Levent Kenez/Stockholm
Turkey’s armed forces are experiencing a significant leadership gap as the number of staff officers, the most strategically trained personnel in the command structure, continues to decline. The shortage, which has been growing since a coup attempt in 2016, has now led the Turkish government to take legislative steps to extend the careers of senior generals amid a shrinking pool of officers eligible for promotion.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan cited the 2016 coup attempt as justification for removing thousands of military officers and civil servants perceived as opponents of his government. Critics still argue that the coup was a false-flag operation orchestrated by Erdogan to consolidate his power.
On July 3, 2025, the Turkish Parliament’s Planning and Budget Committee discussed a proposed amendment to the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law to raise the mandatory retirement age of four-star generals and admirals from 65 to 72. If passed, Turkey will become the only NATO country where officers are allowed to remain in active service at that age. By comparison, no current chief of general staff in the alliance is older than 65.
According to publicly available data, as of 2024 only 63 of Turkey’s 199 active-duty generals are staff officers. The military’s reliance on non-staff officers for senior command roles has increased steadily over the past seven years.
At the 2024 meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), a total of 23 generals and admirals were promoted. Additionally, 77 colonels and naval captains were elevated to general or admiral. Of these, a limited number had completed staff officer training. In the Land Forces only 13 of the 47 newly promoted colonels were staff officers. The Air Force promoted one staff officer out of 16 and the Navy promoted four out of 14.
According to unwritten practice in the Turkish military, colonels who graduated from the prestigious War Academies, which only accept candidates who pass a rigorous entrance exam, were typically promoted to the rank of general. These staff officers usually spoke at least one foreign language, had master’s degrees in nonmilitary fields and were specially trained in war strategy, military tactics and troop management. They were often assigned to overseas missions, especially within NATO, and military attachés at embassies were selected from among them.
Following the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish government disbanded the War Academies. In their place a new system was established under the National Defense University, with staff officer training now conducted by the Joint War Institute. The new system introduced distance learning and expanded eligibility for staff training to include officers from first lieutenant up to lieutenant colonel.
The legislative change extending the retirement age is intended to address the absence of promotable officers at the general level. Without a sufficient number of qualified staff officers, the Turkish Armed Forces face legal and institutional barriers to filling top posts. According to the current personnel law, an officer must be a graduate of staff education to be eligible for promotion from major general to lieutenant general and eventually to full general. The new regulation also opens the way for major generals who have not completed staff officer training to be promoted.
In addition to raising the retirement age to 72, the proposed law allows for the extension of service for up to 75 generals and admirals in exceptional circumstances. The law also modifies certain education requirements for promotion, effectively opening the path to the rank of general for non-staff officers, a significant departure from historical precedent.
The shortage of staff officers is directly related to a post-coup purge. According to official government figures announced by President Erdogan in July 2023, a total of 1,524 out of 1,886 staff officers were dismissed from the Turkish Armed Forces after 2016.
In total the Ministry of Defense reported in late 2023 that 24,339 people including commissioned officers,noncommissioned officers and civilian personnel had been dismissed from the Turkish military since the coup attempt.
These dismissals were conducted under decree laws and administrative decisions, with most of those affected having no access to judicial appeal. The government has consistently maintained that the removals were necessary. However, no more than 8,651 people are officially recorded as having taken part in the failed coup, including 1,761 conscripts and 1,214 military cadets.
Before the coup attempt, 325 flag officers were serving in the Turkish armed forces. According to official records, only 42 of them retained their rank or were promoted in the years following the purge. Most others were retired, dismissed or imprisoned. The personnel gap left behind was filled by officers who had not undergone staff training, many of whom had ideological or political affiliations more closely aligned with the ruling party.
Minutes of the parliamentary committee meeting on July, 3 2025:
In line with this shift, the Supreme Military Council has increased the number of generals and admirals promoted each year despite a shrinking pool of qualified candidates. On August 30, 2024, the number of flag officers in Turkey is expected to rise to 327 from the current total of 281. While the expansion is designed to maintain operational command capacity, the qualifications of the newly promoted officers continue to diverge from earlier standards.
The military reforms under debate are expected to be brought before the floor for a vote in the coming weeks. If approved, the changes will take effect before the 2025 YAŞ meeting, which is expected to be held in early August.
Military experts suggest that due to the possibility of extending the retirement age to 72, current active force commanders and generals are expected to politically support the government in order to have their terms extended and remain in their positions longer. They argue that this would be a new example of the increasing politicization of the Turkish military.
Meanwhile, another new regulation passed last month by parliament allows Erdogan to directly influence the promotion timeline of senior officers. Critics argue that this undermines meritocracy and increases political interference in the chain of command, creating a loyalty-based hierarchy rather than a capability-based one.
