Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
Tracking both the domestic and international travels of the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) is surprisingly easier than one might expect, despite the clandestine nature of the agency’s work and the heavy veil of secrecy surrounding its covert operations.
The agency’s leadership made a misguided decision to continue using a compromised shell company that owns the very aircraft in question. They mistakenly believed that merely changing the shell company’s name, altering the plane’s registration details and blocking flight data from public tracking sites would be sufficient to obscure its airborne movements.
They were mistaken. Not only are the aircraft’s international flights easily traceable, but its domestic routes can also be tracked with precision using specific coordinates, flight paths, call signs, speed and altitude data.
The aircraft, a Bombardier Challenger, is primarily used for the travels of MIT chief İbrahim Kalın, a longtime confidant of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On occasion, it has also been deployed to support covert intelligence operations abroad.
The aircraft originally bore the tail number TC-KLE and was registered to a shell company operated by MIT in Ankara.
TC-KLE was exposed in March 2018 when MIT used the aircraft to abduct six Turkish citizens affiliated with a group critical of the Erdogan government in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. The operation sparked widespread protests in Kosovo, unsettled the country’s leadership and led to the indictment and conviction of several senior Kosovar officials who had unlawfully aided and abetted the abduction.
In January 2019 MIT rebranded the shell company that owned the aircraft, changing its name from Birleşik İnşaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. to its current name, Mavi Başkent İnşaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. (Mavi Başkent). The agency later altered the aircraft’s registration, replacing its original tail number, TC-KLE, with TC-BRY.
Several prominent flight tracking websites, including flightradar24.com and airnavradar.com, were also instructed to withhold flight details, further obscuring the aircraft’s movements.
The November 2023 trade registry records for Mavi Başkent, the shell company operating the Bombardier jet for Turkey’s intelligence agency, reveal details about the company’s ownership, business scope and operations:
MIT_spy_Plane_shell_compnay_recordsHowever, this did not effectively address the core issue of transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) signals. These signals can easily be intercepted by third-party receivers, some of which do not filter out data on blocked aircraft, leaving the plane’s movements traceable.
Even if MIT manages to block ADS-B signals and employs encryption to obscure flight data, it remains possible for amateurs to track the plane using ground-based receivers, satellite tracking or data shared by aviation enthusiasts, including plane spotters and airport photographers.
An investigation by Nordic Monitor revealed that the MIT aircraft was photographed multiple times by spotters at various airports, capturing images as it landed and took off.
As a result, crucial details such as the flight route, the airports it landed at and the specific dates and times remain accessible. This also includes the travel itinerary of MIT chief Kalın, even though the nature of his missions and visits was kept from the public.
Of course, a foreign state with significant resources and advanced capabilities would have far greater ease in tracking the plane than amateurs relying on publicly available data, putting Turkish intelligence in a vulnerable position. It represents a major intelligence failure and scandalous oversight that MIT continued to use the exposed company and the same aircraft for its operations.
Since assuming the role of head of the intelligence agency in June 2023, one of Kalın’s most frequent destinations has been Doha, Qatar, a small Gulf nation closely aligned with the Erdogan government. The rulers of both Turkey and Qatar share a similar Islamist ideology and provide support to the Muslim Brotherhood and various jihadist groups across the Middle East and North Africa.
Turkey provides the muscle, diplomatic influence and logistical support for such groups, while the hydrocarbon-rich Qatar bankrolls their operations.
Qatar also serves as a sanctuary for a substantial portion of President Erdogan’s wealth, with the Gulf nation’s financial system being used to launder illicit money earned through bribes and kickbacks. Many of Qatar’s foreign investments in Turkey have, in fact, been funneled from Erdogan’s secret wealth.
In addition to flights to Doha, most of Kalın’s overseas travels in 2023 and 2024 have been concentrated in the Caucasus, with Baku emerging as the top destination. Other key locations included Libya, Morocco, Malaysia, Iraq, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Kalın’s first overseas flight took him to Baku on July 8, 2023, just a month after his appointment as MIT chief by Erdogan. Turkey provides critical intelligence to Azerbaijan, a close ally, particularly in its ongoing conflict with Armenia. On August 4, 2023 Kalın traveled to Libya, a country where Turkish intelligence and military forces have long conducted extensive operations to support Islamist factions aligned with the Erdogan government.
The plane entered Russian territory multiple times, notably on September 4 and December 6, 2023, with the most recent entry on October 24, 2024. It also stayed in Washington, D.C., for three days between March 3 and 6, 2024. In addition the aircraft visited several European cities, including Helsinki on November 30, 2023, London on July 18, 2024, Munich on February 15, 2024 and the small Norwegian city of Bodø on July 19, 2024.
The most recent registration records, filed on November 17, 2023, indicate that the Mavi Başkent company is still owned by a foundation called MİPVAK (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Personeli Sosyal ve Güvenlik ve Dayanışma Vakfı), an organization established by the government to support MIT agents.
According to Turkey’s General Directorate of Civil Aviation, a division of the Ministry of Transportation, Mavi Başkent holds general aviation license number TR-GH-59, which was originally assigned to its predecessor, Birleşik.
The company’s public representative is Okan Doğan, a MIT employee who handles Mavi Başkent’s official affairs. MIT agents İhsan Sezer Gökgöz and Necati Baykal are listed as members of the board of directors, reporting under him.
The company’s listed address is a small office in Çankaya: Meşrutiyet Mahallesi, Meşrutiyet Cad. Menderes İş Hanı Apt. No: 9/5.
The scope of business activities outlined in the trade registry declaration is exceptionally broad, encompassing sectors such as construction, oil trade, tourism, advertising, arms, industrial goods and insurance as well as real estate, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and the purchase of vehicles, aircraft and ships. The company is authorized to operate both within Turkey and internationally.
Turkey, a NATO member and a candidate for European Union membership, has evolved into a highly authoritarian state under the repressive Islamist regime of President Erdogan and his far-right allies. The intelligence agency has been reshaped into a central tool for maintaining Erdogan’s power, carrying out clandestine operations such as false flag actions, influence campaigns, wealth redistribution, asset seizures, sham trials and even murders and kidnappings.
