Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
In a surprising move, Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals (Yargıtay) — the country’s highest appeals court, dominated by Islamist and far-right judges — has blocked the extradition of a man wanted by Swedish authorities on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering.
The ruling, a copy of which was obtained by Nordic Monitor, cited multiple legal violations as a pretext, including an incomplete investigation, procedural inconsistencies and violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial, as grounds for overturning a lower court’s decision that had previously approved his extradition to Sweden.
The individual, identified in legal documents as Alexander Nedevski, is wanted by Swedish authorities for three separate offenses: aggravated drug trafficking committed in a specific manner, aggravated drug trafficking and aggravated money laundering — all allegedly carried out between January 2020 and April 2021.
Based on these charges, a criminal court in the Swedish city of Växjö issued an arrest warrant in absentia for him on September 1, 2022.
Nedevski, who had been living and operating in Turkey without any issues for some time, was eventually detained on July 24, 2024, in the popular resort city of Bodrum during a police operation triggered by the transmission of an INTERPOL Diffusion to Turkish authorities.
The ruling by Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals blocking the extradition of fugitive Alexander Nedevski, who is wanted by Swedish authorities, has raised serious questions about the integrity of Turkey’s judicial system and its willingness to cooperate in international efforts against organized crime:
Intelligence regarding his presence in Turkey was conveyed to Turkish authorities on July 1, 2024, by the Nordic Liaison Office for Police and Customs Cooperation (Nordisk sambandskontor för polis- och tullsamarbete in Swedish), a specialized inter-agency coordination unit operating in the Swedish Consulate General in Istanbul.
However, it took nearly a month for Turkish police to detain him in Bodrum during an operation hailed by Turkish Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya as a demonstration of the government’s commitment to combating drug traffickers. ‘We will not give international organized crime syndicates and drug traffickers a moment to breathe,’ Yerlikaya vowed in a message posted on X on July 29, 2024.
During the execution of a search warrant at his residence, police discovered a passport, driver’s license and identity documents in the name of Besnik Lajqi, which Nedevski had used to enter Turkey. Additionally, authorities found another passport and identity papers in his car, allegedly obtained under a Serbian alias.
Nedevski was held at the Pehlivanköy Removal Center (Pehlivanköy Geri Gönderme Merkezi) near Kırklareli in northwestern Turkey. Interestingly, rather than putting him in a prison or secure detention facility, Turkish authorities housed him at a center run by Turkish Migration Management (Göç İdaresi) that is typically reserved for individuals apprehended for illegal entry, visa overstays or pending asylum cases.
The Swedish prosecutor’s office promptly submitted a formal extradition request on August 2, 2024, urging Turkish authorities to return Nedevski to Sweden to face criminal charges. The case was heard by the Kırklareli 1st High Criminal Court, which ruled for the extradition on January 13, after reviewing the documents sent from Sweden and translated into Turkish.
Nedevski’s lawyers appealed the court’s decision, and in a highly controversial ruling, the Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the extradition judgment on April 9.
According to the appeals court, Swedish authorities did not provide detailed case files or evidence directly linking Nedevski to the crimes, submitting only legal summaries and arrest warrants. The lower court also failed to consider alternative extradition destinations, such as Kosovo — where Nedevski allegedly obtained a passport — or North Macedonia, which he expressed a preference for as a country to be deported to after his detention in Turkey.
Neither Kosovo nor North Macedonia has lodged an extradition request for Nedevski; nevertheless, the appeals court insisted on exploring these alternative options in his case.
Oddly enough, the court also questioned the intelligence report submitted by the Nordic Liaison Office, which included evidence from the Kosovo police confirming that the fingerprints of both Nedevski and his forged alias, Lajqi, were a match.
Turkish police did not find it necessary to further verify Nedevski’s identity after reviewing the information provided by both Swedish and Kosovar authorities, and the criminal court handling the extradition case did not view this as irregular.
However, the appeals court raised concerns over the alleged lack of concrete evidence regarding identity fraud and ruled that the Turkish police and the lower court should have conducted a more thorough investigation into Nedevski’s identity before proceeding with the extradition.
The case will now be retried in the same lower court, which may well stand by its original ruling — potentially triggering another round of appeals and further prolonging the legal process. Alternatively, the court could rule against extradition altogether, effectively ending the case and allowing Nedevski to be released from the removal center.
Given the highly politicized nature of the Turkish judiciary and the widespread corruption involving judges and prosecutors allegedly being bought off by drug traffickers and organized crime figures, it would not be surprising to see the criminal justice system manipulated by criminal networks — especially those protected by the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and its far-right ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
In cases where the Erdogan government finds a like-minded authoritarian regime such as Azerbaijan, China or Central Asian republics, extraditions have at times been facilitated and fast-tracked — even while court proceedings are still ongoing or when a judge has issued a temporary stay on deportation or extradition pending the outcome of a trial. In such instances the Erdogan government has argued that residence and immigration matters fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive branch, allowing it to act unilaterally without judicial oversight or waiting for a court ruling.
In Nedevski’s case, however, the Turkish government appears to have taken the opposite approach — allowing the judicial process to unfold, albeit under the heavy influence of the executive, given the Erdogan government’s near-total control of the judiciary for the last decade.
Over the past decade Turkey has increasingly become a hub for international criminal syndicates. Many high-profile fugitives facing outstanding INTERPOL arrest warrants have settled in the country, acquired citizenship, exploited the Turkish financial and banking systems to launder illicit proceeds and even adopted Turkish names to avoid scrutiny. This has been enabled by the permissive environment fostered by the Erdogan government.
Turkish authorities have acted against known fugitives mainly when faced with international pressure from other countries. However, some of those arrested were subsequently released from custody, enabling them to go underground or relocate to third countries.
In nearly all cases involving organized crime such as drug trafficking and money laundering, local accomplices who assisted foreign nationals in establishing their operations in Turkey to continue their criminal enterprises have rarely been investigated, prosecuted or punished by the Turkish authorities.
For example, Turkish authorities have never investigated Nedevski’s Turkish accomplices, treating the case as a mere immigration matter. They did not launch any criminal probes into his illegal activities or those who aided him in operating within Turkey. Not a single Turkish citizen has been arrested as part of the criminal investigation into Nedevski.
Nedevski is certainly not the only foreigner to find safe haven in Turkey. Several other drug traffickers and gang members wanted by Swedish authorities have also sought refuge there. For example, Rawa Majid, leader of Sweden’s Foxtrot criminal network involved in drug trafficking, shootings and bombings, was arrested in Turkey in 2023 but was quickly released.
Ismail Abdo, a former associate of Majid and leader of the Rumba criminal network in Sweden, was also arrested in Turkey in May 2024 but was later released. He was arrested again in July of this year. It remains uncertain whether his extradition will ultimately take place. Notably, both Majid and Abdo obtained Turkish citizenship through investment schemes funded by proceeds from their criminal enterprises.
