Levent Kenez/Stockholm
Turkey is facing a growing juvenile crime crisis, marked by rising violence, increasing drug-related offenses and widespread access to weapons, with official statistics showing that tens of thousands of minors come into contact with the criminal justice system annually despite repeated policy pledges to strengthen child protection.
According to data compiled by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) from police and gendarmerie records, nearly 200,000 incidents involving minors are recorded annually by security forces. These cases include minors brought in as suspects as well as those registered as victims. The figures indicate that juvenile crime has become a structural problem rather than a temporary spike, with totals remaining high in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic.
Individuals aged 15 to 17 account for the majority of cases, reflecting a sharp concentration of criminal exposure in late adolescence. Boys represent roughly 70 to 80 percent of minors pushed into crime, a consistent pattern across recent years. The most common offenses recorded are assault and theft, reflecting the increasingly violent and confrontational nature of juvenile crime in Turkey.
At the same time, drug-related offenses involving minors are on a clear upward trend. TurkStat data show growing numbers of cases involving the use, possession and sale of narcotics and stimulants by minors. Security records indicate that drug-related offenses are no longer marginal in juvenile crime statistics but now rank alongside theft and violent acts, raising concerns about organized exploitation of adolescents.
The rise in juvenile crime is mirrored by a similarly alarming scale of child victimization. In 279,000 recorded incidents in last three years, children were registered as victims rather than suspects, according to official data. These cases span all age groups, including children under the age of 11, demonstrating that exposure to violence is not limited to older adolescents. Assault ranks first among victimization categories, followed by sexual offenses and family-related crimes, placing child safety at the center of a broader public security problem.
Turkey’s surge in juvenile crime is unfolding amid persistent child poverty, which remains largely unchanged over the past decade. TurkStat estimates that approximately 7 million children live in poverty, corresponding to 32 percent of all children in the country. A similar proportion of children experience material deprivation, defined not only by income but by limited access to basic goods and opportunities.
Data indicate that while many children are not deprived of food or clothing, participation in social and recreational activities is notably low, pointing to a lack of structured environments outside school. These gaps coincide with evidence that school disengagement and unstructured daily life increase children’s vulnerability to crime.
Despite high school enrollment rates, particularly at the primary and lower secondary levels, the risk of dropout rises in upper secondary education, the same age range in which juvenile crime rates peak. The overlap between declining school engagement and increased police contact highlights a gap between education policy and child protection outcomes. The rate of participation in education among 15 to 19-year-olds stands at 79 percent, compared to the OECD average of 84 percent.
Weapon accessibility further exacerbates the situation. Parliamentary records from earlier committee hearings document widespread illegal access to firearms, while knives remain easily accessible. Academics and child welfare specialists testified that unregistered guns are readily available, making violent incidents involving youngsters more lethal. Even everyday items such as knives and clubs are commonly used in assaults, turning minor disputes into serious criminal cases.
This environment has direct consequences. Assault has become the single most common offense bringing minors to the attention of the police, while theft remains widespread. The combination of easy weapons access and rising drug activity increases the likelihood that minors will become involved in repeat and more serious crimes at an early age.
Public attitudes toward juvenile offenders have been shifting in recent years. The issue resurfaced on January 24, 2025, following the killing of 15-year-old Ahmet Minguizzi by two other minors, which sparked debates over whether penalties for juvenile offenders should be increased.
A new bill drafted by the ruling party initially included provisions to toughen punishments for juveniles involved in crimes; however, these measures were later abandoned.
Instead, the legislation focused on strengthening penalties for criminal gangs exploiting children. Under the new rules, leaders of armed gangs who use individuals under 18 as tools for crime could face up to 30 years in prison.
Turkey’s demographic profile makes the scale of the problem especially striking. With 21.8 million people under 18, accounting for 25.5 percent of the total population, Turkey has the highest population ratio of young people in the European Union. Yet this demographic advantage has not translated into stronger outcomes for child welfare or crime prevention.
Regional disparities deepen the challenge. In southeastern provinces such as Şanlıurfa, minors make up 43.8 percent of the population, meaning nearly one in two residents is under 18. In contrast, western provinces such as Bartın report child population ratios as low as 18 percent. These stark differences place uneven pressure on education systems, social services and law enforcement, while national policy frameworks remain largely uniform.
Official records also indicate an increase in the number of minors subjected to custodial measures within the criminal justice system. In 2023, 1,297 individuals aged 15 to 17 and 98 children aged 12 to 14 were held in juvenile detention facilities. These figures do not include minors held in pretrial detention or placed under judicial supervision, suggesting that the total number of children in contact with the criminal justice system is significantly higher.
Beyond crime statistics, social indicators point to entrenched disadvantage. TurkStat data on intergenerational mobility show that parental education strongly predicts children’s outcomes. Minors whose parents have university degrees have an approximately 80 percent likelihood of receiving a higher education themselves, while those from less educated households face far narrower prospects. This pattern reinforces concerns that crime, poverty and exclusion are being transmitted across generations.
Surveys show high levels of daily screen exposure, particularly among boys, with a majority of children aged 11 to 15 engaging with smartphones multiple times per hour. While not a crime indicator on its own, heavy digital use intersects with exposure to online drug markets, gambling and violent content, all of which are increasingly cited in juvenile case files.
The Turkish Parliament abandoned harsher penalties for juvenile offenders, opting instead to establish a parliamentary inquiry committee. Latest session notes reveal alarming statistical trends in youth crime:
Despite repeated parliamentary inquiries and the existence of extensive statistical monitoring, child poverty rates remain stagnant, juvenile crime remains high and drug offenses are rising. The data point to a policy approach that has struggled to move beyond documentation toward prevention. Children continue to encounter the state primarily through police stations, courts and detention facilities rather than through early intervention, social support and community-based protection.
As Turkey’s long-term population projections show a gradual decline in the share of children toward mid-century, the immediate challenge remains acute, particularly as official policy continues to emphasize higher birth rates while existing conditions for minors deteriorate.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly called on families to have more children, framing population growth as a social and religious imperative. Speaking during an opening ceremony interview on January 11, Erdogan reiterated his long-standing appeal for families to have at least three children, describing large families as essential to a strong society. He said population growth was not a matter of personal preference but a religious obligation, citing Islamic teachings that encourage the growth of the Muslim community. On that basis the government declared 2025 as the “Year of the Family,” presenting higher fertility as a national priority.
Despite these calls, Erdogan acknowledged that the desired results have not materialized, saying recent developments were “not good.” The decline has continued even as the government expanded family-focused messaging and incentive programs.
The issue was again raised during the International Family Forum organized by the government on May 23, 2025, where Erdogan denied claims that economic hardship was driving falling birth rates. He described Turkey’s total fertility rate of 1.48 children per woman as “a disaster” and argued that attributing the decline to economic conditions was misleading. Erdogan said Turkey’s fertility rate had been higher in periods when per capita income was significantly lower and pointed instead to changing cultural values as the main cause.
He compared Turkey to wealthier European countries, noting that Malta, despite much higher income levels, has an even lower fertility rate. The underlying problem, he said, was the spread of individualism and consumerism rather than material constraints.
Official statistics, however, show that fertility in Turkey continues to fall despite state incentives. In 2024 the total fertility rate declined to 1.48 children per woman, well below the population replacement level of 2.1. The downward trend has placed Turkey below the European Union average, which was 1.54 that year.
At the same time, families report growing difficulty raising children amid the rising cost of living and an increasingly unsafe social environment. Official data show persistent child poverty, rising juvenile crime, expanding drug use and trafficking among minors as well as widespread access to weapons, all of which shape family decisions about having children.
