Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
A covertly operated database overseen by Turkish authorities has compiled information on well over a hundred thousand foreign nationals, including journalists and academics. Many of these individuals, subjected to denial of entry and deportation procedures, have been red-flagged primarily due to their having expressed views critical of the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The database employs the code “G,” representing foreign nationals identified as national security threats, and as such, they are subject to monitoring and travel restrictions when entering Turkey. The letter “G” is followed by two-digit numbers, signifying specific concerns leading to the red flags on their files.
While the database was initially designed to identify suspected criminals and terrorists, the Erdogan government over the last decade has increasingly abused the monitoring program. This has resulted in the flagrant inclusion of unsuspecting foreigners who have no connection to criminal activities.
In certain instances, foreign journalists critical of the Erdogan government may find themselves on the blacklist. Likewise, ordinary individuals who have posted or liked messages on social media critical of the government may also face refusal of admission, detention and even arrest when attempting to enter Turkey.
The existence of the blacklist has led foreign governments to issue travel advisories, cautioning their citizens about potential problems during trips to Turkey. In 2018 Germany advised its citizens visiting Turkey to exercise extra caution in their social media activity. The current travel advisory issued by the US State Department in July 2023 cautions Americans to “exercise increased caution when traveling to Turkey” due to Turkish authorities detaining tens of thousands of individuals, including US citizens, in politically motivated cases. Criticism of the government, including on social media, is highlighted as a factor that can lead to arrest.
The legal foundation for such a database is ambiguous, as there is no law explicitly authorizing Turkish officials to draw up and maintain the blacklist. According to the Turkish constitution, rights and freedoms can only be restricted by laws.
In 2022 a Swedish national was denied entry to Turkey due to being blacklisted. Identifying information in the document has been redacted by Nordic Monitor:
INAD_document_Swedish_national
The entry ban, distinct from the blacklist, is regulated by Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection and is overseen by the Directorate General of Migration (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü).
The first paragraph of Article 9 of the law states, “The Directorate General of Migration may, when necessary, prohibit the entry of foreigners deemed problematic for Turkey in terms of public order, public security, or public health, by obtaining the opinions of relevant public institutions and organizations.”
However, this provision does not confer upon the directorate the authority to issue restriction codes. Moreover, it is considered inconsistent with the explicit provision of the constitution regarding the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms.
A traveler blacklisted by Turkey is, in the best-case scenario, declared an “Inadmissible Passenger” (INAD) and given a notification referencing Law No. 6458. The carrier they used for their flight would be responsible for returning them to their departure airport. In more serious instances, the traveler may be detained for hours or even days and, in extreme cases, formally arrested, leading to imprisonment in a Turkish jail.
When the blacklist encountered legal challenges in the past, Turkish authorities often referred to several circulars issued by the Security General Directorate (Emniyet). Circulars number 155 and 180, in particular, were frequently cited as legal authority to justify the practice. However, these circulars are not publicly available as they were intended for internal communication among Turkish law enforcement agencies.
In practice, the restriction codes applied by the migration agency are based primarily on information provided by the Emniyet’s Intelligence Directorate and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Other Turkish government agencies also contribute to the list, and Turkish diplomats posted abroad who monitor articles and comments made by foreigners about Turkey also contribute information to the database.
During the tenure of former interior minister Suleyman Soylu, the Turkish police cyber unit established a special team tasked with scanning social media platforms to identify individuals who criticize the Erdogan government. Subsequently, the names of the people flagged by this unit are added to the blacklist, and false charges of association with terrorism are incorporated into their files, despite the absence of any evidence supporting such claims.
Indeed, in 2019, Soylu publicly issued a warning about the potential arrest of foreign nationals visiting Turkey for vacation due to their prior criticism of the Erdogan government.
“In Europe, especially in Germany, there are people who attend meetings of terrorist organizations and then come to [the resort cities of] Antalya, Bodrum and Muğla for vacation. We have taken precautions now. … Let them come, see if they can enter the [country] easily. It’s not so simple. We will detain them and send them back,” Soylu said.
Turkey has been criticized for effectively categorizing legitimate criticism of the government as an act of terror. In numerous cases, individuals are arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned on terrorism charges without any evidence to support these serious allegations. This has raised concerns about the protection of free speech and the fair application of justice in the country.
Sometimes, intelligence information provided to Turkey by a foreign country is used to include names in the database. Interestingly, there have been instances where the Erdogan government quietly intervened to permit the entry of foreign nationals flagged for deportation. This occurred with certain jihadist clerics, Hamas members and Muslim Brotherhood figures whose names were on the list due to intelligence provided by foreign governments.
In an extraordinary case in 2012, Erdogan personally assisted a one-time al-Qaeda financier to enter Turkey, despite a ban on him imposed by a UN Security Council designation, and secretly met with him in Istanbul and Ankara several times. In other words, when it’s convenient, Erdogan has been known to disregard the blacklist.
There have been instances where foreign nationals were denied entry not solely because their names were on the blacklist but rather due to assessments made on the ground by Turkish officials. The Erdogan government formed teams under the name of the Risk Analysis Working Group (Risk-Analiz Çalışma Grubu), deployed to airports and border crossing points under the authority of the governor in designated provinces.
Comprising police and intelligence officers, this group acts based on suspicions rather than concrete information or intelligence when screening foreigners seeking entry into the country. The group has the authority to compile reports and issue recommendations for entry bans for foreigners.
The Erdogan government justified the establishment of the Risk Analysis Working Group as a measure to prevent foreign fighters and terrorists from using Turkey as a transit hub. However, in practice, the broad scope of the group has resulted in the victimization of many foreigners who have no connection to crime or terrorism.
Despite legal challenges leading to Turkish courts overturning decisions by the risk group based purely on opinion and suspicion without supporting material evidence, the practice persists as of the current day.
The frequently invoked codes in the blacklist include G-82, G-87, and G-89. The G-82 code is assigned to foreigners whom Turkish intelligence believes are associated or affiliated with terrorist groups, warranting an entry ban to Turkey. Given the Erdogan government’s tendency to broadly label opponents and critics as terrorists and to abuse counterterrorism measures for political objectives, the blacklist often includes individuals who have merely expressed critical views of the Turkish government in the past.
In several lawsuits filed by victims of the G-82 code, Turkish authorities have declined to present any evidence justifying such classification. They often claim that the intelligence is classified and that the evidence is considered a state secret. This lack of transparency raises concerns about due process and the ability of individuals to challenge their inclusion in the G-82 category.
The G-89 code, initially designed to identify suspected foreign fighters, has also been misused by Turkish authorities to include individuals who have no connection to militancy or any intention of joining terrorist groups involved in conflict, such as those in Syria and Iraq.
The G-87 restriction code is perhaps the most frequently used designation for foreigners, signifying that an individual labeled with this code is deemed to pose a threat to general public safety. The alleged evidence justifying such classification often originates from intelligence sources or the assessment made by the risk group responsible for screening incoming passengers at airports or at border crossing points.
Furthermore, Turkish intelligence utilizes the blacklist as a tool for hostage diplomacy. Certain individuals added to the list are deliberately chosen to provide the Erdogan government with leverage in negotiations with foreign governments. The legal basis for such actions was initially granted to the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in 2014 through an amendment to Law No. 2937 on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization. Although the Constitutional Court annulled the amendment in 2015, the Erdogan government reintroduced the same amendment to parliament in 2018 and got it passed.
The judicial review of the blacklist has not yielded significant relief thus far. Given that the decision to add names to such a list is made by a government agency, challenges in administrative courts have produced mixed results. In certain instances, courts outright rejected challenges, relying on intelligence reports and ruling in favor of the government. Even in cases where courts ruled in favor of the victim, the government did not consistently enforce such rulings, maintaining the names of victims on the blacklist nonetheless.
The number of innocent victims caught up in this blacklist remains unclear. The government has not officially disclosed figures with G classification codes nor has it responded with statistics to petitions filed by NGOs seeking information about the blacklist under the Right to Information law.
Government officials have disclosed some mass figures at various times to indicate the magnitude of the blacklist. In February 2023 then-interior minister Soylu announced that the government had imposed entry bans on 111,000 people from 150 countries. A statement from the foreign ministry, published in February 2020 and later removed, revealed that 61,158 foreigners were added to the blacklist. The Risk Assessment Group reviewed approximately 22,000 foreigners upon their arrival, resulting in more than 6,000 being denied entry.
In the same month the foreign ministry issued its statement, Abdullah Ayaz, the then-director general of the migration administration, provided different figures, stating that 94,000 foreigners of 150 different nationalities were subject to entry bans. It seems the foreign ministry attempted to downplay the figures. In any case, the number on the blacklist has continued to increase every year.
The extensive list of names on the blacklist has given rise to a market within the legal profession, with victims seeking assistance from lawyers to address their issues. A Google search for legal help for those blacklisted yields thousands of results, with a significant number of law firms advertising themselves as a solution for removing names from the government database.
The blacklist serves as a tool in the Erdogan government’s toolbox to perpetuate an intimidation campaign against critics, particularly foreign journalists, activists and human rights defenders. Denying entry or enforcing abrupt deportations, the government has used the blacklist to restrict the reporting activities of foreign journalists on the ground. Over the last decade, numerous foreign journalists have been affected by this practice, facing the repercussions of having their names added to the list. It appears that the blacklist will continue to be maintained by the Erdogan government’s repressive rule for the foreseeable future.
