Republic

Seen the Constitution

Seen the law on weapons and ammunition issued by legislative decree number 137 dated on 12/6/1959 and in particular article three, modified by law 190 dated on 24/5/2000.

Seen decree number 1221 dated on 3/3/1953.

Seen the request presented by the company Maybel Co. Sarl ([REDACTED]), registered under number 32567 dated on 21/2/2014, concerning the request to renew its license to import dynamite and its accessories and to invest in its storage.

Seen decree number 202 dated on 10/9/2008 deciding to grant the license to import dynamite and its accessories and to invest in its storage.

Seen the motion of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities and the Minister of National Defence.

Decreets as follows:

Article one: Renews the license granted to company Maybel Co. Sarl ([REDACTED]), situated at Parcel number 118 of the Daychounieh Real Estate Area – Mansourieh – Matn District – Mount Lebanon Governorate, to import dynamite and its accessories and to invest in storage depots.

Article two: The licensed company has to comply with the laws and the regulations in force.

Article three: The license is valid for a period of five years starting by 10/9/2013.

Article four: This decree is published and announced if needed %

Issued in name of the President

Baabda, 13 May 2014

The President of the Council of Ministers

Signed: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

The Minister of Interior and Municipalities

The Minister of National Defence

Signed: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

Translation of original documents

ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (10/12)

Republic of Lebanon
Ministry of National Defence
The Minister

Number: 2909/RA/W (س/ع غ/2909)

Berzeh, 6/8/2015

To the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities

Subject: Request for approval to import detonator type number 8 and slow and fast fuses for explosives.

Reference: Letter number 10294 dated on 22/6/2015

Referring to the subject and the reference above concerning the request presented by the company "Maybel Co. Sarl – [REDACTED]", concerning the approval to import detonator type number 8 and slow and fast fuses for explosives according to the following:

5000000 (five million) detonators type number 8

3000000 (three million meters) slow fuses for explosives

3000000 (three million meters) fast fuses for explosives

Article 17 of the legislative decree number 137 (dated on 12/6/1959) and its modification stipulates the following: "the import, export, and re-export of war material and weapons and ammunition and separated parts and all the mentioned material in the four first categories are subject to previous authorisation from the Ministry of Economy and Trade after approval from the Ministry of National Defence (Military Command) and the approval of the Council of Ministers. Hunting weapons on the other hand and its ammunition and weapons and material mentioned in the five other categories are subject to approval from the Ministry of Economy and Trade after the approval of the Ministry of Interior and Municipality."

The material requested to be imported falls within the ninth category of the second article of the above-mentioned decree and therefore its import is subject to previous authorisation. The imported goods of the interested company have been inquired and this has revealed that it meets with the technical conditions according to paragraph 2 of the appendix attached to our letter number 3532/AR/W (س/ع غ/3532), dated on 06/09/2014 and is able to receive the full quantity requested.

Considering the above-mentioned this Ministry does not see any technical obstacle to prevent the acceptance for this company to import the requested quantity after it has obtained the previous authorisations and to inspect it after its arrival on Lebanese soil.

Kind regards

Minister of National Defence

[REDACTED]

[signature]

[illegible]

Translation of original documents

ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (11/12)

Republic of Lebanon
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
The Minister
=====
Number of issue: 10294

To the Ministry of Economy and Trade
– Department Trade –

Subject: Request to import detonators type number 8 and slow and fast fuses for explosives.
Reference: Article 17 of the Legislative Decree number 137 dated on 12/6/1959.

We entrust to you herewith the request, presented by the company Maybel Co. Sarl –
[REDACTED], under number 10294 dated on 1/6/2015 and concerning the import
of what follows:

- 1-/ 3000000/ three million meters of slow fuse for explosives.
- 2-/ 3000000/ three million meters of fast fuse for explosives.
- 3-/ 5000000/ five million detonators type number 8.

We transfer the request to you with our approval, in compliance with the rulings of article 17 of the legislative decree referred to in the reference above, after joining it to the approval of the Ministry of National Defence in its letter number 2909/RA/W (ج ع غ /2909), dated on 6/8/2015, to import the requested quantity and to inspect it at its arrival on Lebanese soil.

Beirut, 10 September 2015
The Minister of Interior and Municipalities
[REDACTED]
[signature]

Translation of original documents

ANNEXE E

Government of Lebanon documentation on detonating cord and detonators (12/12)

[logo]
 Republic of Lebanon
 Ministry of Economy and Trade
 General Department of Economy and Trade
 Number of Record: 1539/2015
 Beirut, 3/2/2015

Import authorisation number 30/2015

Name and surname importer: Company Maybel Co. Sarl – [REDACTED]	Documents attached to Request of Authorisation:
Quality: Trader	Copy of the letter of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities number 7191 dated on 31/7/2014
Full address: Beirut – Lebanon	Copy of the letter of the Ministry of National Defence number 2625/RA/W (س/ع ٤/2625), dated on 24/6/2014
Native country: different	
Country of origin: different	
Entry customhouse: All Lebanese ports	
Purpose of the import: Trade	

Number Custom Notification	Nature of goods	Gross Weight ()	Net Weight ()	Number	Value LBP
	Slow fuse for explosives	x	x	3,000,000 meters	[REDACTED]
	Fast fuse for explosives			3,000,000 meters	[REDACTED]
	Detonators type number 8	x	x	3,000,000 detonators [sic]	[REDACTED]

Total net weight (in full): _____ [seal + signature]

Total value LBP (in full): [REDACTED]

Amount of tax for authorisation LBP: _____ Number of receipt: 15-71-51200032 Date of receipt: 3/2/2015

[REDACTED]

Remarks and special conditions

- The Ministry of National Defence has stipulated in its above-mentioned letter that the requested quantities must be inspected at their arrival on Lebanese soil %

[stamps and seals]

Signature of the governmental Authority
 The President of the Department Foreign Trade
 [signature]

Translation of original documents

ANNEXE F

Message from Premier Explosives regarding detonating cord sold to Syria

Srl No	Invoice number and Date	Product details	Quantity	Consignee details
1.	2110 Date 18/10/2010	Detonating cord	2,900,000 mtrs	Syrian Republic Damascus Mechanical Construction factory Industrial Zone, Al- Qadam road P.O.Box 35202
2.	2109 Date 18/10/2010	Detonating cord	2,100,000 mtrs	-Do-
3	2003 Date 15/05/2009	Detonating cord	1,000,000 mtrs	-Do-
4.	D12/2006-07 Date 22/11/2006	Plain Detonator No 8	2,000,000 Nos	Industrial Establishment of Defence P.O. Box 2330 Damascus Syrian Arab Republic

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (1/26)

ATTACHMENT A

Responses

The tables below provides a summary our responses. In addition, please find below also the Delivery Documents for the shipments that contained these products.

Set 1 - TRACE REQUEST - 2015/10-29

Item Number	Delivery Document Number	Goods Issue Date	Material	Description	Delivery quantity	Name of the ship-to party	Name of sold-to party
# 1	8005252405	15/07/2014	A00010247	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST CYAN	7500	ALAREEN COMPUTERS/4 all logistics F, [REDACTED], Airport Freezone Khalid Bin Wald S, 16898 Dubai, UAE	Ghamdan General Trading& Import, P.O.Box 1813, Sana'A Republic of Yemen, Yemen
# 2	8005181023	09/05/2014	A00011702	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV IQ BLACK	9600	AL WATTANI TELECOM, ERBIL EINKAWA, OPP. MAR YOUSIF KANESAT, ERBIL, IRAQ	AL WATTANI TELECOM AL Mansoor, Mahala 609, Zuhak B, Ho BAGHDAD, IRAQ
# 3	8005252405	15/07/2014	A00010247	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST CYAN	7500	ALAREEN COMPUTERS/4 all logistics F, [REDACTED], Airport Freezone Khalid Bin Wald S, 16898 Dubai, UAE	Ghamdan General Trading& Import, P.O.Box 1813, Sana'A Republic of Yemen, Yemen
# 4	8005252405	15/07/2014	A00010247	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST CYAN	7500	ALAREEN COMPUTERS/4 all logistics F, [REDACTED], Airport Freezone Khalid Bin Wald S, 16898 Dubai, UAE	Ghamdan General Trading& Import, P.O.Box 1813, Sana'A Republic of Yemen, Yemen
# 5	8005252405	15/07/2014	A00010247	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST CYAN	7500	ALAREEN COMPUTERS/4 all logistics F, [REDACTED], Airport Freezone Khalid Bin Wald S, 16898 Dubai, UAE	Ghamdan General Trading& Import, P.O.Box 1813, Sana'A Republic of Yemen, Yemen
# 6	8005252405	15/07/2014	A00010247	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST CYAN	7500	ALAREEN COMPUTERS/4 all logistics F, [REDACTED], Airport Freezone Khalid Bin	Ghamdan General Trading& Import, P.O.Box 1813, Sana'A Republic of Yemen, Yemen

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (2/26)

						Walid S. 16898 Dubai, UAE	
# 7	8005206804	6/06/2014	A0011702	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV IQ BLACK	5000	Fastlink, Via 9-607, Shama Street, Anikwa, Erbil, Iraq	Derinton International FZE, Dubai Airport Free Zone-2E307, Dubai, UAE
# 8	8005378208	4/11/2014	A00011696	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV N-AFRICA 2 BLACK	15000	Hawk Freight Services FZE Plot No W-28, DAFZ, S-4438 DUBAI UNIT ARAB EMIR.	Brightpoint Middle East FZE Unit F21/F22/F23 PO Box 54704 DUBAI UNIT ARAB EMIR.
# 9	8005313739	12/09/2014	A00011705	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV GH CYAN	5000	Onesto FZE, P.O.Box 54695, Dubai Airport Freezone, WarehouseD04&D05, Dubai, UAE	Midcom FZE, P.O.Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Office no6, Tomaco Building, Sheikh Zayed Road, Near Times Square Mall, Dubai, UAE
# 10	8005313739	12/09/2014	A00011705	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV GH CYAN	5000	Onesto FZE, P.O.Box 54695, Dubai Airport Freezone, WarehouseD04&D05, Dubai, UAE	Midcom FZE, P.O.Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Office no6, Tomaco Building, Sheikh Zayed Road, Near Times Square Mall, Dubai, UAE

Please, find the corresponding Shipping Documents below:



Set 2 – TRACE REQUEST – 2015/10-30

The IMEI codes of mobile devices, which are the subject of this request, do not appear in our IMEI database. The Product Code is also not available, and further, the Model and Type descriptions do not appear to be a fit for our records.

Nokia did manufacture a 1208 model, but not with this type description. As Microsoft did not take possession of the Nokia India manufacturing facility (which are stated to have manufactured these products), a potential contact for further information for this inquiry to Nokia is: [REDACTED], Nokia VP Corporate Affairs [REDACTED].

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (3/26)

Agility

232 HAN 8550 4532 HAN - 0037956


Shipper's Name & Address NOKIA VIETNAM LIABILITY CO LTD Street 6 No 6 V&IP Tac NINE Industrial Park, Tu Son Town, Phu Chau Commune, Bao Ninh Province 160000 VN		Shipper's Account Number Air Waybill # AGILITY LTD. 6th Flr, Cartographic Pub. 65 Nguyen Chi Thanh St. Dong Da Dist., Ha Noi	
Consignee Name & Address ALAREN COMPUTERS/ AAL LOGISTICS F2E, AIRPORT FREEZONE, HANOI WALID STR, P.O. BOX 16898 DUBAI AE		Consignee's Account Number Copy 1, 2 and 3 of the Air Waybill are Originals and have the same effect	
Flight Details Agent Name and City Agility Ltd, Ha Noi Branch Office GMC Building, Bach Vong Ha Ward, Cau Giay District, Ha Noi City, VN		Accounting Information AGENTS REF AHN1642504 Door to Airport FREIGHT PREPAID	
Agent's IATA Code 37-3-0169/0305		Account SH990 REF 0005252405	
Name of Origin (Place of Issue) and the Addressing HANOI HAN-KUL-DXB		SH990 REF 0005252405	
To KUL	By MN	Via DXB MN	Currency USD
Mode of Transport DUBAI		Flight Details MH6351/05M154 /19	Date of Issue XXXXXXXXX
Notify: - AGILITY LOGISTICS LLC Dubai Airport Free Zone - B-09 P.O. Box 925 78 Dubal UNITED ARAB EMIRATES			

No. of Pieces Gross Weight	Rate Class	Chargeable Weight	Rate	Charge	Tax	Notes and Quantity of Goods (If of Other than 10 Kilograms)
17	2327.0K Q	2327.0	Nb Arranged			MOBILE PHONES DN NO. 5005252405
10120.0	80.0	31.5cm				
158120.0	80.0	76.0cm				
SLM: 17 17 2327.0						

Signature of Shipper/Consignee
 As Arranged As Arranged
 16-Jul-2014 HANOI
 HAN - 0037956

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (4/26)



AIR CONSOLIDATION MANIFEST

Consigned To: AGILITY LOGISTICS LLC
Dubai Airport Free Zone - B-04
P.O. Box 52378
Dubai
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Agility Ltd. Ha Noi Branch Office:
CNC Building, Dich Vong HBC Ward,
Cau Gay District, Ha Noi City, VN

TEL:
FAX:

WAWB No: 2225FN432

File Ref: 261194254

Airline: MALAYSIAN AIRLINES SYSTE

FWB Number: PKGS

Flight: 9H6051

Departure: Hanoi

Volume Kgs: 2227.00

Gross Kgs: 2227.00

ECN No.: 16-Jul-2014

Destination: Dubai

Order No.: DVCMH154

Commodity/Order No.: MOBILE PHONES
PN NO.800521940

Page: 1 of 1

Collect

Totals: Packages: 17 Gross Kgs: 2227.00

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (5/26)

Transport Document

Shipper's Reference Number: 8005252405

WARNING: LITHIUM BATTERIES THAT HAVE BEEN RECALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER FOR SAFETY REASONS MUST NOT BE SHIPPED BY AIR.

Terminology:

- Cell – electrochemical unit, consisting of an anode and a cathode, capable of generating electrical current
- Battery – assembly of cells
- Lithium ion cells/batteries – rechargeable – includes lithium polymer cells/batteries
- Lithium metal cells/batteries – generally non-rechargeable

This package contains lithium cells or batteries in the following configuration:

Lithium Ion - Maximum of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20 Watt-hours per cell; and • 100 Watt-hours per battery 	Lithium Metal – Maximum of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 gram of lithium metal per cell; and • 2 grams of lithium per battery
Packed with equipment (ICAO/IATA Packing Instruction 966, Section II)- Cells or batteries contained in a package with associated electronic equipment	

- This package must be handled with care. A flammability hazard exists if the package is damaged.
- If this package is damaged in transportation, it must not be loaded until the condition of the contents can be verified. The batteries contained in this package must be inspected for damage and may only be repacked if they are intact and protected against short circuits.
- For more information about the batteries contained in this package, call the following telephone number: +44(0)870 190 8286 CareChem24

List telephone number here, including a sea code and any applicable country code

Name/Address of shipper:

Nokia (Viet Nam) LLC
 No. 3, street 6, VSIP, Phu Chan commune
 Tu Son Town, Bac Ninh Province
 Vietnam

Name/Address of Consignee:

AL AREEN COMPLETEERS/4 all logistics F
 Airport Freezone Khalid Bin Waheed S
 16898 Dubai
 UAE

Date: _____

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (7/26)

Page 2

Invoice

Customer / 101571 Chamdan General Trading & Import P.O.Box 1813 SANA'A-REPUBLIC OF YEMEN YEMEN	Number 500207295 Billing Date 15.07.2014 Your Reference/Date JH/NK/055/2014/W27/30.05.2014 Delivery note no./shipping date 8005252405/15.07.2014 Our Reference 8925963/30.05.2014
--	--

Item	Our Code	Your Code	Qty	Unit	Unit price	Value
Description	Origin	HS	ECCN			
License						
Purch.order no. JH/NK/055/2014/W27 from 30.05.2014						
0030	A00010248		140,0	PC		
CELLPHONE						
Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST BLACK						
VN	85171200		5A992			
Order 8925963 from 30.05.2014						
Purch.order no. JH/NK/055/2014/W27 from 30.05.2014						
0040	A00010248		2.500,0	PC		
CELLPHONE						
Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST BLACK						
VN	85171200		5A992			
Order 8925963 from 30.05.2014						
Purch.order no. JH/NK/055/2014/W27 from 30.05.2014						
Items total						
VAT			0,000			0,000
TOTAL AMOUNT					USD	
=====						
VAT 0%. Export.						
Contact address Nokia Sales International Oy Kaivohdentie 4 FI-02150 ESPOO FINLAND Tel: +358 (0) 7180 08000 Fax: +358 (0) 7180 44940	Bankers Bank of America NA, London IBAN: [REDACTED] BIC: [REDACTED] Kredex Bank Plc Finland IBAN: [REDACTED] (EURI) [REDACTED] (USDI) BIC: [REDACTED]	Registered in Nokia Sales International Oy Kaivohdentie 4 FI-02150 ESPOO FINLAND Domicile: Helsinki Business ID 2422988-2 VAT Reg No: FI24229862				

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (8/26)

Page 3

Invoice

<p>Customer / 101571 Ghamdan General Trading& Import P.O.Box 1813 SANA'A-REPUBLIC OF YEMEN YEMEN</p>	<p>Number 500207295</p> <p>Your Reference/Date JH/NK/055/2014/W27/30.05.2014</p> <p>Delivery note no./shipping date 8005252405/15.07.2014</p> <p>Our Reference 8925963/30.05.2014</p>
<p>Billing Date 15.07.2014</p>	

Nokia Sales International

Invoicing Department

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L * W * H(CM)	unit#	Material	Del. tot.
Wooden	108.9	144.4	120 80 75	1	A00010247	640
Wooden	108.9	143.8	120 80 75	2	A00010247	640
Wooden	108.9	142.6	120 80 75	3	A00010247	640
Wooden	108.9	147.2	120 80 75	4	A00010247	640
Wooden	108.9	147.0	120 80 75	5	A00010247	640
Wooden	98.7	136.3	120 80 75	6	A00010247	580
Wooden	109.8	146.0	120 80 75	7	A00010248	640
Wooden	109.8	145.6	120 80 75	8	A00010248	640
Wooden	108.9	145.9	120 80 75	9	A00010247	640
Wooden	109.8	147.5	120 80 75	10	A00010248	640
Wooden	108.9	146.1	120 80 75	11	A00010247	640
Wooden	88.5	122.3	120 80 75	12	A00010247	520
Wooden	99.5	134.6	120 80 75	13	A00010248	580
Wooden	108.9	145.2	120 80 75	14	A00010247	640
Wooden	108.9	143.6	120 80 75	15	A00010247	640
Wooden	108.9	144.6	120 80 75	16	A00010247	640
Wooden	24.0	44.3	120 80 31	17	A00010248	130

Total number of shp. units: 17 Tot. quant: 10140

Total Net Weight: 1,729.5

Total Gross Weight: 2,327.0

General Terms and Conditions of Sale 2012, of Microsoft Mobile Oy shall

<p>Contact address Nokia Sales International Oy Keuhalahdentie 4 P.O.2190 ESPOO FINLAND Tel: +358 104 7180 08000 Fax: +358 104 7180 44840</p>	<p>Bankers Bank of America NA, London IBAN: [REDACTED] (EUR) IBAN: [REDACTED] (USD) BIC: [REDACTED] Norddea Bank Plc Finland [REDACTED] (EUR) [REDACTED] (USD) BIC: [REDACTED]</p>	<p>Registered in Nokia Sales International Oy Keuhalahdentie 4 02150 ESPOO FINLAND Oskariinikauppi, Helsinki Business ID: 2422986-2 VAT Reg No: FI242298602</p>
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ANNEXE G


Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (9/26)

Page 4

Invoice

<p>Customer / 101571 Ghandan General Trading& Import P.O.Box 1813 SANA'A-REPUBLIC OF YEMEN YEMEN</p>	<p>Number 500207295</p> <p>Your Reference/Date JH/NK/055/2014/W21/30.05.2014</p> <p>Delivery note no./shipping date 8005252405/15.07.2014</p> <p>Our Reference 8925963/30.05.2014</p>	<p>Billing Date 15.07.2014</p>
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apply. General terms and conditions of Sale 2012 are available at web portal for suppliers and customers.



<p>Contact address Nokia Sales International Oy Keuhäydentie 4 FI-02150 ESPOO FINLAND Tel: +358 (0) 7180 08000 Fax: +358 (0) 7180 44340</p>	<p>Bank's Bank of America N.A, London IBAN: [REDACTED] (EUR) ISAN: [REDACTED] (USD) BIC: [REDACTED]</p> <p>Nordea Bank Plc Finland [REDACTED] (EUR) [REDACTED] (USD)</p>	<p>Registered in Nokia Sales International Oy Keuhäydentie 4 02150 ESPOO FINLAND Domicile: Helsinki Business ID: 2422806-2 VAT Reg. No: FI24228962</p>
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ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (10/26)

Mode of transport		Standard		Terms of delivery	
Standard				013 CIP DUBAI, Incoterms 2000	
				No of Net Gross Volume p/s Weight KG Weight KG M3	
				17 1.729,5 2.327,0 11,810	

Item	Our Code	Your Code	Ordered	Unit	Delivered
	Description		Qty.		Qty.
	Origin HS	ECCN			
0010	A00010247 CELLPHONE Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST CYAN VN 85171200 5A992 Batch FI20		5.000,0	PC	5.000,0
0020	A00010247 CELLPHONE Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST CYAN VN 85171200 5A992 Batch FI20		2.500,0	PC	2.500,0
0030	A00010248 CELLPHONE Nokia 105 RM-908 NV MIDDLE EAST BLACK VN 85171200 5A992 Batch FI20		140,0	PC	140,0

Contact Address
Nokia (Vietnam)
No. 9, Street 6
Võ Thị Sáu
Phu Chân Commune
Tư Sơn Town
Bạc Liêu Province
VIETNAM

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (11/26)

Page 2

Delivery note

Delivery note no./shipping date.....
8005232405/15.07.2014

Customer / 101571
Ghamdan General Trading& Import
P.O.Box 1813
SANA'A-REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
YEMEN


Your Reference
JH/NK/055/2014/W27/30.05.2014
Our Reference

Item	Our Code	Your Code	Ordered qty.	Unit	Delivered qty.
	Description	HS			
	Origin	ECCN			
	Licence				
0040	A00010248		2.500,0	PC	2.500,0
	CELLPHONE				
	Nokia 105 RM-906 NV MIDDLE EAST BLACK				
	VN 85171200	5A992			
	Batch PI20				

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L	*	N	*	N(CM)	unit#	Material	Del.	tot
Wooden	108.9	144.4	120	80	75			1	A00010247		640
Wooden	108.9	143.8	120	80	75			2	A00010247		640
Wooden	108.9	142.6	120	80	75			3	A00010247		640
Wooden	108.9	147.2	120	80	75			4	A00010247		640
Wooden	108.9	147.0	120	80	75			5	A00010247		640
Wooden	98.7	136.3	120	80	75			6	A00010247		580
Wooden	109.8	146.0	120	80	75			7	A00010248		640
Wooden	109.8	145.6	120	80	75			8	A00010248		640
Wooden	108.9	145.9	120	80	75			9	A00010247		640
Wooden	109.8	147.5	120	80	75			10	A00010248		640
Wooden	108.9	146.1	120	80	75			11	A00010247		640
Wooden	88.5	122.3	120	80	75			12	A00010247		520
Wooden	99.5	134.6	120	80	75			13	A00010248		580
Wooden	108.9	145.2	120	80	75			14	A00010247		640
Wooden	108.9	143.6	120	80	75			15	A00010247		640
Wooden	108.9	144.6	120	80	75			16	A00010247		640
Wooden	24.0	44.3	120	80	31			17	A00010248		140

Total number of shp.units: 17 Tot. quant: 10140
Total Net Weight: 1,729.5
Total Gross Weight: 2,327.0

Contact Address
Nokia (Vietnam)
No. 8, Street 6
VSIP Bac Ninh
Phu Chau Commune
Tu Son Town
Bac Ninh Province
VIETNAM



ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (12/26)

CUSTOMER / 114850
AL WATANI TELECOM
Al Mansoor, Mahala 609, Zukak 8, Ho
BAGHDAD
IRAQ

Delivery Note

Delivery Document Number/date
8005181023/09.05.2014
Our Reference
8872883/20.03.2014

Delivery Address / 114850S04 / IQ
AL WATTANI TELECOM, ERBIL
EINKAWA, OPP. MAR YOUSIF KANISAT
ERBIL
IRAQ

Delivery Date
21.05.2014

Terms of delivery
013 CIP ERBIL, INCOTERMS 2003


No of p:s	Net Weight KG	Gross Weight KG	Volume M3
10	1,498.3	1,849.8	9.360

Mode of transport
Standard

Item Our Code Description Origin	Your Code HS code	PO No. ECCN	Ordered qty.	Unit	Delivered qty.
0010 A00011702 CELLPHONE Nokia 105 RM-908 NV IQ BLACK	85171290	5A992	9,600.0	PC	9,600.0

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L	*	W	*	H(CM)	unit#	Material	Del. tot
	151.0	186.4	120	100	78			1	A00011702	960
	149.0	184.0	120	100	78			2	A00011702	960
	149.2	184.2	120	100	78			3	A00011702	960
	151.0	186.4	120	100	78			4	A00011702	960
	149.4	184.4	120	100	78			5	A00011702	960
	149.5	184.6	120	100	78			6	A00011702	960
	150.0	185.2	120	100	78			7	A00011702	960
	150.2	185.4	120	100	78			8	A00011702	960
	149.0	184.0	120	100	78			9	A00011702	960
	150.0	185.2	120	100	78			10	A00011702	960

Total number of shp.units: 10 Tot. quant: 9,600
Total Net Weight: 1,498.3
Total Gross Weight: 1,849.8



ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (13/26)

*** Delivery note**

Customer / 127550
Derinton International FZE
Dubai Airport Free Zone-2E307
DUBAI
UNIT.ARAB EMIR.

Delivery Document Number/date
8005208804/06.06.2014
Your Reference
irq2314/2/31.03.2014
Our Reference
8880525/31.03.2014
Contact person
Invoicing
Bill of lading

Delivery Address / 127550S01 / IQ
Fastlink
Villa 9-687, Shlama Street, Ankawa
ERBIL
IRAQ

Our Forwarding Agent
AGILITY LOGISTICS LIMITED
Customer's Forwarding Agent

Delivery Date
15.06.2014

Mode of transport
Standard

Terms of delivery
013 CIP ERBIL, INCOTERMS 2003

Item	Our Code Description Origin License	Your Code HS ECCN	Ordered qty.	Unit	Delivered qty.
0010	A00011702 Nokia 105 RM-908 CN 85171210 Batch CN12	NV IQ BLACK 5A992	5.000,0	PC	5.000,0
0020	A00014125 NOKIA 107 RM-961 CN 85171210 Batch CN12	NV N-AFRICA 5 RED 5A992	1.000,0	PC	1.000,0

Shipper/Exporter
**Nokia Telecommunications Ltd.,
Dongguan Branch**
Keji Road, Nan Cheng High-Tech Industrial Park
Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, P.R.C.
Tel: + 86 769 2402844 Fax: + 86 769 2400405
Post Code: 523077

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (14/26)

*

Page 2

Delivery note

Customer / 127550
 Derinton International FZE
 Dubai Airport Free Zone-2E307
 DUBAI
 UNIT.ARAB EMIR.

Delivery Document Number/date
 8005208804/06.06.2014
 Your Reference
 irq2314/2/31.03.2014
 Our Reference
 8880525/31.03.2014
 Contact person
 Invoicing

Item	Our Code Description Origin License	Your Code HS ECCN	Ordered qty.	Unit	Delivered qty.
0030	A00014126 NOKIA 107 RM-961 CN 85171210 Batch CN12	NV N-AFRICA 5 5A992	1.000,0	PC	1.000,0

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L	*	W	*	H(CM)	unit#	Material	Del.	tot
Pallet	103.3	127.5	123	83	79			1	A00011702		672
								2	A00011702		672
Pallet	103.7	128.0	123	83	79			3	A00011702		672
Pallet	104.1	128.5	123	83	79			4	A00011702		672
Pallet	126.4	156.0	123	83	67			5	A00014125		756
Pallet	103.3	127.5	123	83	79			6	A00011702		672
Pallet	125.6	155.0	123	83	67			7	A00014126		756
Pallet	113.4	140.0	123	83	67			8	A00011702		200
								8	A00014125		244
								8	A00014126		244
Pallet	104.5	129.0	123	83	79			9	A00011702		672
								10	A00011702		672
Pallet	17.0	21.0	74	43	36			11	A00011702		96

Total number of shp.units: 11 Tot. quant: 7,000
 Total Net Weight: 1,108.9
 Total Gross Weight: 1,369.0

Shipper/Exporter
Nokia Telecommunications Ltd.,
Dongguan Branch
 Keji Road, Nan Cheng High-Tech Industrial Park
 Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, P.R.C.
 Tel: + 86 769 2402844 Fax: + 86 769 2400405
 Post Code: 523077

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (15/26)

Transport Document

Shipper's Reference Number: 8095378208

WARNING: LITHIUM BATTERIES THAT HAVE BEEN RECALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER FOR SAFETY REASONS MUST NOT BE SHIPPED BY AIR.

Terminology:

- Cell – electrochemical unit, consisting of an anode and a cathode, capable of generating electrical current
- Battery – one or more cells
- Lithium ion cells/batteries – rechargeable – includes lithium polymer cells/batteries
- Lithium metal cells/batteries – generally non-rechargeable

This package contains lithium cells or batteries in the following configuration:

Lithium Ion – Maximum of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20 Watt-hours per cell; and • 100 Watt hours per battery 	Lithium Metal – Maximum of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 gram of lithium metal per cell; and • 2 grams of lithium per battery
Packed with equipment (ICAO/IATA Packing Instruction 966, Section II) - Cells or batteries contained in a package with associated electronic equipment	

- This package must be handled with care. A flammability hazard exists if the package is damaged.
- If this package is damaged in transportation, it must not be loaded until the condition of the contents can be verified. The batteries contained in this package must be inspected for damage and may only be repacked if they are intact and protected against short circuits.
- For more information about the batteries contained in this package, call the following telephone number: 144(0)870 190 8285 CareChem24

List telephone number here, including area code and any applicable country code

Name/Address of shipper: Nokia (Viet Nam) LLC No 84street 5, VSP,Phu Cham commune Tu Sim Town, Bao Ninh Province Vietnam	Name/Address of Consignee: Hawk Freight Services FZE Plot No: W-28, DAFZ, 54438 Dubai UAE
---	--

Date: _____

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (16/26)

Delivery note

Delivery note no./shipping date
8005378208/04.11.2014

Customer / 123144
Brightpoint Middle East FZE
Unit F21/F22/F23
PO Box 54704
DUBAI
UNIT.ARAB EMIR.

Your Reference
P30896/25.09.2014
Our Reference
9011942/25.09.2014
Contact person
Invoicing
Bill of lading

Delivery Address / 123144S03 / AE
Company
Hawk Freight Services FZE
Plot No: W-28, DAFZ.
54438 DUBAI
UNIT.ARAB EMIR.

Our Forwarding Agent
DHL Hanoi AFR
Customer's Forwarding Agent

Delivery Date
14.11.2014

Terms of delivery
013 CIP Dubai

Mode of transport
Standard

No of	Net	Gross	Volume
p:s	Weight KG	Weight KG	M3
23	2.205,0	2.879,0	15,959

Item	Our Code	Your Code	Ordered	Unit	Delivered
	Description		qty.		qty.
	Origin	HS			
	License	ECCN			

0010	A00011696		15.000,0	PC	15.000,0
	CELLPHONE				
	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV N-AFRICA 2 BLACK				
	VN 85171200	5A992			
	Batch FI20				

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L	*	W	*	H(CM)	unit#	Material	Del.	tot
Pallet	98.8	129.6	120	80	73			1	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.6	120	80	73			2	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.8	120	80	73			3	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.9	120	80	73			4	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	126.8	120	80	73			5	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.5	120	80	73			6	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.6	120	80	73			7	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.7	120	80	73			8	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	128.2	120	80	73			9	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.8	120	80	73			10	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.8	120	80	73			11	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.6	120	80	73			12	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.7	120	80	73			13	A00011696		672

Contact Address
Nokia (Vietnam)
No. 8, Street 6
VSIP Bac Ninh
Phu Chan Commune
Tu Son Town
Bac Ninh Province
VIETNAM

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (17/26)

Page 2

Delivery note

Delivery note no./shipping date
8005378208/04.11.2014

Customer / 123144
Brightpoint Middle East FZE
Unit F21/F22/F23
PO Box 54704
DUBAI
UNIT.ARAB EMIR.

Your Reference
P30896/25.09.2014
Our Reference

Pallet	98.8	129.0	120	80	73	14	A00011696	672
Pallet	98.8	128.2	120	80	73	15	A00011696	672
Pallet	98.8	127.8	120	80	73	16	A00011696	672
Pallet	98.8	128.0	120	80	73	17	A00011696	672
Pallet	98.8	128.4	120	80	73	18	A00011696	672
Pallet	98.8	128.8	120	80	73	19	A00011696	672
Pallet	31.8	54.8	120	80	56	20	A00011696	216
Pallet	98.8	128.5	120	80	73	21	A00011696	672
Pallet	98.8	128.8	120	80	73	22	A00011696	672
Pallet	98.8	127.1	120	80	73	23	A00011696	672

Total number of shp.units: 23 Tot. quant: 15000
Total Net Weight: 2,205.0
Total Gross Weight: 2,879.0

Contact Address
Nokia (Vietnam)
No. 8, Street 6
VSIP Bac Ninh
Phu Chan Commune
Tu Son Town
Bac Ninh Province
VIETNAM

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (19/26)

Page 2

Invoice

Customer / 123144
 Brightpoint Middle East FZE
 Unit F21/F22/F23
 PO Box 54704
 DUBAI
 UNIT.ARAB EMIR.

Number 500224773 Billing Date 04.11.2014
 Your Reference/Date P30896/25.09.2014
 Delivery note no./shipping date 8005378208/04.11.2014
 Our Reference 9011942/25.09.2014

Nokia Sales International

Invoicing Department

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L *	W *	H(CM)	unit#	Material	Del.	tot
Pallet	98.8	129.6	120	80	73	1	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.6	120	80	73	2	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.8	120	80	73	3	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.9	120	80	73	4	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	126.8	120	80	73	5	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.5	120	80	73	6	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.6	120	80	73	7	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.7	120	80	73	8	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	128.2	120	80	73	9	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.8	120	80	73	10	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.8	120	80	73	11	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.6	120	80	73	12	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.7	120	80	73	13	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	129.0	120	80	73	14	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	128.2	120	80	73	15	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.8	120	80	73	16	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	128.0	120	80	73	17	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	128.4	120	80	73	18	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	128.8	120	80	73	19	A00011696		672
Pallet	31.8	54.8	120	80	56	20	A00011696		216
Pallet	98.8	128.5	120	80	73	21	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	128.8	120	80	73	22	A00011696		672
Pallet	98.8	127.1	120	80	73	23	A00011696		672

Contact address
 Nokia Sales International Oy
 Keilalahdentie 4
 FI-02150 ESPOO
 FINLAND
 Tel: + 358 (0) 7180 08000
 Fax: + 358 (0) 7180 44940

Bankers
 Bank of America NA, London
 IBAN: [REDACTED] (EUR)
 IBAN: [REDACTED] (USD)
 BIC: [REDACTED]

Nordea Bank Plc Finland
 [REDACTED] (EUR)
 [REDACTED] (USD)
 BIC: [REDACTED]

Registered in
 Nokia Sales International Oy
 Keilalahdentie 4
 02150 ESPOO
 FINLAND
 Domicile: Helsinki
 Business ID:2422986-2
 VAT Reg No:FI24229862

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (22/26)

232 HAN	15165920	232-15165920
Shipper's Name and Address NOKIA (VIETNAM) LIABILITY CO LTD. STREET 6, NO 8 VSIP BAC NINH INDUSTRIAL PARK, TU SON TOWN, PHU CHAN COMMUNE BAC NINH PROVINCE, VIETNAM		Shipper's Account Number Not Negotiable Air Waybill Issued by MALAYSIA AIRLINE
Consignee's Name and Address ONESTO FZE P.O. BOX 54895, DUBAI AIRPORT FREE ZONE, WAREHOUSE D04 & D05, DUBAI, UAE, TEL:+97142990120, FAX:+97142990121 EMAIL: LOGISTICS.DI@ONESTO.COM GROUP.COM		Consignee's Account Number It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in apparent good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREOF BY THE SHIPPER, AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.
AVIATION SOLUTIONS SERVICES		Accounting information (Prepaid) PREPAID IN HAN BY AGI
Agent's IATA Code	Account No.	
Origin (City/State/Country)	Routing	Reference Number
DUBAI/INTL AIRPORT, U.A.E.	HAN/KUL/DXB	
Carrier	Class	Declared Value
MH	Y	NVD
Origin (City/State/Country)	Destination (City/State/Country)	Declared Value
DUBAI	MH051/17 SEP	NDV
Amount of Insurance	INSURANCE - If Carrier offers insurance, and such insurance is requested in accordance with the conditions hereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked 'Amount of Insurance'.	
XXX	TC	
HANDLING INFORMATION DOCS ATTD LITHIUM ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF P1966 <small>(For USA only: These commodities, technology or software were exported from the United States in accordance with the Export Administration Regulations. Diversion contrary to USA law prohibited.)</small>		
No. of Pieces RCP	Gross Weight Kg	Rate Class
8	1088.0	KO
Chargeable Weight	Rate	Total
1088.0	5.56	6,049.28
Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume) MOBILE PHONES DELIVERY NOTE NO.8005313739 DIMS: 120X80X78CM/08		Handling Information LITHIUM ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF P1966 HANDLE WITH CARE FLAMMABLE HAZARD IF DAMAGE PLS CONTACT THE SHIPPER ON MAWB WHEN DAMAGE OCCURRED TEL: +84 4377370003 MUST BE PROTECTED SO AS TO PREVENT SHORT CIRCUIT SPECIAL PROCEDURES MUST BE FOLLOWED IN THE EVENT THE PACKAGE IS DAMAGED, TO INCLUDE INSPECTION AND REPACKING IF NECESSARY
8	1,088.0	6,049.28
Prepaid	Weight Charge	Collect
6,049.28		
Valuation Charge	Other Charges	
	AWA :	2.00
	MYC :	544.00
	MSC :	163.20
	SCC :	16.32
Total other Charges Due Agent	Shipper certifies that the particulars on the face hereof are correct and that IN SO FAR AS ANY PART OF THE CONSIGNMENT CONTAINS DANGEROUS GOODS, SUCH PART IS PROPERLY DESCRIBED BY NAME AND IS IN PROPER CONDITION FOR CARRIAGE BY AIR ACCORDING TO THE APPLICABLE DANGEROUS GOODS REGULATIONS.	
725.52	AGI	
Total collect	Signature of Shipper or his Agent	
6,774.80	17 SEP 2014 PHAN TUNG AVS	
Currency Conversion Rates	cc charges in Dest. Currency	Executed on (Date) at (Place) Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent
For Carrier Use only at Destination	Charges at Destination	Total collect Charges

ORIGINAL 3 (FOR SHIPPER)

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (23/26)

Transport Document

Shipper's Reference Number: 8085513739

WARNING: LITHIUM BATTERIES THAT HAVE BEEN RECALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER FOR SAFETY REASONS MUST NOT BE SHIPPED BY AIR.

Terminology:

- Cell – electrochemical unit, consisting of an anode and a cathode, capable of generating electrical current
- Battery – assembly of cells
- Lithium Ion cells/batteries – rechargeable – includes lithium polymer cells/batteries
- Lithium metal cells/batteries – generally non-rechargeable

This package contains lithium cells or batteries in the following configuration:

Lithium Ion - Maximum of • 20 Watt-hours per cell; and • 100 Watt-hours per battery	Lithium Metal - Maximum of • 1 gram of lithium metal per cell; and • 2 grams of lithium per battery
Packed with equipment (IATA Packing Instruction 966, Section II). Cells or batteries contained in a package with associated electronic equipment	

- This package must be handled with care. A flammability hazard exists if the package is damaged.
- If this package is damaged in transportation, it must not be loaded until the condition of the contents can be verified. The batteries contained in this package must be inspected for damage and may only be repacked if they are intact and protected against short circuits.
- For more information about the batteries contained in this package, call the following telephone number:
+44(0)870 190 8286 CareChem24

Use telephone number here, including area code and any applicable country code

Name/Address of Shipper: Nokia (Via: Nam) LLC No. 8, Street 6, VSEP, Phu Chan commune Du Son Town, Bac Ninh Province Vietnam	Name/Address of Consignee: Onato FZE Dubai Airport Free Zone, Ware House D Dubai UAE
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Date: _____

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (24/26)

		Invoice	
		<i>Number</i>	<i>Billing Date</i>
		5J0216032	13.09.2014
		<i>Your Reference/Date</i>	
		GH-0042/12.06.2014	
		<i>Delivery note no./shipping date</i>	
		8065313739/12.09.2014	
		<i>Our Reference</i>	
		8935502/12.06.2014	
		<i>Contact person</i>	
		Invoicing Department	
		<i>Our Forwarding Agent / Bill of Lading</i>	
		Agility Haroi/	
<i>Customer / 128004</i>			
Midcom FZE			
P.O Box 16111, Ras Al Khainah			
Office no 6, Tomaco Building			
Sheikh Zayed Road			
Near Times Square Mall			
DUBAI			
UNIT.ARAB EMIR.			
<i>Delivery Address / 128004\$01</i>			
Company			
Onesto FZE			
Dubai Airport Free Zone, Ware House			
DUBAI			
UNIT.ARAB EMIR.			
<i>Mode of transport</i>		<i>Terms of payment</i>	
Standard		10 days net	
		Up to 12.12.2014 without deduction.	
		<i>Terms of delivery</i>	
		013 CIP DUBAI	
		<i>No of Pcs</i>	<i>Gross Weight KG</i>
		8	1.060,1
		<i>Volume M3</i>	5,760
Please re confirm if the CI date is not available			
<i>Item</i>	<i>Our Code</i>	<i>Your Code</i>	<i>Qty Unit</i>
	<i>Description</i>		<i>Unit price</i>
	<i>Origin</i>	<i>NS</i>	<i>/Per Pcs</i>
	<i>License</i>	<i>SCCN</i>	
0010	A00011705		5.390,0 PC
	CELLPHONE		
	Nokia 105 RM-908 NV GH CYAN		
	VN 85171200	5A992	
Order 8935502 from 12.06.2014			
Purch.order no. GH-0042 from 12.06.2014			
<i>Items Sub-total</i>			
VAT		0,00 %	0,03
<i>Total (inc VAT)</i>		USD	
VAT 0%, Export			
<i>Contact address</i>		<i>Bankers</i>	<i>Registered in</i>
Nokia Sales International Oy		Bank of America N.A. London	Nokia Sales International Oy
Keiteleentie 4		IBAN: [REDACTED] (EUR)	Keiteleentie 4
FI-02150 ESPOO		IBAN: [REDACTED] (USD)	02150 ESPOO
FINLAND		BIC: [REDACTED]	FINLAND
Tel: +358 10 7140 08000		Nordea Bank Plc Finland	Damaski Helsinki
Fax: +358 10 7100 44940		[REDACTED] (EUR)	Business ID:2427958-2
			VAT Rec No:FI24229662

ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (25/26)

Page 2

Invoice

Customer / 128004	Number	Billing Date
Midcom FZE	S00216032	13.09.2014
P.O Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah	Your Reference/Date	
Office no 6, Tomaco Building	GE-0042/12.06.2014	
Sheikh Zayad Road	Delivery note no./shipping date	
Near Times Square Mall	8005312739/12.09.2014	
DUBAI	Our Reference	
UNIT.ARAB EMIR.	8935502/12.06.2014	

Nokia Sales International

Invoicing Department

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L	W	H(CM)	unit#	Material	Del. tot
Wooden	110.1	137.4	120	80	75	1	A00011705	640
Wooden	89.4	116.3	120	80	75	2	A00011705	520
Wooden	110.1	137.4	120	80	75	3	A00011705	640
Wooden	110.1	140.3	120	80	75	4	A00011705	640
Wooden	110.1	140.1	120	80	75	5	A00011705	640
Wooden	110.1	140.0	120	80	75	6	A00011705	640
Wooden	110.1	138.1	120	80	75	7	A00011705	640
Wooden	110.1	138.5	120	80	75	8	A00011705	640

Total number of shp.units: 8 Tot. quant: 5,000
Total Net Weight: 860.0
Total Gross Weight: 1,068.1

General Terms and Conditions of Sale 2012, of Microsoft Mobile Oy shall apply. General terms and conditions of Sale 2012 are available at web portal for suppliers and customers.

Contact address Nokia Sales International Oy Keskitalo 4 FI-02160 ESPOO FINLAND Tel: +358 (0) 7180 08000 Fax: +358 (0) 7180 44940	Banking Bank of America NA, London IBAN: [REDACTED] EUR IBAN: [REDACTED] USD BIC: [REDACTED] Nordea Bank P/o Finland [REDACTED] EUR [REDACTED] USD	Processed in Nokia Sales International Oy Keskitalo 4 FI-02160 ESPOO FINLAND City: Helsinki Business ID: 2422960-1 VAT Reg No: FI 24229682
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ANNEXE G

Microsoft Corporation documentation on mobile telephones (26/26)

		Delivery note	
		Delivery note no./shipping date 8065313739/12.09.2014	
Customer / 128004 Midcom FZE P.O Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Office no 6, Tomaco Building Sheikh Zayad Road Near Times Square Mall DUBAI UNIT.ARAB EMIR.		Your Reference GH-0042/12.06.2014 Our Reference 8935502/12.06.2014 Contact person Invoicing Bill of lading	
Delivery Address / 128004S01 / AE Company Onesto FZE Dubai Airport Free Zone, Ware House DUBAI UNIT.ARAB EMIR.		Our Forwarding Agent Agility Hanoi Customer's Forwarding Agent	
		Delivery Date 19.09.2014	
		Terms of delivery 013 CIP DUBAI	
Mode of transport Standard		No of p/s	
		Net Weight KG	
		Gross Weight KG	
		Volume M3	
		3	
		860,0	
		1.088,1	
		3,760	

Item	Our Code	Your Code	Ordered	Unit	Delivered
	Description		qty.		qty.
	Origin	HS			
	License	SCCN			
0010	A00011705 CELLPHONE Nokia 105 RM-908 NV GH CYAN VN 85171200 SA992 Batch FI20		5.000,0	PC	5.000,0

Material	NET(KG)	GRO(KG)	L	W	H(CM)	unit#	Material	Del.	tot
Wooden	110.1	137.4	120	80	75	1	A00011705		640
Wooden	89.4	116.3	120	80	75	2	A00011705		520
Wooden	110.1	137.4	120	80	75	3	A00011705		640
Wooden	110.1	140.3	120	80	75	4	A00011705		640
Wooden	110.1	140.1	120	80	75	5	A00011705		640
Wooden	110.1	140.0	120	80	75	6	A00011705		640
Wooden	110.1	138.1	120	80	75	7	A00011705		640
Wooden	110.1	138.5	120	80	75	8	A00011705		640
Total number of shp.units:						8	Tot. quant:		5.000
Total Net Weight:						860,0			
Total Gross Weight:						1.088,1			

Contact Address Nokia (Vietnam) No. 8, Street 6 VSHIP Bac Ninh Phu Chau Commune Tu Son Town Bac Ninh Province

ENDNOTES

- 1 Correspondence from the Government of the Netherlands to CAR, 19 June 2015.
- 2 Correspondence from the Sealed Air Corporation Group to CAR, 18 December 2015.
- 3 CAR telephone call with an İlci representative, 3 November 2015.
- 4 CAR telephone call with a Nitromak Dyno Nobel representative, 4 November 2015.
- 5 In their response to CAR, the Lebanese authorities also mention the date of 23 February 2015.
- 6 In their response to CAR, the Lebanese authorities also mention the date of 10 August 2015.
- 7 In their response to CAR, the Lebanese authorities also mention the date of 22 June 2015.
- 8 The Lebanese documents provided to CAR (Annexe E) identify the company Maxam, headquartered in Spain, as the exporter of the goods. However, Maxam has informed CAR that the company has never supplied the Indian types of detonating cord or plain detonators documented by CAR, nor does it stock these types. The company states that, on 30 December 2015, it supplied Spanish-manufactured detonating cord and plain detonators to Maybel. One plausible explanation is that Maybel's renewal license (number 30/2015) enabled it to import from more than one party. CAR is currently seeking clarification from the Lebanese authorities.
- 9 Correspondence from Premier Explosives to CAR, 6 December 2015. CAR has not added the Mechanical Construction Factory to the list of entities in Table 1 because, at this stage in the investigations, there is no evidence to confirm that the item documented derives from Syrian government stockpiles.
- 10 See EU (2011a; 2011b). The US Office of Foreign Assets Control followed suit in 2012; see OFAC (2012).
- 11 Correspondence from Premier Explosives to CAR, 6 December 2015.
- 12 Correspondence from CAR to Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals, 4 December 2015.
- 13 Correspondence from Chamundi Explosives to CAR, 19 December 2015.
- 14 In their response to CAR, the Lebanese authorities also mention five million detonators.
- 15 Correspondence from CAR to Economic Explosives, 4 December 2015.
- 16 Correspondence from CAR to Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals and to IDEAL Industrial Explosives, 4 December 2015.
- 17 Correspondence from Premier Explosives to CAR, 6 December 2015. CAR has not added the Syrian Ministry of Defence to the list of entities in Table 1 because, at this stage in the investigations, there is no evidence to confirm that the item documented derives from Syrian government stockpiles.
- 18 Correspondence from CAR to Schaffler, 4 December 2015.
- 19 Correspondence from Czech authorities to CAR, 12 February 2016.
- 20 CAR telephone call with a Hes Kablo representative, 4 November 2015.
- 21 CAR telephone call with an Erikoğlu representative, 4 November 2015.
- 22 Correspondence from CAR to Kablo Türk, 8 October 2015.
- 23 CAR telephone call with an Ünal Kablo representative, 4 November 2015.

- 24 Correspondence from Microchip Technology to CAR, 15 December 2015.
- 25 See FLSD (2008).
- 26 Correspondence from CAR to STMicroelectronics, 10 December 2015.
- 27 Without a response from STMicroelectronics, it is not possible to identify the exact supply route of the transistors. It is plausible that STMicroelectronics neither manufactured the items in Switzerland, nor exported them from that country. In the absence of information to the contrary, Map 9 charts the supply from the company's headquarters in Switzerland to Iraq.
- 28 Correspondence from Microsoft Corporation to CAR, 4 January 2016.
- 29 On 4 January 2016, Microsoft Corporation responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR to Microsoft Mobile Oy (Ltd.) on 5 November 2015. In its response, Microsoft Corporation provided sales and shipping documents for the Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephones with IMEI 354272/06/724114/8, IMEI 354272/06/725697/1, IMEI 354272/06/722934/1, IMEI 354272/06/723688/2, and IMEI 354272/06/723911/8. This documentation confirms that Ghamdan General Trading & Import, Sana'a, Yemen, purchased the items on 30 May 2014 for delivery to Al Areen Computers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). Nokia (Vietnam) Liability Co. Ltd. shipped the items on 15 July 2014 from Hanoi, Vietnam, using the forwarding agent Agility Ltd. (Hanoi) to Al Areen Computers, with a scheduled delivery date of 23 July 2014.
- 30 On 4 January 2016, Microsoft Corporation responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR to Microsoft Mobile Oy on 5 November 2015. In its response, Microsoft Corporation provided sales and shipping documents for the Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephone with IMEI 353060/06/819769/5. This documentation confirms that Al Watani Telecom, Baghdad, Iraq, purchased the item on 20 March 2014 for delivery to Al Watani Telecom, Erbil, Iraq. The delivery note provided by Microsoft Corporation indicates a delivery date of 21 May 2014.
- 31 On 4 January 2016, Microsoft Corporation responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR to Microsoft Mobile Oy on 5 November 2015. In its response, Microsoft Corporation provided sales and shipping documents for the Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephone with IMEI 353635/06/755798/9. This documentation confirms that Derinton International FZE, Dubai, UAE, purchased the item on 31 March 2014 for delivery to Fastlink, Erbil, Iraq. Nokia Telecommunications Ltd., China, shipped the item on 6 June 2014 using the forwarding agent Agility Logistics Ltd., with a scheduled delivery date of 15 June 2014.
- 32 On 4 January 2016, Microsoft Corporation responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR to Microsoft Mobile Oy on 5 November 2015. In its response, Microsoft Corporation provided sales and shipping documents for the Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephone with IMEI 357134/06/881894/3. This documentation confirms that Brightpoint Middle East FZE, Dubai, UAE, purchased the item on 25 September 2014 for delivery to Hawk Freight Services FZE, Dubai, UAE. Nokia Vietnam shipped the item on 4 November 2014 from Hanoi, Vietnam, using the forwarding agent DHL Hanoi, with a scheduled delivery date of 14 November 2014.
- 33 On 4 January 2016, Microsoft Corporation responded promptly to a formal trace request issued by CAR to Microsoft Mobile Oy on 5 November 2015. In its response, Microsoft Corporation provided sales and shipping documents for the Nokia 105 RM-908 mobile telephones with IMEI 355767/06/001699/0 and IMEI 355767/06/001396/3. This documentation confirms that Midcom FZE, Dubai, UAE, purchased the items on 12 June 2014 for delivery to Onesto FZE, Dubai, UAE. Nokia Vietnam shipped the items on 12 September 2014 from Hanoi, Vietnam, using the forwarding agent Agility Ltd. (Hanoi), with a scheduled delivery date of 19 September 2014.

REFERENCES

EU (European Union). 2011a. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 1244/2011 of 1 December 2011 Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 442/2011 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria. *Official Journal of the European Union*. L 319/8 of 12 February. <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011R1244>>

—. 2011b. Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Syria and Repealing Decision 2011/273/CFSP. *Official Journal of the European Union*. L 319/56 of 12 February. <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:319:0056:0070:EN:PDF>>

FLSD (United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida). 2008. 'Criminal Docket for Case #: 1:08-cr-20222-JAL All Defendants: *USA v. Yahya et al.*' <lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea_agreements/dockets/Mayrow_General_TCAR_IED_reportrading.htm>

OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control). 2012. 'Syria Designations; Non-proliferation Designations.' Washington, DC: United States Department of the Treasury. 18 July. <<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20120718.aspx>>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The consistent, long-term support of key actors in Iraq and Syria has made CAR's field investigations possible. CAR investigation teams worked alongside the following partners to collect evidence for this report:

KURDISTAN REGION SECURITY COUNCIL AND PESHMERGA FORCES

Since July 2014, the Kurdistan Region Security Council has constantly supported and coordinated CAR's access to weapons, ammunition, IEDs, and associated materiel throughout Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces have recaptured important territory from IS forces and provided CAR investigation teams secure access to weapons and related materiel captured during those operations.

POPULAR MOBILIZATION UNITS AND IRAQI FEDERAL POLICE

Members of the Popular Mobilization Units, including the Jund al-Imam brigade, played a pivotal role in the second battle of Tikrit. After the city's liberation from IS forces, the Iraqi Federal Police also launched critical counter-IED operations in the area. Each party provided CAR field investigation teams with comprehensive support and access to IS-manufactured IEDs and IED components.

MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S PROTECTION UNITS.

Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) remain at the forefront of action against IS forces in Syria. After lifting the siege of Kobane, YPG units inflicted major losses on IS forces and captured significant quantities of materiel. The YPG Military Council has consistently afforded CAR field investigation teams access to the full spectrum of weapons and IEDs recovered from IS forces.

CAR extends sincere thanks to the groups mentioned above for their support and generous hospitality. In addition, CAR would like to thank the abovementioned governments and companies that willingly shared information on the components presented here. CAR notes that transparency and cooperation are fundamental steps towards mitigating the problem at hand.

