Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
A recent report by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) has unequivocally affirmed that during President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 22-year time in office, Turkey has metamorphosed into a hub for significant criminal syndicates, posing a serious threat to the safety and security of Europe.
Among the 821 most menacing criminal networks examined across Europe, individuals with Turkish citizenship and EU nationals of Turkish descent frequently emerged as members or key criminal figures, increasing the threat to the internal security of the EU.
As an illustration, numerous key figures in criminal networks, based primarily in Belgium and the Netherlands, engage in trafficking cocaine and cannabis, along with money laundering, with many having Turkish origins. “They are present in more than 40 countries, with main operations in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain in the EU, and the United Arab Emirates outside the EU,” the report said.
“Turkish key members often form the core of criminal networks with Belgian, Dutch and German criminals. These networks engage mainly in drug trafficking (cocaine and cannabis) and money laundering. Main countries of activity include Belgium, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Türkiye.”
The findings are hardly surprising, considering the Erdogan administration’s role in reshaping Turkey into one of the central hubs for global cocaine trafficking, predominantly serving clients in Europe and the Middle East. Organized crime operatives, engaged in a spectrum of illicit activities from fraud to human and drug trafficking, have sought refuge in Turkey to evade the reach of law enforcement agencies in their countries of origin.
Operating with impunity in Turkey, these criminals enjoy protection from a network that includes police, prosecutors, judges and politicians who collaborate closely with senior officials of the Islamist Erdogan government and its principal ally, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Moreover, the Turkish intelligence agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) closely monitors these networks, not only to identify vulnerabilities in foreign countries but also to further the political agenda of the Turkish government. MIT also exploits these connections to secure commissions from illegal criminal enterprises, financing clandestine operations that would otherwise be challenging to fund.
Europol’s report:
Europol_2024_report
Titled “Decoding the EU’s Most Threatening Criminal Networks,” the report was released by the European Union, presenting a comprehensive analysis of Europe from a law enforcement point of view. It outlines the organizational structures of the most menacing criminal networks, delves into the spectrum of criminal activities they carry out and explains their modus operandi and geographical scope of operations.
Turkish criminal networks extend their reach into the Western Balkans, predominantly engaging in drug trafficking and money laundering. Turks are implicated in fraud schemes across Europe, deemed the second most prevalent activity among the most menacing criminal networks. According to the report, operators of online fraud schemes frequently establish bases outside the EU, with Turkey being a notable location, employing call centers to lure individuals, particularly the elderly, into their schemes.
The case of Ahmad Nazari Shirehjini, an Iranian national affiliated with an organized crime syndicate engaged in a wide range of illicit activities, from fraud to money laundering, across Europe, exemplifies this finding. Shirehjini, having acquired Turkish citizenship, orchestrated the transfer to Turkey of millions of dollars obtained through fraudulent schemes in Europe. He forged partnerships with individuals closely associated with the Erdogan government, underscoring the intricate involvement of criminal elements with influential figures within Turkey.
Orhan Adıbelli, a drug trafficker known for his extensive network of business operations across Europe, notably in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, primarily focused on the distribution of cocaine. Fleeing to Turkey in 2013 to evade a police operation in Belgium, he found refuge under the Erdogan government, which embraced him as a significant investor.
He quickly made a name for himself with the huge amount of money he managed to bring to Turkey from his drug operations in Europe and owned a cement factory, Kayseri Çimento A.Ş. Adıbelli was killed after his partners refused to share the profits from the drug business. The investigation into his murder was quickly hushed up, with the real masterminds behind the murder protected.
The report highlights the involvement of Turks in migrant smuggling networks, indicating that the most formidable criminal organizations play a critical role in facilitating illicit entry into the EU as well as orchestrating secondary movements within the EU and facilitating the legalization of stay through means such as sham marriages or the provision of residence permits. Some networks offer services to other smuggling networks, ranging from supplying nautical equipment to providing fraudulent documents. Moreover, in certain instances, these networks smuggle migrants with the intent of exploiting them, primarily through labor.
Migration has indeed emerged as significant leverage for the Erdogan government in its dealings with the EU, particularly in securing substantial aid packages from the European bloc. In a noteworthy incident in 2019, Turkish President Erdogan issued a veiled threat to inundate Europe with migrants if the EU failed to provide financial support to his government. This tactic underscores the strategic role of migration as a bargaining chip in Turkey’s negotiations with the European Union, wielding significant influence over diplomatic and financial discussions.
“We will be forced to open the gates. We cannot be compelled to handle the burden alone,” the Turkish president said at his party convention in September 2019. His remarks came just about three months before the end of a Turkey-EU refugee deal under which the EU promised Ankara €6 billion for the 2016-2019 timeframe in exchange for stronger controls on refugees leaving Turkish territory for Europe.
In February 2020 Erdogan announced that Turkey had opened its border with Greece to migrants and refugees, after which Greece saw a large number of migrants at its border with Turkey trying to enter EU territory.
Human smugglers were granted carte blanche to facilitate the movement of migrants towards the Greek border, while the Interior Ministry and Turkish intelligence agency MIT orchestrated the mass transportation of migrants who were housed at removal centers operated by the Directorate General of Migration Management (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı). This coordinated effort highlights the complicity of state authorities in managing and directing the flow of migrants, further complicating the dynamics of migration policy and border security in the region.
At the time, then-interior minister Süleyman Soylu issued alarming statements, claiming that the number of refugees crossing into Europe would soon surpass a million, leading to economic destabilization and potentially causing the downfall of European governments. Furthermore, Soylu declared that Turkey would permit the passage of all non-Syrian refugees, including people from Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Algeria, Morocco and other parts of Africa, towards Europe.
According to the Europol report, Turkey also emerges as the primary source country for trafficking counterfeit firearms into Europe, a trend corroborated by the significant seizures of such weapons. Available intelligence suggests that the majority of illegal firearms in circulation are either diverted from legal supply chains, reactivated or converted from non-lethal firearms, or manufactured in clandestine workshops. This highlights Turkey’s key role in the illicit firearms trade, posing a substantial challenge to efforts aimed at curtailing the proliferation of illegal weapons across Europe.
“Illegal privately manufactured firearms appear to have become more commonly trafficked in the EU. Such firearms are assembled from parts that are sourced legally and then combined with illegally obtained polymer frames or fake components. Investigations reveal that privately manufactured firearms have been used in violent incidents in the EU. Seizures of bigger volumes of completely non-original, counterfeit firearms in the EU have also become common. These fake firearms are believed to be manufactured outside of the EU, often in Türkiye, and then trafficked to EU Member States by Turkish criminal networks,” the report said.
Indeed, the influence of Turkish arms extends beyond Europe, with traces of Turkish weaponry being discovered in regions such as Africa and the Middle East, as indicated by multiple UN reports that monitor global sanction regimes. These reports have identified Turkish arms in conflict zones including Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen, emphasizing Turkey’s involvement in the arms trade and its impact on conflicts beyond its borders.
The criminal networks operating within Turkey are quietly overseen by former interior minister Mehmet Ağar, a nationalist politician known for his longstanding collaboration with the Erdogan government in managing organized crime syndicates in the country. Aided by the far-right MHP, which has played a key role in securing the release of some of Turkey’s most notorious criminal figures from prisons over the last decade, Ağar is also alleged to coordinate operations with Turkish intelligence agency MIT. This collaboration involves leveraging criminal networks for a range of operations in foreign territories, emphasizing the intricate interplay between state actors and organized crime in Turkey.
With apparent endorsement from the Erdogan government, Ağar and his associates are instrumental in providing sanctuary for senior leaders of foreign criminal networks in Turkey. This assistance includes offering political protection, laundering illicit funds, facilitating Turkish citizenship and intervening to resolve issues when these individuals encounter difficulties with law enforcement or the judiciary.
It comes as no surprise that numerous wanted fugitives from around the world have been discovered taking refuge in Turkey in recent years. Despite arrest warrants transmitted to Turkey via Interpol or through bilateral judicial assistance agreements, some of these individuals have managed to obtain Turkish citizenship and evade detention, only to be apprehended following mounting international pressure on the Erdogan government. This pattern exposes the challenges associated with extradition and international cooperation in combating transnational crime as well as the complexities surrounding Turkey’s approach to handling individuals with legal entanglements abroad.
Turkey’s recent crackdown on international criminal networks has been compelled by the worsening of its economic and financial challenges, particularly following its inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list” in October 2021. This designation subjects Turkey to increased scrutiny by the international watchdog, tasked with combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
The pressure from being on the grey list underscores the urgency for Turkey to address deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing frameworks, highlighting the intersection between economic stability and international regulatory compliance.
Despite the Erdogan administration’s implementation of certain measures in response to FATF recommendations, Turkey remains on the grey list as of the present day. The appointment of Ali Yelrikaya as the new interior minister last year marked a turning point, leading to intensified operations against criminal networks.
Over the past 10 months, Turkish authorities have conducted operations targeting 14 international criminal organizations, with all but one involved in drug trafficking. These efforts have resulted in the arrest of 406 suspects wanted by Interpol on charges related to drug smuggling, terrorism and organized crime activities, signaling a new approach to combating transnational crime within Turkey’s borders.
Among those arrested were senior figures from the organization of wanted Dutch cocaine trafficker Jos Leijdekkers as well as Swedish-Serbian criminal figure Maximillian Rivkin, Turkish-Australian drug trafficker Joseph Hakan Ayik and New Zealand drug trafficker Duax Hohepa Ngakuru, among others.
It has emerged that many of these foreign criminal figures acquired Turkish citizenship despite facing international arrest warrants, raising questions about the vetting process conducted by law enforcement and intelligence agencies before granting Turkish citizenship.
Rawa Majid, also known as the “Kurdish Fox,” a notorious drug trafficker and gang leader wanted in Sweden, managed to obtain Turkish citizenship and establish operations within Turkey. Despite the existence of an arrest warrant through Interpol, Majid evaded the police and continued to operate freely. Numerous Swedish gang members sought refuge in Turkey, using Turkish territory as a battleground for turf wars that led to street clashes and fatalities.
Croatian drug lord Nenad Petrak, adopting the Turkish name Nenat Çelik after acquiring Turkish citizenship in 2022, was subsequently arrested in November 2023. He was on a long list of foreign criminals who sought refuge in Turkey, including the notorious criminal figure Jovan Vukotic, who was killed in Turkey in 2022; Montenegrin mob boss Zeljko Bojanic; Bosnian drug trafficker Sani Al Murdaa and his Albanian partner Flamur Sinanaj; Polish drug trafficker Thomas Josef Konrad; and Daniel Alexander Muller, wanted in Germany for cocaine trafficking.
These cases underscore Turkey’s attractiveness as a safe haven for international criminals and the challenges faced by law enforcement agencies in apprehending and extraditing them.
The police operations targeting foreign organized crime figures have remained relatively limited in scope as they have not been escalated to include those who provided sanctuary, facilitated their residence in Turkey or resolved their legal problems in the country. Senior officials in the police, judiciary and intelligence agencies, who may have cleared hurdles for their establishing themselves in Turkey in the first place have thus far remained untouched.
This reveals potential gaps in investigative efforts and underscores the need for comprehensive measures to address the broader network of complicity surrounding international criminal activities in Turkey.
The seizure of assets worth 92 billion Turkish lira from 14 foreign-run criminal networks in the last 10 months underlines the substantial financial power wielded by these criminal enterprises within Turkey. This financial clout enables them to potentially buy their way out of troubles by bribing Turkish officials and sharing their proceeds with local Turkish crime syndicates.
Such practices not only facilitate their illicit operations but also contribute to the erosion of law enforcement integrity and the perpetuation of corruption within Turkey’s justice system, posing significant challenges to efforts aimed at combating transnational crime effectively.
The ongoing operations seem to be a calculated move by the Erdogan government to mitigate the fallout with its allies and partners, particularly in response to pressure from organizations like FATF. While President Erdogan appears to be taking measures to protect his own interests, there’s a perception that he is not entirely willing to abandon the strategy of leveraging criminal networks for personal gain, exerting influence over foreign governments and destabilizing law and order in other countries. This suggests that the Erdogan government is not fully committed to cracking down on organized crime syndicates in Turkey, raising concerns about its long-term dedication to combating transnational crime and upholding international norms.
