Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm
A recently obtained classified document has confirmed that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, former chief of the notorious Turkish intelligence agency MIT, wasted little time in orchestrating a swift transformation of the Turkish diplomatic service into an extensive apparatus for collecting information and conducting espionage activities in foreign countries.
The document, stamped secret and dated October 19, 2023, reveals that Turkish diplomats in Canada collected information on a critic of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government and subsequently transmitted the information gathered to headquarters in Ankara.
The top of the document bears the name of the foreign ministry’s Security and Research Directorate, also known as the intelligence section, or Araştırma ve Güvenlik İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü in Turkish. Ayşe Azra Akıncı Kıran, the department head overseeing the intelligence section, signed the document, which was then transmitted to MIT, the Security General Directorate (Emniyet) and the Justice Ministry.
Intelligence was gathered on a 77-year-old, Toronto-based Turkish man named Sadettin Başer, who became the subject of scrutiny after applying at the Turkish consulate in the city on October 11 to obtain credentials for using e-Devlet, the Turkish government’s e-service platform. The platform was established to facilitate citizens’ easy access to online services provided by the state and its banks.
What was intended as a simple and routine administrative service unexpectedly triggered a flurry of activity at the consulate. This led to an investigation into Başer’s background and the subsequent dispatch of a report to headquarters, disclosing his location in Toronto. The ministry’s intelligence branch provided input to the report, sharing the information with other government agencies.
Secret document from the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s intelligence section (redacted by Nordic Monitor to remove identifying and other information):
Toronto_Turkish_consulate_report_Redacted
On October 27 the Security General Directorate transmitted the intelligence from the foreign ministry to various police departments in a confidential letter. The letter, signed by Mustafa Serkan Sabanca, a department head in the Emniyet responsible for external affairs, requested an assessment of the intelligence from the recipients.
Başer, associated with the Gülen movement — a group opposed to the Erdogan government — is a businessman, philanthropist and entrepreneur. He has dedicated years to establishing schools connected to the movement in Russia and Central Asian countries.
The Gülen movement is recognized for its investment in science and education and the advocacy of interfaith and intercultural dialogue on a global scale. Inspired by US-based Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Gülen, the movement stands out as an advocate for these values. Gülen is an outspoken critic of the Turkish president, particularly for alleged widespread corruption in the government and Erdogan’s support for armed jihadist groups in Syria and Libya.
Erdogan has accused the Gülen movement of orchestrating corruption investigations in 2013 that incirminated his inner circle in an Iran-sanctions busting scheme as well as a coup attempt in July 2016 — allegations strongly denied by the movement. To date, the Erdogan government has been unable to provide any evidence linking Gülen to either the graft probes or the failed coup.
The Turkish government’s extradition requests for Gülen since 2015 have failed in the US, where authorities concluded that the case file submitted by Turkey lacked solid evidence linking Gülen to any crime.
The secret report dispatched from the Turkish consulate in Toronto serves as an indication that Fidan is determined to reshape the diplomatic service into an intelligence tool in order to perpetuate the authoritarian regime of President Erdogan. This transformation aims to instill a climate of fear among critics living in exile and exert pressure on Turkish diaspora groups.
Erdogan appears to be concerned that opposition activities in exile may have the potential to spill over into Turkey. Despite his belief in having domestic opposition under control through relentless crackdowns involving wrongful imprisonments, asset seizures and extrajudicial kidnappings and torture, the fear of losing power is driving Erdogan’s campaign to monitor and manage dissent both within and without the country.
The Erdogan government employs the foreign ministry apparatus as one of its tools to intimidate opposition in the diaspora. The appointment of a former spymaster suggests a strategic intent to utilize the diplomatic service not only for traditional diplomatic functions but also to exert pressure and create a chilling effect among exiled Turks abroad, as a means of discouraging dissent and opposition activities beyond the borders of Turkey.
Hence, it came as no surprise that one of Fidan’s initial appointments after assuming leadership of the foreign service on June 4 was the placement of Fatma Ceren Yazgan at the helm of the ministry’s intelligence section. Yazgan, a longtime MIT operative with a history of covert collaboration with Fidan, played a crucial role in profiling Turkish ambassadors and diplomats.
This profiling contributed to the arbitrary purge of more than 30 percent of the entire diplomatic service, resulting in the dismissal of over 700 employees from the foreign ministry. Among those affected was Tuncay Babalı, the former Turkish ambassador to Canada who was subsequently arrested in Turkey on what appear to be unfounded terrorism charges.
Kıran, whose signature appears on the secret document, serves as a deputy to Yazgan.
Fidan has also extended his influence by bringing members of intelligence agency MIT into the foreign ministry, strategically placing them in key positions. For example, Nuh Yılmaz, former press counselor and head of the counterintelligence section at MIT, has been appointed head of the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) within the ministry.
Yılmaz serves as Fidan’s right-hand man, effectively overseeing the ministry on behalf of his boss. With a background in managing agents and informants within traditional Turkish media outlets and online news websites, Yılmaz has been associated with the dissemination of conspiracy theories. His role involves promoting his boss and constructing narratives based on a mix of lies, half-truths and fabrications to advance specific agendas.
Secret communiqué from Turkey’s Security General Directorate on intelligence transmitted from the Turkish consulate in Toronto:
Sadettin_Baser_Turkish_Emniyet_secret_communique
Furthermore, Ümit Ulvi Canik, formerly MİT’s legal counsel, has been appointed to the Directorate General of Legal Services at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Canik was previously involved in a scandal related to the interception of trucks loaded with arms and ammunition in 2014, purportedly destined for al-Qaeda groups in Syria. In that context Canik had represented MIT in various legal cases and played a role in obstructing the search of the trucks.
The appointment of Hacı Ali Özel, formerly a deputy to Fidan, as director general of personnel indicates Fidan’s intention to reshape the ministry according to his own vision. This move suggests a strategic use of the human resources section to bring more loyalists and partisans into the foreign service, potentially at the expense of career diplomats.
Gürsel Dönmez, who has a history of collaboration with Fidan at MIT, has been appointed Fidan’s chief advisor. Dönmez, previously leading the Austrian branch of the Union of International Democrats (UID) and serving as the initial vice president of the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), is recognized for his involvement with diaspora communities in the West — a strategy often utilized by the Turkish intelligence agency for recruitment purposes.
The actions undertaken by Fidan, employing diplomats and consular officers as spies, indeed raise concerns and potentially violate both host country laws and international treaties governing the responsibilities of diplomatic and consular personnel. Such activities could be viewed as running afoul of established norms and regulations. Despite the potential legal and diplomatic ramifications, it appears that the Erdogan government is undeterred by these infractions and continues with its course of action. This disregard for legal and diplomatic constraints may lead to increased tensions with host countries and impact international relations.
Diplomats and consular staff are indeed granted certain privileges and immunities, but these are contingent upon their adherence to the laws and regulations of the host state. The conventions stress the importance of avoiding interference in the internal affairs of the host country, according to Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Additionally, Article 43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations acknowledges the authority of host state authorities to investigate and prosecute consular personnel for any criminal activities, whether occurring inside or outside the consulate premises.
In the last decade the Erdogan government has increasingly relied on intelligence operations to maintain its hold on power. This includes staging false flags such as the 2016 coup attempt and orchestrating questionable criminal cases against critics, using MIT assets as secret witnesses. Furthermore, there are accusations of utilizing intelligence and the foreign service for spying operations abroad, kidnapping critics when possible, bribing foreign officials and exerting pressure on diaspora communities to discourage Turks abroad from expressing their grievances against the Erdogan government.
Under President Erdogan Turkey has garnered notoriety for its widespread and systematic abuse of the criminal justice system and manipulation of criminal procedures to suppress critical voices, quell dissent and intimidate the opposition. Authorities in Turkey are often quick to label opponents of the current regime as terrorists. Partisan prosecutors have been accused of fabricating evidence to construct spurious cases against individuals who have no connection to terrorism or any criminal activity.
